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A. Introduction 
 
A.1. The Burden of Crime 
Having spent a few years of my life in Latin American countries, I have directly experienced 
what it is like to live in an insecure environment and under the constant fear of becoming the 
victim of a crime. Especially in Venezuela, crime and violent crime rates are high, which is 
tangible in everyday life: Whenever in public, you always have to pay attention to your 
surroundings; identify potential threats and get inside a private space as soon as possible. After 
darkness, it gets too dangerous to even go outside. In Caracas, world’s most violent city, people 
are living in a constant fear of robbery, assault, or even kidnapping. They are trying to spent the 
least amount of time in public spaces and leave their house only to get to work and to the 
supermarket. At night, you can hear gunshots throughout the streets; in the morning, you can 
often find blood on the walkways just outside where you were sleeping. While there is no official 
data, experts estimate that in a typical weekend, around 40 people are killed in Caracas alone 
(OSAC 2016). 
These problems of high crime rates and personal insecurity are not limited to Venezuela 
or the Latin American continent but present in many parts of the world, and they are negatively 
affecting the quality of life of entire societies. Being the victim of a (violent) crime can have 
detrimental impacts on parenting skills, occupational functioning and intimate relationships 
(Hanson et al. 2010). If a family member or friend is the victim of a crime, people experience 
grief and pain. But even if the individual is not a direct victim of a crime, living in circumstances 
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of high crime incidence and insecurity can have negative consequences. Living in a context of 
constant threat of crime and violence is nerve-wracking, exhausting and detrimental for human 
well-being. The fear of crime is a major social problem and its impacts range from detrimental 
psychological changes to suboptimal reactions and behavioral adaptations (Doran and Burgess 
2012). The sheer fear of crime can erode social capital by disrupting neighborhood cohesion, 
creating interpersonal distrust and breaking down social relations and attachment (Doran and 
Burgess 2012, Spelman 2004, Ross and Mirowski 2000). Many of these phenomena are 
consequences of the protective and avoidance behaviors that people adopt when confronted with 
high crime rates and insecurity. 
Apart from these intangible, personal costs, crime and insecurity also have direct 
measurable costs for the entire economy. A significant part of resources is spent on preventive 
measures and precautions, that could otherwise be used to generate additional income and 
welfare. Direct expenses to prevent and clear up criminal incidents are for example used for 
police protection, correction and prosecution. Further costs arise due to the losses and medical 
treatment of the victims, crime prevention and deterrence measures (Anderson 1999). For the 
case of the US, the aggregate burden of crime is estimated to around 11.9% of GDP, or an annual 
$ 4,118 per capita (Anderson 1999). In Latin America, the cost of crime is even higher: Londoño 
and Guerrero (1999) estimated the social cost of only the violent crimes to be as high as 14.3% of 
GDP on average in Latin American countries. In some countries, such as El Salvador, costs of 
violence account for even a quarter of annual GDP. 
According to Detotto and Otranto (2010) however, these sums still considerably 
understate the total impact of crime on society, since they do not account for the detrimental 
effect crime has even on the legal economic activity. The environment of uncertainty and 
inefficiency created by high crime rates discourages investments and reduces the competitiveness 
  3 
of firms, consequently slowing down overall economic growth and imposing an even higher cost 
on the entire population (Detotto and Otranto 2010). Goulas and Zervoyianni (2012) show that in 
uncertain environments, a 10% increase in crime can reduce annual GDP per capita growth by up 
to 0.62 %.  
Given these figures, it is evident that crime has the potential to paralyze the way of life 
and development of entire countries. In order to act against it, scholars and politicians have been 
attempting to identify the main drivers of crime for decades – with mixed results. Due to my own 
experience with high crime rates and insecurity and knowing about the detrimental impact on 
society, I dedicated my thesis to the research on violent crime and its determinants to add 
valuable insights to the existing literature. This thesis examines the determinants of violent crime 
in certain contexts and by taking a look at the interaction of violent crime and punishment. It 
looks at violent crime because it is the more severe form of crime incidence. An overview of the 
definitions and theories used in this context in the following subchapter will set the basis for the 
subsequent analysis.  
A.2. Violent Crime – Definition, Theories and Measurement 
Crime can be divided into two main forms: property crimes and violent crimes1. Property crime 
includes burglary, larceny, theft and arson; hence all the forms of crime that do not intend, threat 
or use physical violence against the person and have the object of taking money or property (US 
Department of Justice 2016). Violent crime includes homicide, manslaughter, aggravated and 
simple assault, rape, sexual assault and robbery. These offenses involve the use or the threat of 
force. Among the violent crimes, there are two different types of violence involved: While some 
                                                
1 In criminology, two more forms of crime are to be distinguished, namely the white-collar crime and organized 
crime.  
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of the offenders want to harm the victim (e.g. assault, homicide), others do not care (e.g. robbery, 
rape) (Felson 2009).  
Violence is defined by the WHO as “the intentional use of physical force or power, 
threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which 
either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation” (WHO 2002, p. 5). Violence also appears in two main forms: 
collective violence, such as interstate wars and civil wars, and interpersonal violence, mostly 
between unorganized individuals, such as homicide (WHO 2002).  
 
Figure A.1: Crime and Violence 
 
 
Violent crime is situated in the intersection between crime and violence (see Figure A.1). 
Crime involves the breaking of rules, while violence is the “intentional harm-doing using 
physical means” (Felson 2009, p.24). Some violent acts are not crimes, which are for example 
violence in self-defense, violence exerted by government institutions such as police force or 
executions on death row in certain jurisdictions, and violence during war time. Since violent 
Civil War 
Interstate War 
Conflict 
Homicide 
Theft 
Burglary 
Larceny Manslaughter 
Arson 
Rape 
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  5 
crime has a more severe impact on society than property crime, this thesis focuses on the 
determinants and interactions of violent crime. 
Crime has always been present in human societies, and scholars have been attempting to 
explain the reasons behind crime occurrence for centuries. After the beginning of the 20th 
century, scholars from the disciplines of sociology and psychology started to study crime as a 
mainly psychological problem: Until the late 1960s, scholars were convinced that individuals that 
engage in criminal behavior are fundamentally different from “normal”, law abiding people 
(Cook et al. 2013). Delinquents, especially killers, were assumed to be “vicious, depraved or 
psychologically disturbed individual[s]” (Cook and Laub 2002, p. 14). An increase in criminal 
activity was therefore associated with an especially high prevalence of this anomalous type of 
human being (Cook and Laub 2001).  
The economist Gary Becker revolutionized this notion of crime in 1968 by moving the 
focus away from the individual and towards contextual factors such as the social, economic and 
political environment that can impact crime incidence. He developed an economic rational choice 
model of crime that showed that a criminal activity can be a rationally optimal decision, 
depending on the individual’s preferences and the expected utility of crime. The utility is 
determined by the return of the crime, the probability and severity of punishment as well as 
opportunity costs such as foregone income, hence the contextual factors in the society (Becker 
1968). Even though the preferences of potential criminals might be different from non-offenders, 
both groups equally react rationally to changing incentives. This notion had important 
implications for crime-prevention policies. One consequence is the possibility of deterrence: By 
increasing the severity or the probability of the punishment, the expected utility of crime is 
reduced and hence might be lower than the expected utility of legal options (Cook et al. 2013). 
Secondly, by altering the opportunity costs, for example by increasing the legal earning 
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opportunities, it should be possible to divert potential delinquents from criminal behavior. 
Apart from the economic theory of crime, other disciplines such as biology, sociology and 
criminology have developed new theories and explanations since the 1960s. Especially in the 
field of violent crime, these disciplines can offer a valuable amendment to the rational choice 
theory. Biology and psychology can explain violent and criminal behavior with genetic 
preconditions that result in impulsive behavior, attention deficit or lower levels of self-control, or 
with psychological disorders (Marsh and Melville 2006). While these explanations are helpful in 
the singular, individual case, they cannot explain why some societies are more violent than 
others. Sociological theories focus on the social circumstances that are conducive to criminal 
behavior. The strain theory by Robert Merton (1968) assumes that social blocks and obstacles 
make it impossible for some individuals to achieve the culturally defined goals (for example 
wealth), which creates strain and pushes these individuals into using illegal methods in order to 
succeed. The social disorganization theory refers to the inability of a community to maintain 
effective social controls due to residential instability and ethnic heterogeneity (Shaw and McKay 
1942). 
Finally, there are two theories that describe the development of crime over time or over 
the course of economic development. The modernization theory states that a transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial and the related division of labor weakens solidarity and the social 
norms that stabilized the society before the transition (Shelley 1981). After an initial upswing, 
crime is then expected to decline again. One of the most famous theories on crime and violence is 
the hypothesis of the civilizing process, first established by the German sociologist Norbert Elias 
in the 1930s and further developed by Eisner (2001) and Pinker (2011). These scholars assume 
that humanity is experiencing a dramatic change of the nature of human interaction regarding 
violence, sexual behavior and manners. The more sophisticated the division of labor becomes, the 
  7 
more dependent individuals are on each other, which makes it necessary to establish common 
rules, coordinate actions and adopt self-control. Physical force is monopolized by the 
government, resulting in a long term decrease of crime and violence. This theory might explain 
the long-term decline in violence experienced in Europe: A tenfold to fiftyfold decrease in 
homicide rates between the middle ages and 1900 (Pinker 2011). However, it cannot explain 
short term fluctuations in crime. All the mentioned theories of crime are summarized in Table 
A.1.  
 
Table A.1: Overview Theories of Crime 
 
Theory Determining Factors 
 
Economic Theory 
 
Expected Utility of Crime 
 
Biological and Psychological Theories 
 
Genes, Psychological Disorders 
 
Sociological Theories 
 
Strain Theory Inequality, Social Barriers 
Social Disorganization 
 
Ethnic Heterogeneity, Residential Instability 
 
 
Theories Describing the Development of Crime over Time 
 
Modernization Theory Crime increases with Industrialization 
Civilizing Process 
 
Crime decreases in the Long-Run 
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The research presented in this thesis contributes to the explorations of long-term trends in 
violent crime using one of the most prominent and widely used indicators: homicide rates. 
Homicide is considered one of the most serious crimes since it involves the taking of a human 
life. Due to its severity and because the definition of homicide is relatively stable and 
unequivocal across cultures and time, homicide data are more accurate than those for other 
crimes such as robbery or rape (see van Zanden et al. 2014 and chapters B.2.2 and C.3.1 for more 
details). After this introduction to the concepts of crime, violence and violent crime and an 
overview over the existing theories, the following subchapter will introduce the structure of the 
thesis at hand. 
A.3. Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises three chapters, of which some are intended for publication. Therefore, I 
refer to the chapters as papers or studies. Together, the studies aim to add to the literature on the 
determinants of crime and the interrelationship of crime with a potential determinant, the capital 
punishment.  
The first aim of the studies is to identify determinants of crime by looking at specific 
contexts in which crime rates have been observed to be especially high. The first paper of the 
thesis presents a case study on the country of Mexico, a country that is notorious for its high 
prevalence of violence and crime. Especially in recent years Mexico has caught the attention of 
the international public due to its spectacular increase in murder rates. The paper reconstructs the 
development of crime back until the beginning of the 20th century and then examines the driving 
forces behind this development. While looking at some of the general determinants that have 
been identified in a global framework as drivers of crime, the study also looks at factors that are 
specific to the Mexican case. 
  9 
The second chapter, the result of a cooperation with my supervisor, Jörg Baten, shifts the 
focus away from the single country-case towards a worldwide perspective. Using a newly 
assembled global data set, the paper takes a look at the impact of valuable natural resources, a 
factor that has been known to increase the risk of collective violence such as interstate war and 
civil conflict. The paper shows that the presence of valuable silver resources can also be a main 
driver of violent crime, by altering the incentives in an economy. 
Deterrence is the hypothesis that the threat of a severe punishment can decrease the 
expected utility of a crime substantially, which results in fewer crimes. While often used as anti-
crime measure, the efficacy of deterrence has not been proven reliably. One fact that complicates 
the matter is that the relationship between crime and punishment is not clear-cut. Societies might 
react to changes in crime rates and adjust punishment accordingly, hence there is the potential of 
reverse causation. With the newly assembled data set and hand it was possible to model the 
complex interactions between homicide rates and the capital punishment and to test the 
deterrence hypothesis as well as the hypothesis that crime levels determine the severity of 
punishment. Finally, the concluding remarks in chapter E. summarize the joint findings of the 
studies and give an outlook on future research and potential policy implications. 
  
A. Introduction 
 10 
A.4. References 
Anderson, D. A. (1999). The Aggregate Burden of Crime. The Journal of Law and Economics, 42(2), 611–642.  
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 
169–217. 
Cook, P. J., Machin, S., Marie, O., & Mastrobuoni, G. (2013). Crime economics in its fifth decade. Lessons 
from the Economics of Crime: What Reduces Offending.  
Cook, Philip J., & Laub, J. H. (2002). After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth Violence in the United 
States. Crime and Justice, 29, 1–37. 
Detotto, C., & Otranto, E. (2010). Does Crime Affect Economic Growth? Kyklos, 63(3), 330–345. 
Doran, B. J., & Burgess, M. B. (2012). Putting Fear of Crime on the Map: Investigating Perceptions of Crime 
Using Geographic Information Systems. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Eisner, M. (2001). Modernization, self-control and lethal violence. The long-term dynamics of European 
homicide rates in theoretical perspective. British Journal of Criminology, 41(4), 618–638. 
Felson, R. B. (2009). Violence, Crime, and Violent Crime. International Journal of Conflict and Violence 
(IJCV), 3(1), 23–39. 
Goulas, E., & Zervoyianni, A. (2012). Economic growth and crime: does uncertainty matter? Applied 
Economics Letters, 20(5), 420–427. 
Hanson, R. F., Sawyer, G. K., Begle, A. M., & Hubel, G. S. (2010). The Impact of Crime Victimization on 
Quality of Life. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 23(2), 189–197.  
Londoño, J. L., & Guerrero, R. (1999). Violencia en América Latina: Epidemiología y Costos (Research 
Department Publications No. 3074). Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. 
Marsh, I., & Melville, G. (2006). Theories of Crime. Routledge. 
Merton, R. K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure. Simon and Schuster. 
Moatsos, M., Baten, J., Foldvari, P., Leeuwen, B. van, & Zanden, J. L. van. (2014). Income inequality since 
1820, 199–215. 
OSAC. (2016). Venezuela 2016 Crime & Safety Report. OSAC United Nations Department of State. Retrieved 
from https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19065 
  11 
Pinker, S. (2011). The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined. New York: Viking. 
Ross, C. E., & Mirowsky, J. (1999). Disorder and Decay: The Concept and Measurement of Perceived 
Neighborhood Disorder. Urban Affairs Review, 34(3), 412–432.  
Shaw, C. R., & McKay, H. D. (1942). Juvenile delinquency and urban areas : a study of rates of delinquents in 
relation to differential characteristics of local communities in American cities. Chicago, Ill. : The 
University of Chicago Press.  
Shelley, L. I. (1981). Crime and modernization : the impact of industrialization and urbanization on crime /. 
Carbondale : Southern Illinois University Press,. 
Spelman, W. (2004). Optimal Targeting of Incivility-Reduction Strategies. Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology, 20(1), 63–88. 
US Department of Justice. (2016). Uniform Crime Report. Federbal Buerau of Investigation. Retrieved from 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/property-crime 
van Zanden, J. L., Baten, J., d’Ercole, M., & Rijpma, A. (2014). How Was Life? - Global Well-being since 
1820. OECD. 
WHO. (2002). World report on violence and health. World Health Organization. Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/ 
 
 
  12 
 
 
 
  13 
 
 
B. Explaining the Great Decline of Homicide Rates in 20th Century Mexico 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the last decade, Mexico has gained notoriety for being extraordinarily violent. Since the 
alarming increase of homicide rates after the launch of the “war on drugs” in 2008, the Mexican 
case has received broad international media coverage as well as the attention of scholars, 
attempting to explain this unexpected development. Meanwhile, the origins of Mexican violence 
and the previous development of homicide rates remain largely unexplored. This paper has the 
goal to shed light on Mexico’s past by reconstructing the homicide rates back until the 1930s. 
The data, compiled using information from statistical yearbooks of the National Archive, reveals 
an impressive decrease in violence levels from over 60 homicides per 100,000 in the 1930s to 
less than 10 in the year 2000. What caused this sustained decrease in violent crime? While the 
rapid economic growth during the Mexican Miracle, improved schooling and institutional quality 
certainly contributed to this development, they cannot explain it entirely. Other, less apparent 
factors must play a role and they are probably unique to the Mexican case. Did the improvement 
in the Mexican justice system deter crime? Or did the abolition of the death penalty lead to a less 
violent society? Did even the Pulque, the traditional Mexican alcohol beverage, have an impact? 
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B.1. Introduction 
On the 13th of July of 1930, Luciano González Medina was drinking Pulque, the traditional 
Mexican alcoholic beverage in a bar in the center of Mexico City. After a disagreement, he ended 
up killing one of his companions with a pocket knife in the street just outside the bar. He was 
arrested by the police and sentenced to a six-year prison sentence (Cetina 2016). This case is 
nothing extraordinary, but rather typical for the Mexican society in the 1930s. According to 
Cetina (2016), violence in the public space was a day-to-day phenomenon. It characterized the 
entire Mexican history, at least until 1940, not only in the form of political violence and 
assassinations of political candidates, but also in generally high crime rates (Knight 1997). In 
most of the reports, the delinquents are reported to have been under the influence of alcohol, and 
many even claimed not to remember anything about the crime they committed due to their 
intoxicated state. Pulque, the traditional Mexican beverage that is made from the fermented sap 
of the agave, is mentioned especially often. Already in historical reports2 authors complained 
about the detrimental impact of Pulque consumption on society, however, little is known about 
Mexico’s experience with violence, and if factors like the Pulque consumption had an impact. 
Even after the outbreak of the “drug war” in the past decade, while Mexico has caught the 
attention of international media as well as the interest of scholars scrutinizing the recent events, 
hardly anyone has looked at Mexico’s past. Apart from descriptive reports, crime data for Mexico 
for the period before 1990 had not been available.  
This paper aims to fill this existing gap by shedding some light on the historic 
development of Mexico’s crime rates. The first part of the paper presents recently collected data 
on homicide rates in Mexico and the data reveals that the recent outbreak of violence was 
                                                
2 Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal, 
Expediente 343700.  
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preceded by an almost century-long decline. Up until the 2000s, crime rates have been steadily 
falling and Mexico seemed to be on a path towards political stability, low crime rates and 
sustained economic growth. The second part of the paper is dedicated to identifying the driving 
forces behind this century-long reduction in crime rates. After a review of the theoretical 
explanations that might potentially explain the striking decrease in violence, empirical tests are 
used to test the significance of single determinants. While the experience of rapid economic 
growth and improved education certainly impacted the development of the homicide rates, there 
must be additional factors. One possibility is the improved justice and police system, that might 
have had a deterrent effect on crime. Maybe even the Pulque, the alcoholic beverage mentioned 
often in the context of homicides did play a role in determining Mexico’s crime rate.  
The motivation behind understanding the underlying dynamics of crime is evident, since 
personal security is an important component of well-being (van Zanden et al. 2014). The 
detrimental impact of crime and violence on society has been well documented and seems to be 
especially high in the Latin American region (see for example Prillaman 2003/ van Zanden et al. 
2014 for an overview). The negative consequences of crime and violence start with the intangible 
personal costs like the constant fear and strain experienced when living in an unsecure 
environment, followed by the grief and pain experienced after the loss of a family member or 
friend. On a macroeconomic level, high crime rates cause measurable direct costs: the expenses 
on prevention and deterrence like police work, correction and prosecution as well as the medical 
treatment of the victims (Anderson 1999). However, the costs of crime are not limited to these 
direct costs, since crime also has a detrimental effect even on the (legal) economic sector. 
Uncertainty and inefficiency created by high crime rates deter investment activity, tourism and 
reduce the competitiveness of local businesses, reducing overall economic activity (Detotto and 
Otranto 2010). Londoño and Guerrero (1999, p. 26) estimate that in the time from 1980 until 
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1995, the social costs of only the violent crimes were as high as 12.3 % of GDP in Mexico. 
B.2. The Data Set: Crime in 20th Century Mexico 
All throughout the 20th century, Mexico experienced what seemed to be an exemplary 
development towards macroeconomic stability and political order. After being torn apart by a 
violent revolution, the entire structure of the economy was changed by political and social 
reforms and direct economic forces (Reynolds 1970). Over the course of the century, “the 
national market has been unified, a third of the population has moved to the cities, the level of 
living has quadrupled and the economy […] achieved[d] one of the most rapid rates of growth in 
the hemisphere” (Reynolds 1970, p. 20). Up to now, little had been known about how the crime 
rates in Mexico responded to this “Mexican Miracle”. While the homicide rate development of 
the recent decades after 2000 has received broad media coverage, the past remained unexplored. 
The newly collected data set at hand enables us to look for the first time at the long-term 
development of Mexican homicide rates, and it reveals that during the 20th century, the country 
experienced an impressive decline in violent crime rates: from 60 murders per 100,000 
inhabitants in 1930 to less than 10 in 2000. The US murder rate was reduced in the same period 
by only 3, from 9 to 6 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2015). Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
compare the reduction of crime to the experience of other Latin American countries, since there 
is no data available before 1960. 
This section will give an overview over the Mexican historical political and economic 
context in which this striking fall of violence occurred. A short introduction of the concepts and 
definitions used to measure violent crime follows, before the data set is presented in descriptive 
statistics. 
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B.2.1. Historical Background Mexico 
The time period covered in this study stretches from the end of the Mexican Revolution in up to 
the late 1980s. The Mexican Revolution started in 1910, ending the rule of Porfirio Díaz, who 
had been in power since 1877. His autocratic style government enforced law, order and discipline 
with a centralized system: It suppressed all kinds of violence and crime, using both the military 
and the federal police (Miller 1985). Under his rule, Mexico improved its infrastructure and Díaz 
encouraged the modernization of the economy as well as foreign investment in the country. 
In 1910, oppositional groups led by Francisco Madero violently overthrew the Díaz 
regime. This revolution was followed by a ten-year civil war in which around 2 million Mexicans 
died. In 1917, a new constitution was established, weakening the property rights that had before 
been protected under Díaz and expropriations were not uncommon (Miller 1985). After the 
governance of two different presidents between 1920 and 1929, the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) was elected and remained in power until the year 2000 - during the entire 
period covered by this study (1930-1990). Even though the PRI was always elected and reelected 
in regular and free elections, the fact that one single party ruled the country during 70 years 
illustrates that Mexico cannot be characterized a fully democratized country during this period 
(Beer 2005, Greene 2007). The PRI was very powerful: it “held the majority in Congress until 
1997, won every governorship until 1989 and controlled the vast majority of municipalities” 
(Greene 2007, p. 1). This one-party rule favored the emergence of close links between the 
government and criminal organizations and corruption was commonplace. 
Economically, Mexico experienced a period of sustained economic growth and expansion 
after the revolution. During World War II, Mexico was a strong ally of the United States and 
provided metals as well as guest workers. This strengthened Mexico economically, establishing 
wealth and political stability throughout the country. The subsequent rapid economic progress has 
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been titled the “Mexican Miracle” (Reynolds 1970). The PRI promoted a strategy mainly based 
on import substitution, oil exports and state-owned industrial companies. The population grew 
rapidly and urbanization advanced, the middle class almost doubled between 1940 and 1980 
(Miller 1985). When oil prices fell in the 1980s, the country experienced a debt crisis that was 
counteracted by privatization of the economy and a renewed inflow of foreign investment. Today, 
Mexico’s most important export source are the assembling plants known as maquiladoras that 
have been introduced by foreign investors in the 1980s. Beforehand, Mexico’s most important 
income source had been agriculture, cultivating mainly wheat, soybeans, rice, beans, cotton, 
coffee, fruit, sugar, and tomatoes. Livestock farming was also prevalent. Mining, the extraction of 
minerals including silver, copper, gold, lead, zinc, and natural gas was an important factor as well 
(Miller 1985). In the 1990s, Mexico experienced another economic crisis with the collapse of the 
peso. In 2000 Vicente Fox was elected president and Mexico experienced the first democratic 
transition to a president from a different party after a 70-year rule of the PRI.  
A summary of Mexico’s historic development would be incomplete without mentioning 
drug trafficking and corruption. Crime, drugs and corruption have a long standing and 
intertwined history in Mexico (Morris 2012). According to Lupsha (1991, p. 41) it is “impossible 
to identify a beginning date for corruption in Mexico, for it is as eternal as the Aztec sun”. From 
the beginning of the 20th century, Mexico was a country of contraband of semi-legal products 
such as patent drugs, alcohol and marihuana flowing north from the Central American countries. 
During the prohibition between 1919 and 1933 in the US, Mexico was the main supplier of illicit 
alcohol (Watt 2012); smuggling routes were established and illegal contraband organizations 
were formed.  
After the Mexican revolution, the central government was worried about turmoil and 
instability in the regions and therefore gave the states quasi-autonomous powers to deal with this 
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threat on their own. Especially the northern states were cut-off from the central government, 
allowing their governors to abuse their position to make a fortune from prostitution, gambling 
and smuggling contraband to the US. The US Border Patrol was installed in 1924, but it resulted 
impossible to efficiently police the massive border that cuts through mainly remote terrain 
between Mexico and the US (Watt 2012). Smugglers benefited from the corruption within the 
police force and the political system and used the vast number of poor citizens with no legal 
alternatives as cheap labor force. Corruption was already a socially perceived problem in the 
1940s, which led Mexican presidents to promote “anti-corruption campaigns”, making the public 
believe that corruption is an “individual problem of certain officials rather than a systematic 
problem” (Morris 1991, p. 78). Under this shield of public deception, organized crime 
collaborated with officials ever since the beginning of the century. 
Opium poppy was introduced to Mexico in the 1930s. The Mexican favorable mild 
climate, allows farmers to get two harvests per year instead of one which makes opium poppy 
cultivation a very profitable alternative, especially compared to legal crops. Nevertheless, up until 
the 1970s, Mexico was mainly a transit country for Colombian cocaine. Several families from 
Sinaloa engaged in moving the large amounts of cocaine they received from Colombian and other 
Central American traffickers to the US. Culiacan, a city in the state of Sinaloa, became the capital 
of the Mexican drug trade. The famous Sinaloa Cartel and its head Felix Gallardo were based in 
the city. Later, due to conflicts with the state, the activities were shifted to Guadalajara in Jalisco 
(Osorno 2011). The Colombian Cartels continued to be in control of the drug trade until 1981, 
when Reagan became president of the US and started a major crack-down in Florida, the 
Caribbean and Colombia. While the international community was focusing on the Colombian 
Cartels, the Mexican drug traffickers seized the opportunity (Quince and Phillips, 2014) and took 
control of the Inter-American cocaine and heroin market. After this transition, heroin was still 
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produced in Colombia, however, now Mexican Cartels were in control, organized transport and 
sales and reaped the profits. The high profitability of the drug trade increased the ability of the 
Mexican drug cartels to buy protection from the state as well as weapons, technique and training 
(Piccato 2012). Today, Mexico is said to be the world’s second largest opium poppy producer 
after Afghanistan, and the primary supplier of heroin to the United States (Office of National 
Drug Policy, 2015). The presence of illegal drug business is inevitably connected to the presence 
of violent crime. In illegal sectors, there is no enforcement of laws or property rights by 
governmental institutions, hence violence is used as a substitute. The following section 
introduces the topic of violent crime, the definitions and concepts related as well as the variables 
used to measure violent crime in this study. 
B.2.2. Crime: Forms and Measurement 
Crime has been present across all cultures and periods of human history and almost every person 
is victim of a bigger or smaller offense at least once in life. Crime appears in a variety of forms 
that can be divided into two major categories: offenses against the person, also known as violent 
crime, (homicide, assault, robbery, kidnapping or sexual assault) and offenses against property 
(theft, robbery, burglary, fraud, forgery, etc.). 
Regarding the social cost of crimes, violent crime has the most detrimental overall impact 
on society (Prillaman 2003). It does not only slow down economic development but also 
undermines the strength and credibility of democracy and its institutions. When violent crime 
rates are extraordinarily high, voters turn to extremist and populist candidates that promise a 
“hard hand” against crime. Many times, these anti-crime strategies also involve the military (as in 
the case of Mexico’s recent drug war) and citizens might engage in vigilante justice and mob 
lynching, which weakens the monopoly on the use of force by the state. In many Latin American 
countries, private security forces outnumber the police force (Prillaman 2003). Jointly, these 
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factors lead to the fading of public faith in democratic institutions, courts and the police force and 
ultimately weaken democracy. 
In the literature, homicide rates are the most prevalent proxy of violent crime or even of 
overall crime rates (Neapolitan 1997, Nivette 2011, Fajnzylber et al. 2002). A homicide is 
defined as “unlawful death deliberately inflicted on one person by another person” (OECD, 2011) 
per 100,000 people. This study also uses homicide rates as proxy for violent crime in Mexico.  
Data on crime of “notoriously poor” quality, since crime is inherently clandestine and 
difficult to measure (Prillaman 2003, p. 4). The biggest drawback is the problem of 
underreporting (Fajnzylber et al. 2000). The victim might not report the crime, which happens 
mostly in the case of minor offenses or in cases of domestic violence and rape. A change in a 
crime rate could always reflect a change in the information-gathering technique, the reporting 
behavior of the society, corruption or the way crime records are aggregated. Another source of 
bias is that government agencies or police officials especially in less democratic countries tend to 
artificially lower crime rates to mask their inability to cope with crime. 
Homicide rates, however, are least affected by underreporting and measurement error: 
First, the definition of murder is very clear cut and stable over time and across cultures and legal 
systems, which is especially important in studies including a variety of countries or a large time 
horizon (van Zanden et al. 2014). Since the scope of this study is Mexican regions, definitions of 
homicide do not vary substantially across observational units. Secondly, homicides are drastic 
events that are most likely reported and recorded. Soares (2004) finds that underreporting is 
severe for property crimes and for crimes with social stigma such as rape. In the case of homicide 
however, measurement error is not substantial (Levitt 1995b). These factors make homicide rates 
a superior crime indicator that is less affected by measurement error than other crime indicators 
(OECD 2011, Neapolitan 1997, Fajnzylber et al. 2000, Fox and Zawitz 2000). 
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Secondly, the data used was assembled by health authorities that obtained the information 
from hospitals and morticians. The authors of these sources were physicians and medics or 
undertakers that were concerned about the sanitary causes of death such as infectious diseases. 
Hence, they had no direct incentive to artificially reduce crime rates, as would for example police 
officials, politicians or personnel of the judicial branch. Van Zanden et al. (2014) confirm that 
health statistics are a lot less likely to underestimate the actual number of homicides than for 
example criminal records and police statistics. Using data from health authorities further reduces 
the probability of underreporting. 
Another advantage of this analysis is the fact that the scope of the data is limited to the 
Mexican regions and the focus is on the variation between the states and over time, not the level 
of the homicide rates. Within this extent, reporting behavior can be assumed to be similar across 
states and constant over time. The portion of the reporting bias that stable over time in one state is 
captured by the state fixed effect introduced in the empirical analysis. Even though single, 
specific numbers might not be flawless, the analysis of trends and changes is possible without the 
risk of severe bias. 
B.2.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Up to now, historical data on crime in Mexico went back only until 1990, except for homicide 
data on the Federal District that was presented by Piccato (2013). The data used in this section is 
completely new and reveals the overall development of the homicide rate in Mexico over the 
course of the 20th century for each of the 32 Mexican regions for the years between 1930 and 
1988. The data set was compiled using statistical yearbooks found in the Archive of the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) in Mexico City (see appendix B.9.1 for further 
details on the data sources). 
Figure B.1 presents the annual homicide rate for Mexico from 1935 until 2005. The 
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massive decline from a very high level of more than 60 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 
1935 to around 15 in the 1970s is striking. This consistent, downward trend of at least 30 years 
coincides with the period of political stability and economic growth that began in the 1940s, 
triggered by the increased foreign demand for Mexican exports during World War II. In the 
1970s, the homicide rate stabilizes at a level of around 17 to 20 homicides per 100,000 until 
around 1990. During this period, the economic growth in Mexico slowed down. After 1990 the 
homicide rates experience another drop that lasts for around 15 years, until 2005. The recent 
increase of homicide rates in the 2010 during Mexico’s drug war is not part of this study, and 
therefore not pictured in this graph. To sum up, the development can be divided into three phases: 
A 30-year sustained decline from the 1930s until the 1970s, a period of stabilization between 
1970 and 1990, followed by another drop after that. Since the development of homicide rates 
mirrors the economic situation of the country, one could jump to the conclusion that the 
improvement of the overall living conditions reduced the incentives to commit violent crime. 
This is one of the hypothesis that will be empirically tested in the subsequent analysis. 
Looking at the development of the homicide rates in the single states shows that most of 
the 32 states mirror the trend visible for entire Mexico. They experience a long and sustained 
decrease over the first 30 years, with homicide rates moving almost parallel. This suggests that 
important factors on the national level affected the homicide rates in all the states, a fact that 
needs to be taken into account when estimating an empirical econometric model. After the 1970s, 
the homicide rate stabilizes or increases again. 
Some exceptions to this general rule are for example the two parts of Baja California 
(North and South), where the homicide rates follow a different pattern (Figure B.2). In the 
Northern part, the homicide rate drops already at the beginning of the period and then remains 
relatively stable over time until increasing again in the 1980s. In the Southern part, the overall 
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level does not change over time. In Aguascalientes (Figure B.3), the homicide rate does not 
follow a decreasing trend but rather remains on one level from 1940 to 1960, then drops rapidly 
to a lower level. 
Some states that display an especially high homicide rate are Colima and Morelos, two of 
the smallest states both in terms of area and population. In both states, homicide rates started on a 
very high level in the 1930s (well over 100 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), but then rapidly 
decreased and reached the level of the rest of Mexico in the 1970s (Figure B.4). This particular 
pattern could partly be caused by measurement error in the earlier periods, since in these states 
with a very small population, a small overstatement of the absolute number of homicides results 
in a very high value of the homicide rate. Other states that display a persistently high homicide 
rate are Guerrero, Michoacán and Oaxaca (Figure B.5). These three pacific states also represent 
the states with the highest mean homicide rate in the period contemplated, and they are some of 
the states with the lowest income levels. Even though the level of the homicide is higher than in 
the rest of Mexico throughout, they follow a similar pattern of decrease until 1970 followed by a 
stable phase until 1990 and another decline.  
For Mexico City, the longest time period of homicide rate data is available. There are 
some data points for the 1880s, displaying a level between 20 and 30 homicide rates per 100,000. 
In the 1920s, the homicide rate then increased slightly, however fell back to the previous level by 
1930. After another wave of increase violence, the homicide rate in the Federal district enters a 
sustained decline until the end of the 1970s, when it starts increase again. On average, the 
homicide rate in the capital is not higher than in the remaining states, as is for example in other 
Latin American countries such as Venezuela or Colombia.  
Figure B.7 presents the average homicide rates per state in the period from 1930 to 1990. 
Surprisingly, the northern states that have direct contact to the US-border (Baja California Norte, 
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Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas) and are the focus of the smuggling 
and drug trafficking business, experienced on average a very low homicide rate during the 
contemplated period (less than 20 homicides per 100,000). The same can be observed for the 
southern periphery (Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán and Quintana Roo). 
While the smuggling and trafficking takes place in the states neighboring the US, the 
production of the drugs is said to be situated in the so called “Golden Triangle” formed by the 
sates of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua (Vinson 2009). These three states are known to be the 
major heroin and marijuana producers today; however, these states did not experience 
extraordinarily high homicide rates during the 20th century.  
Comparing the development of the homicide rates in the Golden Triangle to the rest of 
Mexico (Figure B.8), it is evident that for the most part of the century, the developments are 
parallel and not too different in levels. In the “Golden Triangle” states, the homicide rate started 
on a higher level in the 1940s, decreased rapidly and then stayed below the level of the rest of 
Mexico up until 1960. Afterwards, the homicide rate in the Golden Triangle states experiences 
several waves of short increases and decreases, while the rate in the rest of Mexico remains 
stable. This development coincides with the rise of the Sinaloa cartel in the 1970s and the start of 
the drug business in the Triangle states. At the end of the 70s, due to the antidrug campaign, 
activity of drug cartels was slightly suppressed; they recovered however in the 1980s. The 
development of the homicide rates seems to mirror the activity level of the drug cartels and the 
counter-activities of the government. 
Figure B.9 to Figure B.12 plot the temporal development of the homicide rates. While in 
1930, a high homicide rate (>40 homicides per 100,000) was prevalent in almost all Mexican 
states, in 1950 most of the Northern states were already able to decrease the homicide rates in 
their territories. Homicide rates remained high in the pacific and southern states and the center of 
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Mexico. By 1970, Guerrero was the only state left with a homicide rate higher than 40, however 
homicide rates remained high in most of the southern pacific states. In 1990, Oaxaca was the only 
state with a homicide rate higher than 40, but Sinaloa, Durango, Michoacán, Guerrero and the 
central states still display a medium high rate. This pattern underlines the counterintuitive fact, 
that those states expected to be most violent due to drug production and trafficking consistently 
display the lowest homicide rates. 
This illustrates that while some of the patterns visible in the descriptive analysis can be 
related to events and developments in Mexican history, others are completely unexpected and 
need further empirical exploration. On the one hand, the long and sustained decline from levels of 
over 60 homicides per 100,00 at the beginning of the 20th century to levels of around 10 
homicides per 100,000 by the year 2000 has certainly been fostered by the Mexican Miracle, the 
improvement is schooling and the overall increase in living standards. Likewise, the homicide 
rate development in some of the states known for drug trafficking can also be related to historical 
facts about the emergence of drug cartels and the government counteractions. On the other hand, 
the especially high homicide rates in the pacific states (Michoacán, Guerrero, Oaxaca) are not as 
easily explained, just as the low levels of the southern periphery (Yucatán, Quintana Roo, 
Campeche). The following chapter will turn to economic and sociological theory to find potential 
explanations for these differences in levels and trends.  
For the subsequent empirical analysis of the homicide development in 20th century 
Mexico it is important to keep in mind two things that were evident in the descriptive analysis: 
First, it will be necessary to estimate the model including state-fixed effects in order to capture 
the differences in the level of homicide rates that are persistent over time and caused by time-
invariant characteristics of each state. Secondly, there is considerable correlation between the 
homicide rate trends in the different states, which implies the existence of cross-sectional 
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correlation. Since the data includes all 32 states of the same country, it is plausible to expect that 
there exist common shocks that affect all states equally, as for example national policy measures, 
economic crises or interrelations due to interactions between states. 
B.3. Theories of Crime in the Mexican Context 
The causes of crime are multidimensional and intertwined. Over the course of the past century, a 
variety of theories from the fields of biology, psychology, sociology and economics have been 
developed, attempting to explain crime incidence. In search of potential causes, this section 
reviews the major theories of crime and discusses their implications for the Mexican case. The 
economic theory as well as sociological concepts offer potential factors that can have an impact 
on crime rates. In the unique case of Mexico, the consumption of alcohol and the presence of 
drug cartels needs to be considered as well.  
B.3.1. The Economic Theory of Crime 
Regarding crime theories, one can distinguish between theories that focus on the individual 
perpetrator and theories, that focus on the society and the conditions surrounding the perpetrators. 
Up until the late 1960s, sociologists and psychologists tried to explain crime incidence by 
focusing on the character of the individual perpetrator (Cook et al. 2013). Criminals were 
assumed to be fundamentally different from a “normal”, law abiding person. Delinquents, 
especially killers, were said to be “vicious, depraved or psychologically disturbed individual[s]” 
(Cook and Laub 2001, p. 14). An increase in criminal activity was therefore explained by an 
(exogenous) increase in the prevalence of these anomalous individuals (Cook and Laub 2001; 
Bennett, DiIulio and Walters 1996). 
In 1968, Gary Becker revolutionized this view of criminality when presenting an 
economic approach to crime, shifting the focus away from the time-stable characteristics of the 
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criminal individual towards the situational factors such as the social, economic and political 
conditions in which crime occurred. He applied the economic rational choice model to the 
context of criminal activity, pointing out that crime is an option open to everyone and that it can 
be a rational choice under certain circumstances. An individual is most likely to choose the 
criminal behavioral option if the expected return of the crime exceeds the return from his legal 
earning opportunities, even when taking into account the likelihood of apprehension and 
conviction and the severity of the punishment (Becker 1968). 
While certain aspects of the human character, the individual preferences do play a role 
when explaining criminal behavior, the focus of Becker’s theory is on the circumstances that 
determine the expected return from crime (Eide, Rubin and Shepherd 2006; Cook et al. 2013). 
The circumstantial factors defining the utility of a crime can be summarized in three groups:  
1) Factors that increase or decrease the costs of committing the crime (direct and 
indirect costs) 
2) Factors that determine the revenue generated by the crime 
3) Factors that determine the probability of apprehension and the severity of the 
punishment  
The first group of factors, the overall costs of crime, consist of the direct and indirect costs. 
Direct costs are for example the actual work the delinquent must put in to commit the crime and 
potentially the costs of supplies necessary for the criminal act. The second part are indirect costs, 
such as for example opportunity costs. These are mainly defined by the employment status, 
income level (e.g. wages, education) and/or existing wealth (e.g. consumption). While the direct 
costs of the crime can be slightly increased by implementing preventive and security measures, it 
is much more effective to increase the opportunity costs of a crime. The economic theory predicts 
that an increase in opportunity costs, as for example by improving the legal earning opportunities, 
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would translate into a lower crime rate. This could be done via the general income level or wages 
(GDP, real wages), a reduction of unemployment or by higher education, which improves the 
earning opportunities of the individual in the legal sector. Several studies have shown that these 
implications are valid and can be observed empirically (Trumbull 1989, Machin and Meghir 
2000). The employment status has been shown to be of less importance (Ehrlich 1973 and 
Freeman 1999), even though there seems to be a significant and positive relation between 
unemployment and crime. What seems to be a very important factor is education. On the 
individual level, there is a significant negative effect of education on crime (Witte and Tauchen 
1994). 
In Mexico, the general income level has grown at an average rate of 2% from 1940 until 
1995 (see Figure B.13), triplicating the income in this period (Esquivel 1999), which could be 
one of the factors contributing to the falling crime rate. As legal income sources improved, 
individuals did not turn to criminal behavior to generate income. Regarding the cross-sectional 
distribution of income, it is striking that some of the poorest states in the country also display the 
highest homicide rates (Oaxaca, Michoacán, Guerrero), while the Northern states that 
experienced lower homicide rates have higher income levels. This negative correlation might 
help to explain the extraordinarily high homicide rates in the Southern states. 
In the field of education, Mexico made fundamental improvements in the contemplated 
period. The constitution of 1917 stipulated compulsory, free basic education. Consequently, the 
number of schools as well as the number of enrolled students increased rapidly. In 1930, there 
were only around 11,000 primary schools in Mexico, but this number had already doubled by 
1940 (Alvarez Mendiola 1994). Even though the educational system was mainly controlled by 
the central government, the disparities across regions were still very high. Access to schooling 
was easier for the urban population, whereas the rural and indigenous population was mainly 
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neglected. 
After World War II, the government put additional focus on the education of the 
indigenous and rural population and the reduction of illiteracy (Alvarez Mendiola 1994). 
Education continued to improve and these achievements are clearly visible in the data. For 
example, the percentage of the school-age population not receiving education has been reduced 
significantly from 36 % in 1970 to only 13% by 1990. The illiteracy rate fell from around 45% in 
the 1920s to 10% in the 1980s (see Figure B.14). However, it is important to note the striking 
differences among states – especially the southern periphery was still lagging behind in 1990. For 
example, in Chiapas, in 1950 only 35% of the total population was able to read and write, in 1990 
it was already 70% - a level clearly lower than the national average of 90%. In the framework of 
Becker’s crime theory, these improvements in education and living standards are expected to 
promote a reduction in crime rates, since the opportunity costs of potential delinquents all over 
the country have been improved. Piccato (2013) already observed that crime rates and literacy 
rates were negatively correlated in Mexico in the 20th century. 
The second group of factors in Becker’s model consists of the aspects related to the 
potential revenue generated by a crime. Most importantly, the income level could also play a role 
here. The higher the overall income level, the higher the value of the pickings from an assault 
against a random individual or a robbing of a random home. Hence, increasing income does not 
only increase the opportunity costs for potential delinquents but also increases the potential 
revenue obtained from a crime. The direction of the impact of income levels on crime is therefore 
ambiguous. 
In the last decade, another aspect of Becker’s crime model has caught the attention of 
researchers: the effect of inequality. In unequal societies, the high income differential makes 
criminal activity especially attractive for individuals at the bottom end of the income distribution 
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since it combines high expected revenue from crime directed against the wealthier part of society 
with low opportunity costs. Numerous studies have shown a robust positive link between 
inequality and crime incidence (see for example Machin and Meghir 2000, Ehrlich 1973; 
Demombynes and Özler 2002; Chiu and Madden 1998, Bourguignon 1999, Hsieh and Pugh 
1993). In Latin American countries both crime rates and inequality are high, which is why many 
blame high inequality as driving force behind crime rates. On the other hand, higher inequality 
could also be linked to lower crime rates, when including the possibility of protection against 
crime into the model. Wealthy individuals living in an unequal society will spend high sums on 
private protection from crime that can range from a simple guard dog or bars on the windows to 
electric fences, alarms systems and armed private security companies that offer police services. 
This implies that in an unequal society, it is incredibly hard if not impossible for a person from 
the poorer part of society to steal from a wealthy individual. Consequently, “increasing inequality 
can actually lead to less crime if […] richer people spend a higher proportion of their income on 
protection (i.e. protection is a superior good)” as in the model developed by Heufer (2011). 
In Mexico, cross-regional inequality is substantially more pronounced than intra-regional 
inequality (Moreno Brid and Ros 2009). For example, in 1940, the per capita income in the 
Federal District was almost 10 times as high as in the poorest state, Oaxaca (Esquivel 1999, 
p.13). In 1995, this coefficient had been reduced to 5.4, but these interregional disparities are still 
very pronounced in international comparison (for example in Colombia 3.3, USA 1.2) (Esquivel 
1999). Esquivel also describes that there is some rigidity among states, such that in the period 
from 1940 to 1995, the poorest states remained poor and the states at the top part of the income 
distribution also managed to stay there. All throughout this time period, the capital states (Federal 
District and Mexico State) as well as the Northern states have been at the top of the income 
distribution, whereas the states in the south (Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacan and Oaxaca) have 
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maintained their position at the bottom. Esquivel (1999) identifies the unequal access to 
education as one of the most important reasons behind these cross-regional disparities. When it 
comes to intra-regional income inequality, there is no reliable data available for Mexico. Several 
sources suggest that inequality was falling at least until the 1980s. Hanson and Harrison (1999) 
for example calculate the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar wages in Mexican manufacturing 
plants and show that the wage gap was steadily falling until 1985. Felix (1977) however claims 
that income inequality in Mexico was rising from 1940 until 1975. Moreno Brid and Ros (2009) 
emphasize that intra-regional inequality is linked to urbanization, as rural areas lag behind the 
industrialized cities.  
With the newly collected data, it was possible to construct an alternative inequality 
indicator, using the ratio of the minimum wage to GDP per worker hour, both measured in 1995 
Mexican pesos: 
!"#$%&'()* = 1 − .#&'	0("(0%0	1&2#	(%"45(''#6)89:	;#.	1<.5#.	ℎ<%.  
 
The higher the inequality, the lower the ratio between the real minimum wage of an unskilled 
laborer and the average wage, represented by the GDP per worker hour. The ratio moves between 
0 and 1, since the minimum wage is never higher than the GDP per worker hour. To be able to 
interpret the ratio as an indicator of inequality, it was subtracted from 1, so that an increase in the 
indicator now represents an increase in inequality. 
The development of this inequality indicator (Figure B.15) suggests that inequality has 
increased throughout the 20th century. This means that the average income (GDP per worker 
hour) has increased faster than the minimum wage. Interestingly, inequality increased mainly 
between 1930 and 1940 and stayed the same afterwards. The empirical analysis will show if the 
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inequality can help to explain the trajectory of the homicide rates.  
B.3.2. The Deterrent Effect of Punishment 
The third implication from Becker’s theory of crime, the possibility of deterrence, is a long 
debated idea. Since the potential criminals are assumed to respond rationally to a change in the 
return from crime, crime rates could be reduced using an aggravation of the potential punishment 
and/or a higher probability to be caught (Cook et al. 2013), according to the theory. Deterrence 
has two dimensions, first, the probability of getting punished and secondly the severity of the 
punishment. The severity of the punishment is mainly determined by the legal system and the 
jurisdiction, whereas the probability of the punishment is determined by the efficiency of the 
legal system and the police force. 
In Mexico, the legal system has its roots in the Colonial law of the 16th century but was 
reformed by the 1917 constitution which was the main source of Mexican law for the remaining 
of the 20th century (Reynolds 1970). The Judicial Power is vested in the Supreme Court, but 
every state has its own state supreme court that applies the state laws. On the state level, there are 
also courts of first instance which are the ones dealing with cases of the “common law” (fuero 
común), the kind of offenses that only affect the victim of the act directly, such as robbery, theft, 
rape, bodily injury and most importantly homicide (Procuraduría General de la República 2011).  
One proxy that can gauge the severity of the punishment and has been used in previous 
studies is the death penalty, since it is “assumed to be an indicator of the overall severity of [the] 
legislation regarding the punishment of offenders” (Fajnzylber et al. 2000, p. 249). If the death 
penalty has a deterrent effect is however widely debated. Ehrlich (1975) for example shows that 
the death penalty has a major impact on crime rates, while others found no evidence for 
deterrence (Donohue and Wolfers 2006, Mathieson and Passell 1976, Levitt 1995a and 1997).  
In Mexico, the death penalty has been abolished by each state independently in the period 
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between 1924 (Michoacán) and 1975 (Sonora) (Gonzalez Mariscal 2011). This variation can be 
used to examine if the abolition of the death penalty had an impact on homicide rates. One 
problem with measures of severity of the punishment is that they might suffer from endogeneity, 
since the severity of the punishment can react to the development of the country’s crime rate. 
Countries with higher crime rates also tend to have tougher legislation, whereas states with low 
crime rates might abolish the death penalty first. Hence, observing a positive coefficient of the 
death penalty might be caused by endogeneity.  
The second dimension of the deterrence apart from the severity of the punishment is the 
probability of receiving the intended punishment after committing a crime. Even the most severe 
punishment will not have any deterrent effect if it is not enforced. Proxies that capture the 
probability of getting punished are for example indicators of efficiency of the police force and the 
jurisdiction system, such as the clear-up rate. In Mexico, the probability of punishment seems to 
be unbelievably low: Per Cascante (2013), around 98.2% of all killings went unpunished in 2012. 
The newly assembled data set contains information about the number of persons accused 
of homicide as well as the number of convictions for homicide. Figure B.16 compares the 
development of these to the homicide rate, each indicator measured as rate per 100,000. In 1940, 
the first year for which all three variables are available, a big gap between the number of 
homicides, the number of persons accused and the number of persons convicted is noticeable. 
There are more than 60 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, however there were only around 33 
persons accused of homicide and only 14 convicted. This translates in a probability of 
punishment of only around 23%. The clear majority of murderers never had to face punishment. 
Over the course of the century, the three rates converged significantly, reaching almost the same 
level in the 1970s (17 homicides and 12 sentenced) and hence a clear-up rate of 70%. While 
homicide rates remained stable in the 1970s and 1980s, the number of people accused and 
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sentenced continues to decrease. This insinuates that these additional murderers successfully 
evaded punishment. It is possible that the violence emerging in these decades was mainly drug 
related, hence inflicted by illegal organizations that were successfully evading apprehension, 
mainly through corruption. Due to this impunity, the gap between the number of homicides and 
people convicted for murder widened again until 1988 (17 homicides vs. 7 sentenced), reaching 
again a lower clear-up rate of only 40%, however this value is still far away from the 
abovementioned clear-up rate of only 1.8% in 2012. 
The presence of widespread impunity weakens the public trust in legal institutions and 
consequently their deterrent ability. Owens (2013) shows that the main impact of police on crime 
is through deterrence and not through the actual detention of criminals. If the probability of 
punishment is very low however, then the police force loses this deterrent function, which might 
be the case in Mexico. Hence it is not clear, if it is possible to find a deterrent effect of the legal 
institutions or the death penalty. The empirical analysis will show, if any of the two dimensions 
of the deterrent effect, the severity of the punishment as well as the probability of receiving the 
punishment, did significantly reduce the homicide rate in 20th century Mexico.  
Since the 1960s, the results of numerous studies have supported Becker’s theory and 
shown that crime is indeed determined by the economic conditions such as income levels, 
education, inequality and deterrent factors, and probably not as much by the individual’s 
character (for example Cook and Laub 1998; Eide, Rubin, Shepherd 2006; Dezhbakhsh et al. 
2003). These mechanisms have been proven especially in the field of property crimes. In the field 
of violent crime however, especially for severe crimes like rape, homicide and hate crimes, the 
“rational choice theory” is sometimes not sufficient to explain crime incidence. Sociological 
theories offer some additional insights using more a wider range of potential influence factors.  
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B.3.3. Sociological Theories 
One of the most influential sociological theories on crime is the strain theory developed by 
Robert Merton in 1938. If social obstacles make it impossible for certain individuals to achieve a 
culturally defined goal (such as wealth for example), the strain experienced by these individuals 
pushes them into using illegal methods to succeed, since the importance of the goal might 
outshine the means (Merton 1968). Even though plausible, this theory is especially difficult to 
test, since strain is a quite subjective concept that is hard to measure. One example for an 
empirical study can be found in Agnew and White (1992) who used questionnaire data of US 
adolescents to test the impact of strain on delinquency and found significant results. General 
inequality has also been used to capture at least part of the strain levels experienced by the poorer 
part of society. For example, Kelly (2000) finds that inequality has an important impact on 
violent crime, whereas it does not influence property crimes. This would indicate that inequality 
impacts crime rather through the strain-channel than through the higher payoff channel suggested 
by Becker. 
Another theory focusing on the social environment as key determinant of crime is the 
social disorganization theory. Social disorganization is defined as “the inability of a community 
structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls” 
(Sampson and Groves 1989, p. 777). In their classic work, Shaw and McKay (1942) found that 
the three structural factors low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability 
weaken the social bonds within a community, which encourages more individuals to choose 
illegal alternatives. 
In the case of Mexico, the population is made up of two main ethnical groups: the 
descendants of Spanish immigrants and the indigenous population. This fractionalization of the 
society could impact the homicide rates, hence it might be illustrative to control for the presence 
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of each ethnic group as well as a to introduce a measure of ethnic fractionalization, when 
explaining the variation in homicide rates. The share of indigenous population in total decreased 
over the 20th century, starting at 6% in the 1930s and reaching only 2% by 1988. The variation 
between states is however much more pronounced. The lowest shares are found in the central and 
northern states such as Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Chihuahua and Baja California (<1%). The 
Southern periphery states are then ones with the highest shares of indigenous population as for 
example Oaxaca (17%), Quintana Roo (10%), Chiapas (12%) and Yucatán (13%). 
Another proxy that partly captures the trust, norms and networks present in a society is 
religion. Freeman (1999) found a strong relation between church attendance and arrest 
probability. In Mexico, the predominant religion is Catholicism, and the percentage of population 
reported to be catholic has always been above 90%, it increased slightly during the 1940s and 
1950s, reaching almost 99%, but decreased again afterwards down to 90% in 1988. Other 
religions present in Mexico are Protestantism and indigenous religions. Among the states with the 
lowest share of Catholics are the southern states Chiapas (90%), Quintana Roo (86%) and 
Tabasco (87%). 
The phenomenon of residential instability is equally hard to measure; however, it might 
be related to the pace of urbanization. Already in the 19th century, Emile Durkheim realized that 
during the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, the increasing division of 
labor, urbanization and residential unsteadiness weaken the social bonds and norms that in a rural 
society traditionally help to restrict criminal behavior. The consequence of this was an increase of 
crime in Europe during industrialization (Rogers 1989; Clinard and Abbott 1973). 
Also in Latin America, it has been found that crime is mainly an urban phenomenon 
(except for Columbia, Prillaman 2003). Urbanization also could reduce the direct costs of 
criminal behavior, since “a large degree of urbanization can facilitate the development of social 
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interactions between criminals and would-be criminals” (Fajnzylber et al. 2000, p. 252). Several 
studies found a significant impact of urbanization and population density on property crime, 
however not on homicide (Fajnzylber et al. 2000, Gaviria and Pages 2002, Glaeser and Sacerdote 
1996).  
For the case of Mexico, high homicide rates seem to be a rather rural phenomenon, just as 
in Colombia. The correlation between urbanization and homicide rates is -0.54 and significant at 
all commonly used significance levels, indicating that states with higher urbanization display on 
average a lower homicide rate. Mexico experienced a rapid urbanization during the 20th century. 
In the 1930s, only 30% of the Mexican population lived in cities; however, this number increased 
rapidly over the course of the century, reaching 61% in the 1980s. The state with the highest 
urbanization rate is the capital, Mexico City, with 95%, followed by Aguascalientes (60%), Baja 
California Norte (65%) and Nuevo León (63%). Among the most rural states are the Pacific 
states Guerrero (26%), Oaxaca (23%), e.g. two of the states with the highest mean homicide 
rates. 
Norbert Elias (1939) stated that as a country develops, it experiences a “civilizing 
process” which includes a dramatic change of the forms of human interaction, for example in the 
fields of violence, sexual behavior and customs. The more specialized the division of labor, the 
more dependent the individuals are on each other, what makes it necessary to establish common 
rules, exert self-control and coordinate actions. Physical force is monopolized by the government, 
which results in a long term decrease of crime and violence (Eisner 2001, Pinker 2011). Here, the 
size of the public sector might play a role, since a bigger government might be able to more 
efficiently control and punish criminal behavior. Also, an increase in education might change 
how individuals deal with strain and frustration, leading to lower violence among them. 
Cultural aspects in general have also been suspected to cause especially high or low crime 
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rates. In Japan, the “shame culture” seems to be the reason why the country modernized relatively 
crime free (Leonardsen, 2004). Contrarily, in Latin America, the “cultural values conducive to 
violence [that] have evolved out of the history of colonization and subjugation” have been 
blamed for causing the high homicide rates throughout the continent (Neapolitan 1994, p. 4). As 
for most of the sociological factors that might impact homicide rates, it is hard to find proxies, 
especially when contemplating historical data. In the subsequent analysis, indicators of strain, 
social disorganization and the civilizing process include inequality, education, ethnic 
heterogeneity, religion, population density, urbanization and the share of workers employed in 
the agricultural sector.  
B.3.4. Alcohol Consumption and its Impact on Violent Behavior 
Cetina (2016) examines crime in post-revolutionary Mexico City between 1920 and 1940 and he 
emphasizes that one of the most common crimes between 1920 and 1940 was the “homicidio en 
riña“, a homicide induced by quarrel, which typically occurred between two males in the 
surroundings of canteens, pulquerías or bars (Cetina 2016, p. 156). In these spaces of “masculine 
encounters”, quarrels and disputes due to rivalries, offenses against the honor and these disputes 
often escalated into open violence. The persons included in the quarrels were often acquaintances 
that lived in the same neighborhood or visited the same pulquería. Just as in a Wild West movie, 
people challenged each other to duels, that often ended with death (Cetina 2016). In most of these 
events, the delinquents and their victims were under the influence of alcohol, and afterwards 
claimed that they could not remember anything, due to their drunkenness (p. 161). 
Already in the statistical yearbook of Mexico City of the year 1899 (found in the National 
Archive of Mexico), reports of drunken violence can be found. The (unknown) author describes 
that the reason for most of the violent crimes can be found in the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages. A cheap price combined with a growing number of bars and canteens (expendios de 
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alcohol) is responsible for the offense against the person, in the opinion of the author. Over five 
pages, he describes how alcohol stimulates the temperament of the drinkers, awakens the instincts 
and reveals the individual wishes and passions. These illustrations show that alcohol consumption 
might have been a serious problem in 20th century Mexico, which in turn increased the incidence 
of homicides. The effect of alcohol consumption on violence has already been shown in other 
contexts. Mehlum et al. (2006) show that in 19th century Bavaria, higher rye prices led to higher 
beer prices, which in turn resulted in a drop in alcohol consumption and consequently reduced 
violent crime. Markowitz (2005) found that higher beer taxes led to lower violent crime in the 
1990s in the US. In a meta-analytic review covering nine countries, Kuhns et al. (2014) conclude 
that on average 48% of the homicide offenders were under the influence of alcohol at the time of 
the offense.  
The most prevalent alcoholic beverage in Mexico is Pulque, a traditional liquor made 
from fermented sap of Agave. Pulque always had an important place in the Mexican society. 
Already during colonial times, the “excessive consumption of pulque caused serious problems in 
public health and order” (Garine 2001, p. 171). Pulque is even considered as the “center of whole 
ways of life”, at least in the regions in which it is produced. Pulque is almost exclusively drunk in 
special bars known as pulquerías (see Figure B.17) (Garine 2001), that were the center of the 
(male) social life in 20th century Mexico (Cetina 2016). Still after the colonial period, the 
excessive consumption of pulque as well as the extraordinarily high number of Pulquerías in the 
cities was considered public nuisance. Cetina (2016) describes that the pulquerías were known 
for scandals, fights, quarrels and violent behavior. Rancaño (2000) reports that at the beginning 
of the 20th century, newspapers were filled with news about fights, injuries and assassinations 
that happened in the surroundings of pulquerías and many were complaining about the general 
turmoil caused by the presence of pulquerías. In Mexico City 1,311 pulquerías existed, while the 
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city had only 400,000 inhabitants, which corresponds to one pulque bar for every 305 persons. 
For comparison, there was only one bakery for every 11,764 inhabitants. The Newspaper “El 
Imparcial” then concluded that Mexicans consumed more pulque than meat. Since the presence 
of so many pulquerías led to social disorder and turmoil, the municipality of Mexico City decided 
to impose clear regulations. While until 1906 there was one pulquería every 60 meters, 
afterwards there had to be a minimum distance of 100 meters between two pulquerías in any 
direction (Rancaño 2000). Also in other cities, following incidents of social disorder, pulquerías 
were closed or the number of pulquerías admitted was reduced. These facts illustrate how severe 
the impact of the consumption of pulque was in the Mexican society. Whenever pulquerías are 
mentioned in the literature, quarrels, disputes, violence, duels and assassinations are mentioned as 
well. This leads to the hypothesis, that the consumption of pulque might have significantly 
augmented the number of homicides in Mexico.  
Because of these circumstances revolving around the pulquerías, the number of pulquerías 
was precisely documented in every state all throughout the 20th century. The statistical yearbooks 
that are the basis of the data set used in this study also contained data on the number of pulquerías 
per state. Fortunately, the variation in this variable is substantial. In some cases, the number is 
reduced by 10 pulquerías from one year to next, probably caused by an incident of social disorder 
and the subsequent closing of the bars. Additionally, the number of cervecerías, the bars selling 
beer, is also reported, even though beer has been less influential in the Mexican society.  
To obtain an indicator that gauges the intensity of pulque consumption in every state-year 
observations, the number of pulquerías is divided by the total population of the state. The 
underlying assumption is that the size of pulquerías stays roughly the same and that each 
pulquería can serve roughly the same number of people. This assumption is reasonable, since 
pulquerías are usually small to medium sized bars.  
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Figure B.18 depicts the geographical patterns of the pulquerías per capita indicator. While 
the northern states as well as the southern periphery are characterized by a low density of 
pulquerías, they were omnipresent in the center of Mexico. The highest average density of 
pulquerías was present in Tlaxcala, followed by Puebla, Mexico, Querétaro, Hidalgo and Mexico 
City. 
B.3.5. Drug Cartels, Corruption and State Capacity 
Mexico is notorious for its drug cartels and their role in the international drug trade and hence a 
search for the determinants of crime would not be complete without the mention of organized 
crime. In general, the presence of illegal drug production or consumption is thought to be linked 
with higher crime rates and lethal violence, especially among youth (Grogger and Willis 1998). 
Fajnzylber et al. (2000, p. 250) suggest that the presence of illegal drug business is a “potentially 
important determinant of crime, not only because the drug trade is highly profitable but also 
because it uses a very violence-intensive technology”. Violence is a tool used on both the supply 
and the demand side of the drug market. On the supply side, drug cartels use violence to enforce 
agreement and property rights in the illegal environment that lacks other enforcement 
mechanisms. On the demand side, juveniles with low opportunity costs use criminal activity to 
generate the income they need to purchase the drug, since drugs have a very low elasticity of 
demand (habit forming good). Therefore, property crimes appear mostly on the demand side, and 
violent crimes on the supply side. Since in Mexico the single most important illegal industry is 
the drug production and trade, it is probably not surprising that homicide rates are especially 
high. The presence of profitable criminal industries and the geographical pre-condition for such 
could be providing an important incentive to commit crimes.  
Furthermore, the presence of illegal drug business is inevitably related to corruption. 
Without corruption, organized crime would not be able to operate (Morris 2012) and this form of 
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government involvement in illegal activity is common in Mexico (Piccato 2013): During the 20th 
century, “everyone knew that policemen, prosecutors and judges could be bought” (Piccato 2013, 
p. 112). The reasons for this weak rule of law can be found mainly in poor training of officials, 
insufficient resources, inefficient procedures, official corruption, abuse of authority, limited 
transparency and even the involvement of police officers in criminal activity (Shirk and Cazares, 
2007). When it is possible for criminals to bribe police officials and consequently walk free, the 
overall probability of punishment is very low which makes criminal activities more attractive. 
Especially in a money-spinning illegal business such as drug trafficking, most delinquents have 
the financial capacity to buy protection from the law. The possibility of collusion between police 
and criminals undermines the potential deterrence mechanisms by decreasing the probability of 
punishment (Bowles and Garoupa 1997). This way, corruption is expected to increase crime. One 
consequence is that drug cartels and other forms of organized crime might choose the state in 
which they operate depending on the willingness of the government and police force to 
cooperate. Drug cartels move their operations to regions in which government officials are 
especially easy to bribe and consequently bribery costs are low, and avoid regions in which law 
enforcement is relatively strict. 
The obvious problem with corruption or criminal organizations is that there is no official 
data on their activity. However, it is possible to gather information on the presence of drug cartels 
for the states by decades: Per Valdés Castellanos (2013), drug cartels started to operate in Mexico 
in the 1970s and their activity was concentrated in the following states: Tamaulipas, Tabasco, 
San Luis Potosí, Nuevo Leon and Veracruz (Gulf Cartel); Sonora, Sinaloa, Baja California, 
Jalisco, Durango and Chihuahua (Guadalajara Cartel); Oaxaca (Oaxaca Cartel) and Michoacán 
(Milenio Cartel). The drug cartel activity was limited to these states until the end of the 1980s. 
Afterwards, the existing cartels expanded their area of influence and new cartels arose. See 
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Figure B.19 for an overview of the geographical distribution of the drug cartels in the year 1977. 
Based on this information (see also narcodata.animalpolitico.com (2016)), a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of an active drug cartel in the respective state in the respective decade 
was created and can be included in the subsequent empirical analysis.  
Regarding corruption, there is a variable that has been used to gauge the extent to which 
corruption is present, especially in settings of not fully democratized countries: the size of the 
public sector. Inflated government budgets are associated with more corruption. The 
argumentation is that “regulations and other forms of intervention typically associated with and 
facilitated by larger public sectors distort competition and introduce opportunities for rent-
seeking” (Montinola and Jackman, 2002). Goel and Nelson (1996) show that government 
spending has a strong positive influence on corruption in the US. Kotera and Okada (2012) show 
that this relationship is especially true in partially democratized countries, which tend to have a 
higher level of corruption generally (Montinola and Jackman 2002). In dictatorships and mature 
democracies however, corruption tends to be low and bigger public sectors are not linked to 
higher corruption. Mexico in the 20th century displays the characteristics of a partially 
democratized country, emerging from a dictatorship but not having reached the status of a full 
democracy yet (one-party system). Hence the government size might be a proxy of corruption 
and inefficient governance. The channel through which corruption can affect crime is the 
probability of punishment. The higher the overall corruption level, the more likely a criminal can 
bribe a police officer into refraining from executing his duties, and consequently the lower is the 
probability of punishment. 
On the other hand, a larger public sector could also indicate a more powerful government 
and a higher effectiveness in fighting crime. A government that has the power to appropriate and 
consequently spend more resources should be more capable and effective at maintaining order 
  
 45 
and enforce the law (Richani 2010). Savolainen (2006) predicts that a country with strong 
institutions of social protection (welfare states) can even counteract the homicidal effects of 
economic inequality. Other studies found links between (low) state capacity and general violence 
levels (Huntington 1968), civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and genocide (Heldring 2014).  
To measure state capacity, a wide range of proxies has been used ranging from GDP per 
capita to road density and census frequency (Soifer 2012). More common are measures of the 
state’s extractive ability (Soifer 2012). In the data set at hand, the government spending per capita 
in 1995 Mexican pesos is used to gauge the capacity of the state. On the one hand, it measures the 
state’s power to extract revenue, and at the same time it quantifies the amount of government 
revenue that is spent on public goods, services, administration and social programs. Due to the 
theoretical models explained above, the effect of this variable could be in either direction: Higher 
government spending could increase homicide rates due to increased possibilities for corruption 
and rent-seeking behavior. It could however also decrease homicide rates, via a more effective 
prevention of crime, via social protection or via law enforcement and improved institutional 
quality.  
B.4. Empirical Strategy 
After theoretically identifying the factors that might have impacted the homicide rate in Mexico, 
the goal of the subsequent empirical analysis is to check which of them has a significant impact 
and hence could cause the remarkable decline in violent crime. The focus will be, apart from the 
rather obvious economic factors such as income levels, education and inequality on the impact 
factors that might be unique to Mexico: The consumption of alcohol in the form of Pulque, or 
rather a high density of pulquerías per capita as well as the presence of drug cartels. Furthermore, 
the analysis will check if there is evidence for a deterrent effect.  
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The analysis is based on the newly created panel data set containing information about 
homicide rates and numerous control variables for the 32 federal entities of Mexico. The 
observations range from the 1930s until the 1980s. For the homicide rates as well as some of the 
explanatory variables, yearly observations are available. However, for other variables, the 
information was only available every five or every ten years. 
For some of the analysis, yearly observations will be used, however, to introduce more 
control and explanatory variables, the bulk of the regressions is done with decade averages. This 
results in six decades from 1930 to 1980 for each of the 32 regions, e.g. a strongly balanced panel 
with a total 192 observations. Due to the strongly balanced nature of the data, there is no risk of 
selection bias, since all federal entities are observed in all the time periods. Further advantages of 
using decade averages are the ruling out of short term fluctuations and the prevention of spurious 
regression, since the time dimension is reduced to six observations. 
The model to be estimated is based on the theoretical framework developed by Becker: log	(A<0(B(6#	C&)#)D,F = 	GHID,F + %D,F3 
with ( = state, ) = year and X the vector of control variables that might have an impact on crime 
rates. In the baseline model, proxies for the most common determinants of homicide rates (as 
shown by cross-country studies, e.g. Fajnzylber et al. 2000) are included: 
1) Income level: log(GDP per capita), in 1995-Mexican Pesos (Esquivel 1999)4 
2) Education/Human capital: illiteracy rates (percentage of the population that is not 
able to read and write) 
3) Inequality: 1 − LMNO	PDQDPRP	SNTM	(RQUVDOOMW)XYZ	[ML	S\LVML	]\RL  
When using panel data, there are factors that affect crime rates on the state level but do not 
                                                
3 Due to the extremely skewed distribution of the homicide rates, the logarithmic transformation is used for all 
regressions. The same holds for GDP per capita.  
4 Summary statistics for all included variables can be found in appendix B.9.2. 
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change over time. Examples are geographical conditions (location relative to the border/US, 
suitability of poppy seed cultivation), certain demographic, ethnic and cultural features that are 
roughly constant over time (for example presence of indigenous population), crime reporting 
behavior, attitudes towards crime and historically grown institutions and customs (judicial system 
of each state). It is well known that OLS-estimates are biased in the presence of these unobserved 
fixed effects. By controlling for fixed effects in the regression, it is possible to allow for (the 
likely) correlation between geography and historical factors and the time-variant regressors such 
as income, education and inequality. Even though necessary, there is one caveat of including state 
fixed effects, namely that it is not possible to analyze the impact of time constant geographical 
conditions, as for example the presence of poppy seed cultivation or the location at the border. In 
the regression, time fixed effects will also be included to capture common time trends or events 
that affected all states in the same way, like national political reform. 
With time and state fixed effects, the model is as follows: log	(A<0(B(6#	C&)#)D,F = GHID,F + F^ + _D + %D,F 
An additional challenge when estimating this model is that traditional panel data methods are all 
based on the assumption of cross-sectional independence, which in this case is an assumption that 
is not easy to maintain. Since the data stems from the 32 states of Mexico, the time series are 
likely correlated across cross-sections due to common unobserved and observed factors, as for 
example similar geographical and climate conditions, federal policy measures that affected some 
of the regions as well as the interrelations of drug cartels and commerce between states. Time 
fixed effects do account for some of the cross-sectional dependence; however, they assume a very 
simple form of dependence, imposing the same coefficient for all the cross-sections. The Pesaran 
(2004) test for cross-sectional independence on the variables as well as on the residuals of the 
baseline model reject the Null hypothesis of cross-section independence (see Table B.1). This 
B. Explaining the Great Decline of Homicide Rates in 20th Century Mexico 
 48 
indicates that there is still considerable cross-sectional dependence present in the panel even 
when controlling for time fixed effects, (as indicated by the graphical analysis). To accommodate 
both time- and cross-sectional fixed effects and cross-sectional dependence, Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998) standard errors will be used. These are robust to all forms of (spatial) cross-sectional 
dependence and temporal dependence. 
B.5. Empirical Results: What explains the Great Decline? 
Following the methodology of Fajnzylber et al. (2000), the first step is to estimate the baseline 
model including the proxies of the three most important determinants of crime identified by 
cross-sectional studies: General income level, education and inequality. Subsequently, the 
baseline model is extended along four dimensions (deterrence, sociological factors, alcohol 
consumption and drug cartel activity). 
B.5.1. Baseline Model 
The results of the baseline estimation are presented in Table B.2. Column (4) shows the standard 
fixed effects regression, not taking into account the cross-sectional dependence. However, the 
Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional dependence on the residuals (Table B.1) results in a 
rejection of the independence hypothesis, indicating that even when including time-fixed effects, 
there is still considerable cross-sectional dependence present.  
Consequently, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are used that are robust to all kinds of cross-
sectional dependence, and the result is presented in columns (1) to (3). In the first two 
regressions, the GDP per capita has a significant positive effect on homicide rates, indicating that 
higher income levels result in higher violence. This counterintuitive result is probably a result of 
omitted variable bias, since the income levels are positively correlated with inequality 
(coefficient of correlation 0.82), which in turn is expected to increase homicide rates. Indeed, 
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when including the inequality indicator in column (3), the sign of GDP per capita turns negative, 
and the effect is insignificant. Inequality however has a positive, significant impact on homicide 
rates, just as expected. This connection could work through various channels, first through the 
higher spread between the income of the poor and the rich part of society which increases the 
expected utility of crime for the poorer part of society and furthermore also through sociological 
channels such as strain and social heterogeneity that are supposed to drive individuals into 
criminal behavior. The share of illiterate population does not have a significant impact. The time 
fixed effects are jointly significant (p=0.000) and all negative, revealing an overall downward 
time trend that is common in all the 32 states of Mexico.  
The results of the baseline regression identified inequality as crime-increasing factor. 
Since inequality increased over the contemplated period, it cannot account for the decrease in 
homicide rates in 20th century Mexico. Maybe the improvements in the judicial and police system 
had a deterrent effect on crime? 
B.5.2. Is there Evidence for Deterrence? 
Becker’s theory of crime predicts a negative impact from the probability of being convicted and 
the severity of the punishment on crime rates. The death penalty has been used as proxy for the 
severity of punishment, since it captures the overall harshness of the penal system (Fajnzylber et 
al. 2000). Since in Mexico there is substantial variation in the abolition of the death penalty 
across states, it is possible to analyze the impact of the death penalty on homicide rates even with 
state and time fixed effects included in the model. The earliest state to abolish the death penalty 
was Michoacán in 1925, the latest Sonora in 1975 (Gonzalez Mariscal 2011). The abolition 
dummy takes on the value 1 if the death penalty was still in place in a certain decade (in most of 
the years), and it takes on value 0 if the death penalty was already abolished. 
One problem with the inclusion of the death penalty as control variable is that it might 
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suffer from endogeneity; since it is expected to react to the country’s crime rate. Countries or 
states with higher crime rates could have tougher legislation, and the death penalty might be 
abolished only when the crime rates are already quite low. Finding a positive coefficient on the 
death penalty variable could imply that its crime reducing impact does not offset the positive bias 
caused by reverse causality. 
Apart from the severity of the punishment proxied by the death penalty, measures of the 
probability of being convicted will be included. The two following indicators were constructed 
using the data about the number of persons accused and convicted of homicide. 
1) Police = #	\a	[MLU\QU	NbbRUMW	\a	]\PDbDWMF\FNO	#	\a	]\PDbDWMU  
This indicator measures the number of people that have been caught by the police 
and accused of homicide. It is a measure of the efficiency of the police force, if the 
police is able to find and arrest the delinquent. However, it remains to mention that 
in the historic data at hand, especially in the states with a smaller population, there 
are sometimes more persons accused of homicide than occurred murders in some 
years. One explanation for this could be that the delinquents that committed 
murder in one year might have been apprehended and accused only in the 
following year, or that more than one suspect was arrested and accused in a single 
murder case. Therefore, in some cases the police indicator exceeds the value one.  
2) Jurisdiction = #	\a	[MLU\QU	b\QcDbFMW#	\a	[MLU\QU	NbbRUMW	\a	]\PDbDWM 
This indicator is the percentage of persons accused that are convicted 
subsequently. It is a measure of the efficiency of the judicial system, e.g. if it can 
prove the guilt of the delinquent and enforce the sentence.  
Both variables could be subject to measurement error, since it is indeed possible that the police 
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catch the wrong person and consequently the judicial system is not able to prove the person 
guilty. Furthermore, if the police apprehend an innocent person, it is still counted as successful 
apprehension by this indicator. It is assumed that the number of these erroneous incidents is 
relatively small, and therefore the indictor is still able to capture the efficiency of police and 
justice system to some extent. Table B.3 presents the results of the regression analysis. In column 
(1), only the death penalty indicator is included, displaying no significant effect, as does the 
jurisdiction indicator in column (2). The police indicator (column (3)) however, has a significant 
and negative impact, indicating that a more efficient police work leads to a decrease in the 
homicide rates. This effect is robust to including the other deterrence indicators in column (4). 
These results indicate that while there is no evidence for a deterrent effect of the severity 
of the punishment, the probability of the punishment might indeed influence crime rates, 
especially in the form of more efficient policing. The effect of the police indicator is also quite 
substantial in magnitude. An increase of one standard deviation of the police leads to a reduction 
in homicide rates by around 16%. Regarding the level of 60 homicides per 100,000 in 1930, this 
corresponds to a decrease of 10. 
B.5.3. Sociological Theories 
The next section examines the importance of various sociological phenomena related to crime. 
As illustrated above, theories from the field of sociology predict an impact of factors such as 
population growth, urbanization rate ethnic composition or religion on crime. The results of the 
inclusion of these variables are shown in Table B.4. The first column includes the percentage of 
indigenous population living in the respective state. A high percentage of indigenous population 
decrease or increase social cohesion in the society, or it could proxy some kind of underreporting 
in the indigenous population. Viqueira and Palerm (1954) for example observed that in various 
indigenous communities, homicide due to vengance or honor is not seen as a crime and hence is 
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usually not reported to the authorities. The indicator does however not have a significant impact 
on homicide rates, hence no such effects are present.  
The second column, introduces the share of catholic population into the regression and it 
has a positive and significant effect. This might indicate that the religious communities were able 
to construct a social barrier against violent crime. The urbanization rate is included as additional 
control variable in column (3), mainly to check for the implications of the social disorganization 
theory that predicts higher violent crime due to weakening social bonds with increasing 
urbanization. However, the results indicate that there is no significant effect. The same results 
when including the population density in column (5). A further control related to the social 
disorganization theory is the share of workers employed in the agricultural sector. In 
industrializing society, hence when the share of agricultural workers decreases, violent crimes 
might increase. Column (4) however shows that the opposite is the case. Homicide rates are 
higher in settings with a high share of agricultural workers, and more industrialized states 
experience lower homicide rates. 
B.5.4. The Role of Pulque Consumption 
Due to the excessive consumption of pulque and the social disorder and problems revolving 
around it, a higher density of pulquerías is expected to increase the homicide incidence. And 
indeed, column (1) of Table B.5 shows the highly significant impact of the pulquería density on 
homicide rates. An increase of the pulquería density by one standard deviation leads to an 
increase of the homicide rate by 8%. This effect even increases in magnitude when including the 
covariates that also significantly determine the homicide rate (column (2)). Here, an increase of 
pulquerías per capita by one standard deviation increases the homicide rate by 12%. The decrease 
in the pulquería density from 1930 to 1980 accounts for a decrease in homicide rates of roughly 5 
homicides per 100,000.  
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In contrast, the number of cervecerías per capita as well as the total number of alcohol 
selling points (columns (3) and (4)) do not have a significant impact. This suggests that not the 
alcohol consumption per se, but rather the social dynamics surrounding the traditional pulquerías 
is responsible for the increasing effect on homicide rates.   
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B.5.5. Drug Cartels and State Capacity 
The history of Mexico in the 20th century is inevitably intertwined with the presence of drug 
cartels. Even though the impact of these illegal organization is not the focus of this study, the 
regressions should still control for the presence of a drug cartel in the respective state. Including 
the drug cartel dummy in the regression model results in a positive and significant coefficient as 
expected (Table 4, column (1)). The homicide rate is expected to increase by 17 to 27% if a drug 
cartel is present. Even though this effect was not visible in the descriptive analysis, the data 
suggests that the presence of drug cartels is an important determinant of homicide rates.  
Column (3) includes the indicator of real government spending per capita and the result 
suggests that a bigger public sector is not linked to higher homicide rates via corruption, but that 
the government spending is successfully used to combat crime. However, this effect is not very 
robust, as evident from column (4). 
Up to now, the empirical analysis has revealed a total of five factors that have a 
significant and robust impact on the homicide rates. Inequality as well as the presence of drug 
cartels have a crime-increasing effect. Since both phenomena experienced an increase over the 
observed period, they cannot explain the decline in homicide rates, but have rather hampered an 
even more pronounced decline in homicide rates. The factors that can account for the decline are 
the share of catholic population (increased over time and has a crime-reducing effect), the police 
indicator of efficient prosecution of delinquents (indicator improved over time and has a crime-
reducing effect as well) and the pulquería density (decreased over time, and less pulquerías are 
associated with less homicides). Together, these five variables can account for roughly 50% of 
the total variance in the homicide rate. Including state fixed effects, the amount of explained 
variance reaches even 77%, which is substantial. Nevertheless, there might be factors that do 
have an impact on violent crime, but the effect is not visible in the decade averages. Since for 
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many variables, yearly observations are available, it is meaningful to exploit the yearly variations 
in these indicators to identify additional driving forces.  
B.5.6. Exploiting Yearly Variation 
With the yearly observations, instead of the decadal averages, the panel still contains the 32 
cross-sectional units, however the time period is extended to between 40 and 80 observations per 
state. According to Eberhardt (2011), any panel with more than 20 time periods is a macro panel 
with higher risk of variable non-stationarity. Before conducting further empirical analysis, the 
series need to be pre-tested for the presence unit roots to make sure the results are not spurious. 
The results of the Pesaran (2004) unit root test that is applicable in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence are shown in Table B.7. The null hypothesis of a non-stationarity can be rejected for 
the specifications with up to 2 lags. Given the stationarity of the homicide series, standard panel 
procedures can be applied, however the standard error must be corrected for cross-sectional 
correlation and time fixed effects should be included (Eberhardt 2011). 
The results are presented in Table B.8. The analysis based on yearly observations 
corroborates the previous findings for the pulquería density as well as for the policing indicator. 
Both have the same sign as in the previous analysis and are highly significant. The yearly 
regressions introduce an alternative measure of income level, sugar consumption per year per 
capita in kilograms, since GDP per capita is only available on decade level (Esquivel 1999). 
Sugarcane production in Mexico has a history of almost 500 years, and is the most important 
agricultural industry after corn (Aguilar-Rivera et al. 2012). Also, the fact that its consumption 
has been documented over the entire century indicates, that sugar had an important standing in 
Mexican society. A higher sugar consumption could hint towards an increase in income levels. A 
higher consumption in one year could indicate a particularly good crop, which would also 
increase overall income levels, especially in the first half of the century, where the agricultural 
B. Explaining the Great Decline of Homicide Rates in 20th Century Mexico 
 56 
sector was still the most important in the Mexican economy: In 1940, still around 60 % of the 
total workforce was employed in the primary sector.  
Including this alternative income indicator, sugar consumption per capita, into the 
regression, results in a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that higher consumption 
levels decrease violence levels. This is the effect that was in fact expected for GDP per capita, 
however GDP per capita did not have any significant impact. Unfortunately, in this yearly 
regression it is not possible to control for inequality, since that indicator is only available for the 
decades. One explanation that the GDP per capita is not significant is that the impact is averaged 
out by the decadal averages, and hence not visible. Another reason might be measurement error, 
since the GDP per capita variable is based on estimations by Esquivel (1999), and no real GDP 
data is available for Mexico for that period. A third explanation could be that the sugar 
consumption is a better proxy of the living standards directly experienced by the households than 
GDP per capita.  
In any case, the negative impact of sugar consumption on crime supports the predictions 
by the economic rational choice theory of crime by Becker (1968). Higher income levels increase 
opportunity costs, and hence make criminal behavior less attractive, compared to the legal 
earning opportunities. This suggest that the “Mexican Miracle”, the increase in income levels 
between 1940 and 1970 could have had a crime-decreasing effect, even though this is not visible 
when using GDP per capita as income indicator.  
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B.6. Summary of the Findings and Conclusions 
This paper contributed to the historical literature on Mexico by reconstructing the homicide rates 
for all federal entities back until at least 1930. Up to now, data on homicide rates had only been 
available until 1990. The data reveals that the recent increase in homicide rates since 2008 in 
Mexico is indeed alarming, since it breaks with an almost century long trend of decreasing 
homicide rates. While the recent outburst of violence has been identified as the result of the break 
of an agreement between the drug gangs and the government, in which criminal organizations 
could buy protection from the government (Piccato 2012, p. 52), and the subsequent war on 
drugs, the past development of homicide rates pre-2000 remained unexplored. 
Therefore, the second goal of this study was to identify the factors that have contributed to 
the century-long decline of homicide rates in Mexico revealed by the recently compiled data. One 
of the main results is that the indicator of inequality used in this study is significantly increasing 
homicide rates. This confirms the findings of the previous literature on general determinants of 
crime (for example Fajnzylber et al. 2002). However, since inequality increased during the 20th 
century in Mexico, it cannot explain the great decline in homicide rates. 
The analysis did not offer any support to the deterrence hypothesis, namely that the 
severity of the punishment, measured by the presence of the death penalty, decreases crime. 
Nevertheless, there is a significant deterrent impact from a newly developed policing indicator. It 
measures the percentage of homicide perpetrators that were arrested and accused of the crime 
they committed. The higher the probability of getting caught, the lower the expected utility from 
a crime, and hence the less attractive the criminal behavioral option. The jurisdiction indicator, 
the percentage of the persons accused of homicide that were in fact convicted of the crime, did 
not have any deterrent power. These findings suggest that in order to effectively deter crime it is 
not necessary, to increase the severity of the punishment. An improvement in the criminal 
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prosecution system that results in a higher probability of apprehension and conviction seems to 
be a lot more effective in deterring crime.  
Among the cultural and socioeconomic factors such as ethnic diversity, religion, 
urbanization rate, the importance of agriculture as well as population density, only the share of 
Catholic population was found to have an impact on homicide rates. This confirms the findings of 
Fajnzylber et al. (2002) who found a negative link between Christianity and violence levels.  
One surprising and novel result is the influence the number of establishments that sell and 
serve alcohol, in particular the pulquerías, have on the homicide rate. While there is a multitude 
of reports on violence revolving around pulquerías, it is remarkable that this effect is visible in 
the data. The effect is very robust to including different cofounding factors, and hence it is 
possible to conclude that the historical reports on the problems and turmoil revolving around 
pulquerías are not an overstatement of a few incidents, but accurately describe the real experience 
Mexico had with pulquerías. The decision of the government to regulate and restrict the number 
of pulquerías during the 20th century did have a pacifying effect on the social life. 
The presence of drug cartels seems to have hampered the decreasing trend of homicide 
rates, and it is safe to assume that without the activity of the drug cartels in the regions, violence 
levels would have declined even more. Regarding income levels, the results of this study are 
twofold. First, there was no evidence for an impact of GDP per capita on homicide rates. This 
fact is hard to believe, since income levels have been proven to be important in most of the 
previous literature. Potential reasons are the reduction of variation due to decadal averaging and 
the fact that the GDP data are estimates, not real statistical data. Secondly, when using the yearly 
consumption of sugar per capita as income proxy, a crime-reducing effect is found. This result 
indicates that the growing income level in Mexico throughout the 20th century was at least to 
some extent causing the century-long reduction in violent crime.  
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Overall, the factors identified as driving forces behind Mexican homicide levels are very 
similar to the ones found by previous research. Alcohol consumption has been hypothesized to be 
conducive to violent behavior beforehand, however the significant correlation between the 
number of alcohol sales points and violence even when controlling for cofounding factors found 
by this study is novel. It remains to clarify that these results are probably of quite limited external 
validity, since Mexico is an individual case.   
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B.8. Figures and Tables 
B.8.1. Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1: Homicide Rate in Mexico, 1935 - 20055 
 
  
                                                
5 In all of the following graphs, the data before 1988 stems from the assembled data set. The data from 1988 to 
2005 was obtained from UNODC 2017. 
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Figure B.2: Homicide Rate in Baja California 
 
 
 
Figure B.3: Homicide Rate in Aguascalientes 
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Figure B.4: Homicide Rate in Colima and Morelos 
 
 
 
Figure B.5: Homicide Rate in Guerrero, Michoacán and Oaxaca 
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Figure B.6: Homicide Rate in Mexico City 
 
 
 
Figure B.7: Mean Homicide Rate by State from 1930 to 1990 
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Figure B.8: Homicide Rate in the Golden Triangle vs. the Rest of Mexico 
 
 
 
Figure B.9: Homicide Rate in 1930 by State 
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Figure B.10: Homicide Rate in 1950 by State 
 
 
 
Figure B.11: Homicide Rate in 1970 by State 
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Figure B.12: Homicide Rate in 1990 by State 
 
 
 
Figure B.13: GDP per capita (Source: Esquivel 1999) 
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Figure B.14: Illiteracy Rate 
 
 
 
Figure B.15: Inequality Indicator 
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Figure B.16: Homicide, Accused and Convicted Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) 
 
 
 
Figure B.17: Picture of a Pulquería in 1930 
 
(Source: relatosehistoria.mx)  
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Figure B.18: Number of Pulquerías per capita (Average 1930 – 1990) 
 
 
 
Figure B.19: States with Presence of Drug Cartels in 1977 (red) 
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B.8.2. Tables 
 
 
 
Table B.1: Pesaran (2004) Test of Cross-Sectional Dependence 
 
# of States 32 
 Average # of Observations 6 
Variable CD-test p-value Average Correlation 
log(Homicide Rate) 38.041 0.000 0.697 
log(GDP per capita) 45.051 0.000 0.826 
Residuals of Regression (4) of Table B.2 13.490 0.000 0.247 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate) – Baseline 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log(GDP per capita) 0.148*** 0.160*** -0.0715 -0.0715 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.061) (0.094) 
Inequality Indicator   0.895** 0.895*** 
   (0.234) (0.294) 
% Illiterate  0.792 0.823 0.823 
  (0.397) (0.454) (0.687) 
Constant 2.629*** 2.248*** 3.735*** 3.735*** 
 (0.278) (0.313) (0.279) (0.746) 
     
Observations 192 192 192 192 
# of States 32 32 32 32 
Driscoll- Kraay standard errors in parentheses, time and state fixed effects included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.3: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate – Deterrence 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log(GDP per capita) -0.0764 -0.0795 -0.0837* -0.0655 
 (0.0643) (0.068) (0.041) (0.038) 
Inequality Indicator 0.881** 0.906** 0.865*** 0.862*** 
 (0.221) (0.236) (0.159) (0.174) 
Death Penalty Dummy 0.0391   0.102 
 (0.058)   (0.055) 
Jurisdiction Indicator  -0.0923  -0.134 
  (0.057)  (0.067) 
Police Indicator   -0.159*** -0.169*** 
   (0.034) (0.032) 
Constant 4.050*** 4.131*** 4.276*** 4.112*** 
 (0.421) (0.472) (0.266) (0.244) 
     
Observations 192 192 192 192 
# of States 32 32 32 32 
Driscoll- Kraay standard errors in parentheses, time and state fixed effects included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.4: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate) – Sociological Factors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log(GDP per capita) -0.083 -0.077 -0.064 -0.070 -0.086 -0.065 
 (0.066) (0.071) (0.077) (0.068) (0.070) (0.074) 
Inequality Indicator 0.875*** 0.874** 0.826** 0.862** 0.919** 0.849** 
 (0.212) (0.235) (0.252) (0.226) (0.247) (0.245) 
% Indigenous -0.657      
 (0.404)      
% Catholics  -0.531***    -0.523*** 
  (0.125)    (0.111) 
Urbanization Rate   -0.006    
   (0.005)    
% of Workers in 
Agriculture    0.187**  0.174* 
    (0.053)  (0.069) 
Population Density     0.001  
     (0.000)  
Constant 4.172*** 4.577*** 4.193*** 3.906*** 4.135*** 4.369*** 
 (0.453) (0.580) (0.453) (0.448) (0.465) (0.607) 
       
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
# of States 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Driscoll- Kraay standard errors in parentheses, time and state fixed effects included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.5: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate) – Alcohol Consumption 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log(GDP per capita) -0.043 -0.026 -0.085 -0.082 
 (0.061) (0.036) (0.068) (0.067) 
Inequality Indicator 0.551** 0.437*** 0.882** 0.887** 
 (0.201) (0.102) (0.229) (0.224) 
Pulquería Density 0.293** 0.460***   
 (0.090) (0.090)   
Police Indicator  -0.216***   
  (0.028)   
% Catholics  -0.366***   
  (0.073)   
% of Workers in Agriculture  0.102   
  (0.060)   
Cervecería Density   0.063  
   (0.119)  
Alcohol Sales Points Density    0.009 
    (0.011) 
Constant 3.888*** 4.248*** 4.134*** 4.110*** 
 (0.437) (0.385) (0.463) (0.455) 
     
Observations 192 192 192 192 
# of States 32 32 32 32 
Driscoll- Kraay standard errors in parentheses, time and state fixed effects included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.6: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate) – Drug Cartels and State Capacity 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log(GDP per capita) -0.088 -0.049 -0.060 -0.034 
 (0.068) (0.033) (0.060) (0.027) 
Inequality Indicator 0.888*** 0.477*** 0.866*** 0.463*** 
 (0.213) (0.078) (0.208) (0.069) 
Drug Cartel Dummy 0.172*** 0.251***  0.273*** 
 (0.028) (0.025)  (0.016) 
Pulquería Density  0.342**  0.303** 
  (0.106)  (0.109) 
Police Indicator  -0.231***  -0.232*** 
  (0.031)  (0.029) 
% Catholics  -0.304***  -0.271*** 
  (0.043)  (0.036) 
Log(Government 
Spending per capita)   -0.092* -0.070 
   (0.040) (0.049) 
Constant 4.174*** 4.462*** 4.435*** 4.679*** 
 (0.464) (0.337) (0.508) (0.382) 
     
Observations 192 182 192 182 
# of States 32 32 32 32 
Driscoll- Kraay standard errors in parentheses, time and state fixed effects included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table B.7: Pesaran (2004) Unit Root Test of the Yearly Homicide Rate Series 
 
# of States 32  
Average # of Observations 42  
# of Lags Zt-bar p-value 
0 -8.701 0.000 
1 -5.104 0.000 
2 -3.161 0.001 
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Table B.8: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate) Based on Yearly Observations 
 
  (1) (3) (4) 
    
Sugar Consumption per capita -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Pulquería Density 0.726*** 0.688***  
 (0.201) (0.197)  
Police Indicator  -0.199*** -0.201*** 
  (0.029) (0.030) 
Constant 10.60*** 11.32*** 11.76*** 
 (0.949) (0.759) (0.795) 
    
Observations 1,305 1,153 1,191 
# of States 32 32 32 
Driscoll- Kraay standard errors in parentheses, time and state fixed effects included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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B.9. Appendix 
B.9.1. Sources 
Most of the variables have been obtained from the Archive of the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografía in Mexico City. The information was found in statistical yearbooks that 
were available for the years from 1937 to 1988. The publications contained detailed and 
standardized information about a variety of statistical variables, disaggregated by year and state. 
The variables obtained include cause of death data, jurisdiction data such as the number of people 
accused and convicted for homicide, population, precipitation, illiteracy rates, percentage share of 
Catholics, indigenous population, per capita sugar consumption, number of pulquerías, 
cervecerías and total alcohol selling points, minimum wage, urbanization rate and the share of 
workers employed in the primary, secondary and tertiary sector. The yearbooks have been 
accessed during October and November of 2014 in the Archive of the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografía in Mexico City. Figure B.20 gives an insight into the structure of the 
yearbooks. 
Few other variables were obtained from additional sources. Since there is no official GDP 
data for Mexico available for before 1970, the estimated GDP series provided by Esquivel (1999) 
was used. Homicide data for the years after 1988 was retrieved from UNODC (2017).  
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Figure B.20: Statistical Yearbook of Mexican States for the Years 1963 to 1965 
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B.9.2. Summary Statistics 
 
Table B.9: Summary Statistics 
 
 # of Observations Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Homicide Rate 2488 25.653 0.000 160.647 22.945 
Log(Homicide Rate) 2487 2.854 -0.888 5.079 0.930 
Economic and Deterrence Variables 
Log(GDP per capita§) 192 9.181 2.625 10.842 0.863 
Minimum Wage§ 192 29.572 0.770 180.000 46.798 
      
Inequality Indicator 192 0.740 0 0.948 0.220 
% Illiterateª 255 0.285 0.019 0.620 0.154 
Death Penalty Dummy 3012 0.304 0.000 1.000 0.460 
Police Indicator 1715 1.061 0.129 24.000 1.221 
Jurisdiction Indicator 1790 0.856 0.000 12.702 0.918 
Sociological and Socioeconomic Variables 
% Indigenousª 255 0.064 0.000 0.692 0.107 
% Catholicsª 223 0.943 0.148 1.000 0.108 
Urbanization Rate 893 41.752 0.000 100.000 18.577 
% of Workers in Agricultureª 192 0.577 0.022 1.000 0.224 
Population Density 2794 156.449 0.211 6347.606 728.045 
Alcohol Consumption and Government Activity 
Alcohol Sales Points Density6 1585 2.809 0.000 9.055 1.502 
Cervecería Density7 1429 0.305 0.000 1.268 0.244 
Pulquería Density8 1544 0.164 0.000 1.971 0.307 
Drug Cartel Dummy 3012 0.172 0.000 1.000 0.377 
Log(Government Spending per 
capita§) 192 6.000 3.995 8.994 1.077 
Additional Variables for yearly data 
Sugar Consumption  
per capita in kg 1453 29.677 2.051 143.515 15.966 
§ - in 1995 Mexican pesos 
ª - percentage share of total population 
 
 
                                                
6 Number of alcohol selling facilities per 1,000 inhabitants. 
7 Number of beer serving facilities per 1,000 inhabitants. 
8 Number of pulque serving facilities per 1,000 inhabitants. 
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C. Did the “Curse of Resources” impact on Homicide Rates?  
Global evidence since 1890 
 
Abstract 
Does mining increase interpersonal violence? While the impact of natural resources on civil war 
and interstate conflict is well examined, its link to a second context of violence, interpersonal 
violence, is less explored. We assess the effect of silver mining on homicide rates, choosing 
silver because it was an important mining product for many countries over a substantial time 
span. We use a newly collected, global sample of countries, covering over more than 100 years 
between 1890 and 1990, and find that extensive silver extraction leads to heightened 
interpersonal violence. The effect is particularly pronounced in the interaction between silver 
mining and systems of autocratic governance. To rule out endogeneity, we use silver prices and 
silver deposit density as instrumental variables. Our key message is that economies mainly 
dependent on mining resources are not only prone to violent conflict, but are also at risk of 
amplified day-to-day violence.  
 
 
This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Jörg Baten (University of Tübingen). At the 
time this thesis was completed, the paper was in the peer-review process.  
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C.1. Introduction 
Mining resources are a crucial input for modern economies. Without metals in particular, today’s 
welfare and productivity levels could not be imagined. However, metal mining often has side 
effects on the societies and economies that surround it (Campbell and Roberts, 2010). Some of 
these side effects were most prominently hypothesized under the empirical paradox of the “Curse 
of Natural Resources” (Sachs and Warner 2001). Traditionally this phenomenon has been studied 
using national income growth (or its abatement) as the variable to be explained. But human 
welfare depends on a much larger vector of components which might be equally impacted. 
The OECD stresses in a series of publications that personal security is an important 
component of living standards (for example OECD 2011). Welfare is not only reduced by 
deficient health, but also by serious crimes. People’s well-being is certainly higher if they do not 
have to fear becoming a victim of crime, especially a serious crime such as homicide. Even if a 
crime does not happen to an individual, the victimization of a close relative or friend can have 
disastrous influence on the individual’s welfare (van Zanden et al. 2014). A change in crime 
levels may also affect well-being substantially; a rise in violent crime, even if the absolute level is 
still relatively low, may contribute to feelings of insecurity; in particular if the increase in 
violence is broadly covered by the media.  
Since personal security is one of the most important elements of a high living standard, 
here we study whether a “Curse of Natural Resources” might have a systematic impact on 
personal security. We use a global sample of country-specific averages over time (1890 to 2010). 
As a caveat, we need to mention that intra-country regional evidence would be preferable, as 
Fleming et al (2015) demonstrated. However, we compensate for this issue of country-averages 
by expanding our knowledge about resource curse effects far back in time, to the late 19th 
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Century.9  
In order to study the effect of mining resources, a suitable indicator is needed. Silver is a 
natural resource that has always been important; and scarce. Silver coins were used as some of 
the first currencies in ancient times, it has always been rare and short in supply due to the limited 
presence of silver deposits worldwide and due to mining limitations. Thirdly, silver is distributed 
all across the world (Sverdrup et al. 2014). These characteristics make silver a suitable indicator 
of scarce resources with universal validity through time and across different cultures. 
Our main hypothesis is that interpersonal violence is indeed one of the negative 
consequences of the resource curse of silver. To gauge the importance of country-level silver 
production, we use the share of gross value added by silver production relative to total GDP as 
our resource indicator. We measure country-level violence using homicide rates, since they have 
the advantage of being relatively clearly defined and the definition varies little over time and 
space. In contrast, other crimes have varying definitions and are sometimes counted in a different 
manner across nations. Hence, the degree of measurement error is usually lower for homicide 
rates than for other crimes. Moreover, homicide is a far-reaching crime for the offender, the 
victim and the public. Most societies invest a large amount of resources to prevent homicides (on 
all these aspects, see van Zanden et al. 2014). 
We have collected and consistently coded contemporary statistical publications and 
archival data on homicide rates for numerous countries. These collections were supplemented 
with data from publicly available sources (WHO mortality database, ClioInfra, Historical 
Violence Database, Interpol) to construct a large unbalanced panel. The data set covers more than 
65 countries, including data on Africa, Latin America, Asia. For many of these countries, a time 
                                                
9 It would not be feasible to a construct a dataset of resource curse effects on a regional level so far back in 
time. 
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span of 10 decades is covered, from the 1890s until the 1990s. 
A graphical inspection of the trends of silver dependence and homicide rates gives some 
suggestive evidence that these two might be related, especially in Latin America: Figure C.1 
shows the trends for Mexico, Peru and Chile from 1910/1920 until 2010. In the case of Mexico, 
we observe a small increase in silver dependence between 1920 and 1930 as the economy 
recovered from political conflicts during the Mexican revolution. However, after 1940, there is a 
consistent decline in silver dependence in Mexico. Accordingly, the homicide rate accompanied 
this change. On the other hand, in the figure on Peru, we can distinguish not only a decline, but 
also increases in silver dependence and murder. The initial decline in silver dependence around 
the 1930s is followed by an increase in the 1960s and a climax around the 1990s, in both silver 
dependence and homicide. Finally, for the case of Chile, downward trends in silver dependence 
and the homicide rate are visible from the early 1900s until 1960. After that period, the 
relationship is not as strong, since silver dependence started to increase again while the homicide 
rate did not. It seems that Chile was able to maintain its homicide rate at a relatively low level, in 
spite of its renewed dependence on silver resources. 
Figure C.2 shows the average homicide rate and silver dependence values for all countries 
for which every decade between 1920 and 2000 was available. Aside from the first decade, 
declining silver dependence corresponds with declining homicides. An increase in silver 
dependence in the 1980s was followed by an increase in homicide rates in the 1990s. 
To test this hypothesis empirically, we employ three different regression models. First, 
fixed effects as well as correlated random effects models are estimated. We include a number of 
control variables to check if the effect hinges on other mechanisms. Most prominently, GDP per 
capita is included. Low GDP levels might not only proxy low opportunity cost (allowing easier 
recruiting of young men or criminal gangs) but also an undiversified economic structure in which 
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high silver dependence could also measure economic monoculture. By controlling for GDP per 
capita, we take this effect into account. Another important control variable is inequality, which 
might have a distinct effect as criminal gangs often arise when assets can be transferred from rich 
to poor in high inequality settings (Fajnzylber et al. 2002b). We also control for education, drug 
production and trade, violent conflicts and other factors (Fajnzylber et al. 2002a). The results 
show that silver dependence does in fact have a negative effect on personal security when looking 
at the global data set. This effect also survives the inclusion of these and other control variables. 
Secondly, we also assess the interaction of silver dependence with autocratic regime types 
(using Polity IV data). A number of articles have hypothesized that law and order policies (which 
might be associated with autocratic regimes, see Chile 1970s/80s) might reduce crime and 
homicide (Pinker 2011). In the absence of mining resources, we actually confirm this. However, 
in silver mining countries, the interaction of autocracy and silver leads to further homicide, 
suggesting that kleptocratic behavior emerges more often in autocracies and that dissatisfaction in 
parts of the population is also more likely. The takeaway message is that – especially in the 
presence of valuable resources – the quality of the institutional landscape is crucial in avoiding 
violence and crime. 
In a third and final step, we employ an instrumental variable approach to make sure that 
the results are not caused by endogeneity that might occur due to omitted variables or reverse 
causality: By altering the incentive structure in an economy, homicide rates might increase or 
reduce silver production. We use the world market price of silver as well as the number of sites in 
which silver occurs, per country, relative to the country size. Both variables are arguably good 
sources of exogenous variation that influence silver production in a country, but they cannot be 
impacted by the violent characteristics of a single country. The results show that the effect is even 
more pronounced when integrating these exogenous sources of variation. We conclude that the 
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previous results were not artificially bolstered by reverse causality or an omitted variable, but 
rather that the effect might even be underestimated by OLS benchmarks. As an additional check 
of a potential omitted variable bias we use the methodology proposed by Oster (2017) and find 
that omitted variables would probably not eliminate the silver dependence effect.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a summary of the existing 
literature on the topic and previous studies. It also provides some potential channels through 
which silver dependence might influence homicide rates. Section C.3 presents the data and some 
descriptive statistics. In Section C.4, we describe the methodology used and present our 
regression results. Section C.5 summarizes the findings and discusses potential policy 
implications. 
C.2. Previous Literature and Economic Framework 
The “resource curse”, originally identified by Sachs and Warner (2001), is one of the most 
paradox and interesting phenomena in the economic growth research area. This line of research 
argues that the availability of natural resources does not stimulate income growth but rather 
reduces it, especially in the presence of suboptimal institutional setups. Windfall gains from 
mining resources, for example, lead to exchange rate appreciation and, hence, pressure on 
industrial exports. They can also lead to rent-seeking behavior, corruption and inefficient 
governance (see, for example, Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003).  
But do resources only impact on economic performance? As human welfare depends on a 
multitude of factors, one should not consider economic growth rates in isolation. One important 
dimension of wellbeing is personal security, which might also be affected by the resource curse 
via an increased incidence in violence. 
According to the WHO (2002), violence appears in two main forms: on the one hand, 
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there is collective violence – which refers to any violence committed by larger groups of 
individuals such as interstate wars or civil wars. On the other hand, there is interpersonal 
violence, which mostly appears between unorganized individuals – homicide being the most 
prominent example. 
A vast number of empirical studies have shown that the presence of valuable resources 
increases the probability of civil war or conflict (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004, Fearon and 
Latitin 2003, Blattman and Miguel 2010, Ross 2004 and Bazzi and Blattman 2014). Elbadawi 
and Soto (2014) also examine the interaction of resource rents and institutional quality. They find 
that better political institutions (democracy, control over government decisions) decrease the 
incidence of conflict while the presence of resources can even dampen the potential conflict-
containing effect of good institutions. Van der Ploeg (2011) summarizes various studies on the 
impact of natural resources and comes to a similar conclusion: “A resource boom reinforces rent 
grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad [and] induces corruption, especially in 
nondemocratic countries” (p.1). While a substantial amount of evidence has been gathered on the 
fact that natural resources can increase the risk of war and conflict there are only few studies that 
look at the effect resources can have on the second form of violence – namely day-to-day, 
interpersonal violence.  
A couple of studies look at the grey area between conflict and individual violence, namely 
the emergence of organized crime groups and gangs, which usually entails higher violence levels. 
Angrist and Kugler (2008) show that the Colombian civil conflict is fueled by the financial 
opportunities that coca production provides. In 1994, rural areas were affected by increases of 
coca prices and the extension of cultivation. Subsequently, these regions became considerably 
more violent. The authors suggest that coca revenue supports rural paramilitary groups and 
insurgents. Similarly, the emergence of the Sicilian Mafia can be attributed to the concurrence of 
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a lack in state property-rights enforcement, with a sharp increase in the international demand for 
Sulphur – Sicily’s most important export commodity (Buonanno et al. 2015). This combination 
increased the demand for private protection and created opportunities for rent-seeking through 
extortion. 
Interpersonal, individual violence has not been studied as extensively, mostly due to the 
lack of data. Only a few studies in a local context have been published. One example is a study 
by Couttenier et al. (2016) that exploits a natural experiment during the US gold rush. Gold was 
discovered in some counties after the establishment of formal police institutions and in other 
counties even before formal police institutions were in place. Couttenier et al. (2016) show that, 
in the latter case, homicide rates per capita were higher and that this effect has persisted until 
today. Idrobo et al. (2014) show that gold mining in Colombia is related to increased violent 
activity. In a recent paper, Hong and Yang (2018) look at the impact of natural resource 
extraction on violent incidents in Xinjiang, China. They find that for the specific Chinese context 
that higher natural resource extraction has a soothing effect on violence. James and Smith (2017) 
present another study on the US, examining the impact of resource booms on violent and 
property crimes. They find that towns affected by an energy boom display increasing crime rates 
throughout the country.  
Stretesky et al. (2017) is the only cross-national study using a relatively short panel of 173 
countries and 12 years. They use the revenue created by the sale of natural resources as indicator 
and show how excessive natural resource dependence increases homicide rates. 
The previous results are mixed; however, they mostly suggest the presence of a violence-
increasing effect of natural resources for regional examples and short macroeconomic panels. 
Since no study with global and long-term perspective has yet been conducted on the link between 
(mining) resources and interpersonal violence, our study adds substantial value to the literature.  
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The mentioned examples show that gold and silver seem to be among the resources that 
are particularly prone to increasing violence in society (Downey et al. 2010). Galeano (1971) 
noticed that gold and silver extraction in Latin America was accompanied by violence ever since 
colonization. Berman et al. (2015) document how – throughout Africa – the “appropriation of a 
mining area” (p.1) by violent groups contributes to the escalation of violence across the entire 
country.  
The presence of mining resources might matter, especially in the absence of property 
rights enforcement and the rule of law. Two channels of transmission can be hypothesized: 
First, in a setting with low institutional quality and the subsequently weak enforcement of 
property rights, individuals with a comparative advantage in violence will engage in violent 
behavior to appropriate a larger share of the resource surplus (Skaperdas 1992, Gonzalez 2012, 
Spierenburg 2006). According to Couttenier et al. (2016), this occurs “because interpersonal 
violence and state enforcement are substitutes for enforcing or defending property rights”. 
Violence can be used for both direct expropriation as well as to create a reputation of being 
extraordinarily violent. Downey et al. (2010) state that in the presence of abundant natural 
resources, violence is the most efficient mechanism to prevail over others in the occurrence of 
conflicts. In their definition of violence, they include violence perpetrated by the military, the 
police as well as by mercenary and rebel forces.  
The second potential channel is that resources provide financing for the formation of 
criminal gangs and organizations, which might have external effects on interpersonal violence.  
In conclusion, if resource extraction is high and the institutional structure allows kleptocratic 
tendencies to arise, the presence of (abundant) silver resources might lead to an outburst in 
violence, since interpersonal violence is used to appropriate revenue, defend or enforce property 
rights, or to deter attacks revolving around the revenue generated subsequently. 
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C.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
C.3.1. Measuring Interpersonal Violence: Homicide Rates 
We take the homicide rate as an indicator of interpersonal violence. We follow the UNODC 
definition of homicide as an “unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another 
person” (UNODC 2011). This definition makes clear that the incident has to meet 3 points: 1) 
there must be a killing, 2) the killing was intended by the perpetrator and 3) the killing was 
against the law. 
Homicide rates are widely used by researchers as an indicator of interpersonal violence 
because they have many advantages (van Zanden et al. 2014). First, there are fewer definition 
issues compared to other violence statistics, since the definition of a homicide is relatively clear 
and is identical in most cultures. On the contrary, non-lethal violent activities are often counted in 
many different classification items of statistics. For example, rape was not considered a violent 
crime in some western societies until few decades ago if it took place between married partners. 
Another advantage is that for homicide rates, technological change in killing technology does not 
matter, since all deaths are counted regardless of how they occurred.  
Certainly, homicide rates are not without problems. Among the caveats, we need to 
mention that during the most recent period, there was a certain degree of medical progress. This 
implies that nowadays, the same level of violence results in fewer lethal homicides because the 
victims can be saved. Mobile telephone technology has also led to a mortality reduction in a 
number of otherwise lethal events. Moreover, some countries did not always treat infanticide or 
the killing of brides or marriage partners after adultery (honor crimes) as homicide. Another 
major challenge is the problem of underreporting. The institutions reporting the homicide rate 
(for example police force, criminal justice system) might have an incentive to artificially lower 
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the number of homicides, which might cause a downward bias. There is a large amount of 
research on these issues, which suggests that these caveats bias neither the cross-sectional nor the 
intertemporal statistics substantially (see UNODC 2011). In general, homicide research in a long-
term perspective has made progress, improving the comparability between cultures and over time 
(for a recent review of studies, see ibid.). 
Our homicide rate database was constructed using a wide variety of sources. A large 
amount of earlier research by social historians, legal study experts, and –  for the more modern 
periods – UN organizations, allows us to mobilize a substantial compilation of homicide rates 
worldwide; and in some countries, even for early periods. Generally, there are two main sources 
of homicide data: criminal statistics and health statistics. Health statistics are usually less affected 
by underreporting since the deaths are certified by health physicians10, and health authorities 
usually have no incentive to artificially lower the homicide rate. It is a great advantage that, in 
many cases, we had both sources available and hence, were able to minimize measurement error: 
When data from both sources was available (health and criminal statistics) and not concordant, 
priority was given to the cause-of-death data from public sources. The most important sources for 
our database were the WHO, ClioInfra Project, the World Bank, Interpol and the Historical 
Violence Database.11 
  
                                                
10 During the last decades, physicians used the WHO International Classification of Diseases (ICD) for this 
purpose. 
11 More information on the homicide rate data and sources can be found in appendix C.8.1. 
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C.3.2. Silver as Resource Indicator 
Why do we study silver as indicator of resource dependence? For our analysis, we chose to focus 
on silver since it has a number of advantages over other mining products, first of all, universality 
over time and space. Silver has been important for many civilizations since ancient times, 
whereas gold, diamonds, or other scarce resources have been either more localized (gold, 
antimony and diamonds) and/or have only become important during recent decades (oil). In the 
case of diamonds, the top four countries (Congo (Kinshasa), Russia, Australia and Botswana) 
account for 91% of the total world mine production while for silver, the top four producers 
account for only 53% of total world mine production (U.S. Geological Survey 2018).  
Silver coins were already used as a payment method in antiquity. Silver was converted 
into decorative items and jewelry since this period. Most nations were on a silver standard until 
the late 19th century. Nowadays, silver is still widely used. Due to its excellent thermal and 
electrical conductibility, silver is integrated in conductors, switches, contacts and fuses, as 
coating material in photovoltaic cells, in mirrors and in batteries. Silver is also present as jewelry 
and silverware, in photography and in coins. Silver deposits are also not limited to certain 
geographical conditions or continents. Even though the bulge of silver deposits is situated along 
western North, Central and South America, significant silver production can be found in all 
continents. Silver deposits are only rare in Northern and Central Africa (Figure C.3).  
The second advantage of silver is that the law of one price is not too strongly violated. 
East Asia might have had slightly higher prices and a greater appreciation of silver in the early 
modern period but, in general, the price of silver is quite similar across countries due to its easy 
transportability. For this study, silver also has the advantage that it belongs to a group of 
resources that are easily appropriable or lootable (Van der Ploeg 2011). Other resources that have 
a much lower value per unit of weight, such as iron, need more consent and cooperation by the 
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labor force to be transported and, hence, the resource curse aspects are much less obvious for iron 
production.  
Finally, technological change matters for silver, but it was less radical than for other 
resources. Oil experienced an enormous increase in demand during the middle of the 20th century 
whereas guano, for example, was important for the 19th century. However, it became obsolete 
after the invention of nitrogen fertilizer. Moreover, the data availability and comparability for 
silver is a lot better than for other metals or natural resources (except gold), which makes it one 
of the best natural resource indicators. One last reason why we decided to use this single resource 
indicator instead of a vector including a larger set of natural resources is comparability over time 
and space, which would not be given if different resources with different units and volatile prices 
were used.  
C.3.2.1. History of Silver production 
Silver is a soft, white metal that occurs in nature either in native form, as an alloy with gold, or in 
various ores (in conjunction with minerals). The main sources of silver are ores combined with 
copper, lead and zinc. The silver metal is extracted by smelting or by chemical leaching. After the 
discovery of the Americas, vast amounts of silver were shipped to Europe, especially from 
Zacatecas (Mexico) and Potosí (Bolivia). 
Between 1876 and 1920, worldwide silver production exploded, mostly due to 
technological innovations and the exploitation of new regions in Australia, Canada, USA, Africa, 
Japan and elsewhere. The total silver production increased from around 80 million ounces 
annually in the 1870s to 190 million ounces by 1920 (on all this, see silverinstitute.org). Major 
technological breakthroughs include “steam assisted drilling, mining, mine dewatering and 
improved haulage” (silverinstitute.org 2017). These new technologies were necessary to be able 
to separate silver from ores that contained less silver, since many of the high-ore deposits were 
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exhausted by the end of the 19th century.  
In 2015, the biggest silver mine was situated in Australia, whereas Mexico continues to be 
the world’s largest silver producer (189.5 million ounces). Other top silver producers are Peru, 
China, Russia and Australia (silverinstitute.org 2017). 
C.3.2.2. Silver Data 
The information on silver production was retrieved from three different sources: the ClioInfra 
database, the British Geological Survey and the “Historical Statistics on Silver Production” by 
the US Department of Commerce.12 The production data from the different sources have all been 
converted to kg per capita to ensure comparability. In a second step, the average annual silver 
production (in kg per capita) has been calculated for each decade. Since, for our analysis, we 
need a variable that expresses how important silver production was for each respective country, 
we calculated silver dependence ratios, presented below. 
The dataset employed in this paper stretches over 110 years from the 1890s to the 1990s, 
covering 67 countries in total. In the earliest decade, seven countries are covered (Spain, Italy, 
Germany, Greece, France, Sweden, Japan) while in the most recent decade, observations for 58 
countries are included. The coverage is quite global, including data from all world regions (see 
Figure C.4 or refer to appendix C.8.3. for a more detailed discussion of the observations included 
in the dataset). 
  
                                                
12 For further information on the sources see appendix C.8.2. 
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C.3.2.3. Silver Dependence Ratio 
To what extent does an economy depend on silver production? We construct a measure of silver 
dependence, the share of total GDP that was generated by silver production. 
 d('e#.	9#;#"6#"B*	C&)(< = 	8.<44	f&'%#	g66#6	h*	d('e#.	i("("2	;#.	B&;()&		89:	;#.	B&;()& ∗ 100 
 
Both the gross value added (GVA) of silver mining per capita and GDP per capita are expressed 
in 1990 international Geary-Khamis USD.13 We use deflators (nominal per real GDP) to convert 
nominal silver prices into 1990 dollars (following Földvári 2006, for details see appendix C.8.2). 
Using this approach, we can calculate silver dependence ratios for 90 countries. The ratios range 
from 0% to 6%.  
According to this ratio, the most silver dependent countries that, on average, obtained 
more than 1% of their national income during the last centuries are Mexico, Republic of Congo 
(Brazzaville) and Peru. These countries are closely followed by Honduras, Namibia and Bolivia 
(between 0.5 and 1%). Other countries that obtain a substantial share of their GDP from silver 
mining (between 0.1 and 0.5%) are Chile, Australia, Colombia, Canada, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Kinshasa), Zambia, Kazakhstan and the USA.  
Previously, no estimations of the contribution of silver mining to GDP have been realized 
for most of the countries for the period under study. However, estimates for total mining per GDP 
exist and hence we were able to cross-check the obtained results with estimations of the 
contribution of the total mining sector in order to assess whether the magnitude of silver 
dependence in each respective country is realistic (Table C.1). We find that our estimate of silver 
dependence correlates with the total mining contribution to GDP that is available in some cases, 
                                                
13 Since the 1990 Geary-Khamis international USD is chosen as the currency unit of this paper, all data 
expressed in other currencies were converted. 
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and the magnitude does indeed seem plausible. Silver typically accounts for 10 -20% of total 
mining revenue to GDP. Also, the high dependence numbers for Mexico at the end of the 19th 
century seem plausible, since up to 1850 Mexico was always among the largest silver producers 
(US Department of Commerce 1930).  
C.4. Empirical Analysis 
Our main hypothesis is that higher silver dependence leads to a significantly higher homicide 
rate. To test this hypothesis, we use the following specification: 
 YDF = Gm + Gno. d('e#.	9#;#"6#"B#D,Fqn + GrIDF + sD + sF + tDF  (1) 
 YDF	 is the natural logarithm of the decadal homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants of country i in 
decade t. We use decadal averages to rule out short-term fluctuations both in the dependent and in 
the explanatory variables and to rule out the risk of spurious regression: As described by Kao and 
Baltagi (2000) and Ventosa-Santaularia (2009), when dealing with macro panels with large N 
(Number of countries) and large T (length of the time series) rather than the usual micro panels 
with large N and small T, the presence of a trending mechanism can lead to spurious results. 
Reducing the length of the time series reduces the risk of spurious regression. Furthermore, we 
are not interested in the short term fluctuations in homicide rates or silver dependence, but rather 
in the long-term effects of how a high silver dependence can have a substantial effect on the 
violence levels in a society. Another argument in favor of the use of decadal observations is the 
availability of control variables. For many variables, data is only available every or every five 
years. Using decadal averages, the availability of control variables can be maximized. 
Nevertheless, we also report results using country-year observations in the robustness checks. sD	and sF are country and time fixed effects. tDF is the unexplained, idiosyncratic error.  
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d('e#.	9#;#"6#"B#D,F is our silver dependence ratio described above. This variable enters 
the regression lagged by one decade. We expect the effect of resource dependence on violence 
not to be immediate, but it seems more realistic that distortions take a certain time to exert an 
influence. Lagging by one decade is a natural choice in a decadal panel, which is in line with the 
methodology applied by previous studies as for example Hong and Yang (2018) and Stretesky et 
al. (2017). Stretesky et al. (2017) show that the correlation between homicide rates and resource 
dependence is highest when the resource rents are lagged by 10 years. The decision to lag the 
silver dependence is furthermore supported by our inspection of Figure C.2, which displays a one 
decade lag from resource dependence to homicide.  
An additional benefit is that lagging the most important explanatory variable avoids the 
possibility of reverse contemporaneous causation (Hong and Yang 2018, Kollias and Ali 2017).  IDF is the vector of control variables that includes: 
1) Log (GDP per capita) 
2) Gini coefficient of income inequality 
3) Execution of death penalty (dummy variable) 
4) Education (combined index of numeracy and enrollment rates) 
5) Interstate conflict in that decade (dummy variable) 
6) Autocracy (dummy variable) 
7) Major drug production or trade (dummy variable) 
We include GDP per capita as a proxy of the general level of income and development of each 
country; it acts as one of the most important control variables. Lower GDP levels might not only 
proxy low opportunity cost (allowing easier recruiting of individuals for criminal activity, see 
Fajnzylber et al. 2002a) but also an undiversified economic structure in which high silver 
dependencies are more pronounced. Another important control variable is inequality, measured 
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by the Gini coefficient, which has previously been shown to be related to high levels of violence 
(Fajnzylber et al. 2002b). Incentives for violent expropriation are higher if assets can be 
transferred from rich to poor in high inequality settings.  
Execution of the death penalty is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the death 
penalty has been executed in that decade and 0 otherwise. This variable can be used as a proxy 
indicator for the severity of the judicial system or, more precisely, the harshness of the 
punishment of convicts. Deterrence of potential delinquents through severe punishments might 
influence the decision to engage in criminal behavior (Fajnzylber et al. 2002b) and hence, needs 
to be controlled for. 
Education is another factor that alters the incentives of an individual to commit a severe 
crime by increasing the opportunity costs of criminal behavior, resulting in less violent and illegal 
activities. We include a combined index of education that is based on average years of schooling 
and is complemented by numeracy data.14 
We include a dummy variable that indicates if a violent conflict, civil war or interstate 
war took place in the respective decade in the country, to control for the fact that in the years 
leading up to a war and during its aftermath, a society is generally characterized by unrest and 
turmoil. There might be externalities from wars on interpersonal violence.  
We control for autocracy, using an indicator variable that takes on value 1 if the Polity IV 
score of the single country in each decade was lower than the world average score in that decade. 
Hence, it identifies whether the political setup was rather autocratic in comparison to the other 
countries in the world at the same time. As mentioned above, institutions play an important role 
in determining the specificities of the resource curse. Since the multitude of institutional regimes 
is impossible to capture in one single variable, we decided to opt for a dummy indicator that 
                                                
14 For a detailed description of the construction of the index refer to appendix C.8.4. 
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clearly discerns between “good” and “bad” institutional setups. 
Finally, we include a binary variable indicating whether a country was majorly involved 
in drug production or trade. Due to the lack of time variant evidence, we can only include this 
variable in the random effects specification (see Table C.5). 
Table C.2 offers descriptive statistics of the variables included in our empirical analysis.15 
Our empirical analysis follows a three-step approach: In a first step, we estimate fixed effects 
panel models to control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity that is constant over time. 
Secondly, since we realized that the assumptions of a random effects model might be fulfilled, we 
estimated correlated random effects models as first suggested by Mundlak (1978) and developed 
by Allison (2009). This specification has the advantage that it relaxes the assumption of the pure 
random effects model and that it allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables. Even more 
importantly, we can identify whether the resource effect is more an intertemporal or a cross-
sectional feature.  
Thirdly, we estimate IV regressions. Even though silver mining depends mostly on the 
availability of resources and the world market demand, there is always the possibility that 
endogeneity – due to reverse causality or omitted variables – is present in macroeconomic 
regression models. For example, one could imagine that homicide rates might influence silver 
mining by changing the incentives of investors and the overall economic climate in the country. 
Autocracy is less suspicious of endogeneity because of its institutional nature, which implies that 
it changes relatively slowly over time and is, hence, unaffected by the homicide rate, 
contemporaneously or in the short run. To ensure that the previous results are not influenced by 
endogeneity, we present IV-estimations in chapter C.4.4. 
  
                                                
15 For a detailed description of the control variables and their sources, please see appendix C.8.4. 
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C.4.1. Fixed Effects Analysis 
In a first step, we examined the impact of silver dependence on homicide rates over the entire 
global panel16 using a fixed effects estimation. This model identifies the effect of silver 
dependence on homicide rates by relying on within-country time series variation while 
controlling for country specific differences that are constant through time. We also include time 
FE (specified as half centuries controls). We clustered the standard errors at the country level to 
allow for both heterogeneity and intra-country correlation of errors.  
The results are presented in Table C.3 and the main hypothesis is confirmed. We find a 
significant positive link between lagged silver dependence and homicide rates (models (1) to (4)). 
This effect holds even when controlling for different sets of covariates.17 Regarding magnitude, 
in the case of model (4), a 1 standard deviation increase in silver dependence (0.19) roughly 
entails a 10% increase in the homicide rate.  
In line with theoretical predictions and previous studies, we find a negative impact of 
GDP per capita on homicide rates (van Zanden et al. 2014 and van der Ploeg 2011). Higher 
incomes direct activities away from illegal and violent alternatives. In this fixed effects 
specification, we nevertheless find no evidence for an impact of inequality on violence levels. 
This might be due to the nature of the fixed effects model, which puts the focus on variation over 
time but not on variation across countries. Likewise, we find no evidence for a significant impact 
of education or the execution of the death penalty. The presence of violent interstate conflict or 
civil war, in contrast, has externalities on interpersonal violence and increases the homicide rate 
over the entire decade. The dummy for an autocratic institutional setup is negatively associated 
with the homicide rate. This might be due to the severity of the punishment and prosecution of 
perpetrators in authoritarian regimes, which might not be fully captured by the death penalty 
                                                
16 For a discussion of selectivity of the sample refer to appendix C.8.3. 
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variable. This is not implausible. Related studies on civil war also find that countries that 
transitioned from autocracy to democracy were especially vulnerable to this type of violence. 
Only extremely democratic countries with a history of democratic participation were not violent 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004 and Benson and Kugler 1998). Appendix C.8.5 offers various 
robustness checks, showing that the results remain identical when using country-year 
observations or different groups of countries with especially high or low silver dependence. 
C.4.2. Correlated Random Effects Analysis 
In the current literature, it is customary to estimate fixed effects models because the strong 
assumption of the alternative random effects model (i.e. that the regressors and the unobserved, 
time-invariant factors are uncorrelated) usually cannot be maintained (LaFree 1999). However, 
when performing Hausman tests to compare the fixed effects to the random effects results, we 
discover that the use of a random effects model is actually feasible in our case (the results of the 
tests are included at the bottom of Table C.4). Hence, we additionally decided to estimate a 
correlated random effects model as originally proposed by Mundlak (1978) and developed by 
Allison (2009). This model splits the effect of the cluster-varying covariates into within-cluster 
(correlation over time) and between-cluster (across cross-sections) effects. This is accomplished 
by including, as independent variables, both the deviations of the variable from the cluster mean 
as well as the cluster means of the variable. The assumptions of a pure random effects model are 
relaxed. The estimated equation is as follows: 
 uDF = v + wn ∗ IDF − xD + wr ∗ xD + tDF  (2) 
 wn - captures the within-cluster effect wr - captures the between-cluster effect  
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The results of the Mundlak-model are presented in Table C.4. Again, we clustered the 
errors on the country level to allow for heterogeneity and for intra-country correlation of errors. 
The results concerning the within effects corroborate the inference obtained from the 
previous fixed effects regressions (Table C.3). Over time, an increase in silver dependence by one 
standard deviation leads to around an increase in homicide rates by roughly 10%, which is 
obviously a substantial effect. However, in the cross-sectional dimension, the silver dependence 
does not have a robust effect. This finding is in line with Stretesky et al. (2017) who propose that 
natural resource extraction has an impact over time within countries but not between them.  
Again, GDP per capita has a violence-reducing effect, while a higher silver dependence 
one decade ago increases violence levels significantly. Looking at the between effects, we can 
now identify the important impact of the inequality measure, the Gini coefficient: Higher 
inequality is associated with a higher incidence of homicide (Paré 2006). As expected, the impact 
of inequality on crime and violence can only be observed looking at the cross-sectional level, as 
we find no impact of inequality on violence over time. 
One advantage of the random effects model is that we can also control for time-invariant 
country characteristics, e.g. being a major drug producer, which might be an important 
confounding factor. Table C.5 shows that the results are robust to including a dummy variable 
that indicates if the country is listed as a major drug producer18. 
C.4.3. The Interaction of Institutions and Silver Dependence 
In the first two regressions, we have shown that there is significant correlation between silver 
dependence and crime, even when controlling for different confounding factors. In a second step, 
we now want to assess the role of the political setup in this relationship.  
                                                
18 The dummy variable takes on the value 1 if the country is listed as major illicit drug producing or major 
drug-transit country in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2015 (US Department of State).  
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We employ an interaction specification to test our hypothesis that the silver-violence-
curse is reinforced in countries with an autocratic political setup that allows kleptocratic behavior 
if an “easily lootable” resource such as silver is available (van der Ploeg 2011). 
We estimate the following model specification: 
 YDF = Gm + Gno. g%)<B.&B*DF + Gro. d('e#.	9#;#"6#"B#DF +Gyo. (g%)<B.&B*	DFx	d('e#.	9#;#"6#"B#DF) + IDF + sD + sF + tDF (3) 
 
When applying Hausman tests, we again find that the assumptions for the random effects model 
are met (results are presented at the bottom of Table C.6). Hence, we estimated the correlated 
random effects model presented in Table C.6. 
The results regarding the within effect are consistent with the previous regressions, 
relating an increase in silver dependence to significantly higher homicide rates. The interaction 
between institutional setup and silver dependence does not have a significant within effect. When 
looking at the between effect, the picture is different. The results indeed indicate that an 
interaction effect exists in the cross-sectional dimension. While the silver dependence and the 
autocracy dummy alone have no significant impact, the interaction of the two is highly significant 
and substantial in magnitude: An increase of 1 standard deviation of silver dependence in an 
autocratic country translates into a 113% increase in homicide rate (model (3)). 
The secondary results are consistent with previous findings, e.g. higher GDP per capita is 
associated with lower violence levels (over time) while inequality is linked to higher violence 
levels (across cross-sections). 
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C.4.4. Instrumental Variable Approach 
The previous results might be affected by endogeneity problems. Endogeneity could be caused, 
for example, by reverse causality between homicide rates and silver production or by omitted 
variables. It might be the case that changes in country-level violence impact on mining activities 
due to different incentives and conditions. For example, investors might be less likely to invest in 
mining in countries with high levels of violence, thereby reducing the quantity of silver produced. 
One additional threat to the validity of the result is the possibility of measurement error in both 
the silver dependence variable and the homicide rates.  
To assess whether the regression results are biased by endogeneity, we adopt an 
instrumental variable strategy. As a first instrument for silver dependence, we use the number of 
identified silver deposits in a country relative to their total area (see appendix C.8.2 for additional 
information). The geographical features that favor the occurrence of silver cannot be affected by 
the levels of violence in the country, or by other omitted variables that are not geographical in 
nature. Hence, the number of silver sites per country provides a good source of exogenous 
variation across cross-sections, which is strictly unrelated to the socioeconomic conditions in a 
country, since it is predetermined by geographical features. Additionally, we assume that there 
cannot be any direct effect form the silver deposits in the ground on homicide rates, since the 
number of discovered silver sites in a country does not have any economic or social impact on 
society. Only via extraction, once the deposits are being extracted, the impact can show via the 
mechanisms described above. 
Additionally, we add the international silver price as a time-varying instrument. This 
instrument is not affected by the production quantities of individual countries, since none of the 
countries included in the sample is a producer with a large enough share of the world market to 
influence the world market price. The exclusion restriction is also assumed to hold, since it is 
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hard to imagine to have any direct impact of the silver price on a country’s homicide rate. Only 
via the production of silver and hence the silver dependence, the homicide rate might be 
impacted. Finally, it is likely that an increase in the international silver price raises the incentive 
to extract silver, and silver production in a country will increase. Hence, the silver prices likewise 
are a source of exogenous variation.  
We regress the silver dependence on the two instruments, the world silver price as well as 
the predetermined number of (discovered) silver sites per area to obtain exogenous variation in 
silver dependence. The first stage of our regression is as follows: 
 Silver	DependenceDF = Ñm + ÑnLog(Silver	Sites	per	Area)D +Ñro<2(C#&'	d('e#.	:.(B#)F + ÑyIDF +∈DF  (4) 
 
Table C.7 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using the two stage least squares model 
(2SLS). The specifications contain different sets of control variables and all contain half-century 
fixed effects. 
As seen from the first stage results, the F-statistics of excluded instruments are at least 
close to the threshold level of 10. To cope with a potential weak instruments problem, we apply 
limited information maximum likelihood techniques that were designed for moderately weak 
instrument estimation and these yield very similar results.  
Under the usual assumptions, the Sargan-test signals that overidentification is not a major 
issue, as p-values are always higher than 0.10. Of course, no empirical economist can ever be 
sure that the exclusion restriction does indeed hold. However; in the case of silver deposits, it 
seems likely that the effect on homicide rates runs via silver production, and the same is true for 
the world market price of silver.  
In all specifications, the lagged silver dependence has a positive and significant impact on 
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homicide rates, just as in the previous estimations without instrumental variables. When 
comparing the results to the fixed and correlated random effects models above, it is striking that 
the coefficient has increased considerably in magnitude. If the lagged silver dependence increases 
by one standard deviation, the homicide rate increases by almost two standard deviations (when 
evaluated at the mean homicide rate). The reason might be the presence of some degree of 
measurement error in the fixed effects specification, which was considerably reduced using the 
instrumental variable approach. 
Regarding the secondary results, the importance of a conflict in the respective decade is 
underlined also by the 2SLS results. Inequality tends to increase violence, while the contrary 
holds for GDP, however these results are not very robust.  
C.4.5. Selection on Unobservables 
Even though the instrumental variable approach corroborates the findings in Table C.3, the 
estimates might still be biased by unobservable factors related to the degree of silver dependence 
in a society. Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) have suggested a method to gauge the potential bias 
from unobservables using the selection on observables. This method examines how strong the 
selection on unobservables has to be in order to annul the estimated effect. Recently, this method 
has been applied in a variety of empirical frameworks (for example Nunn and Wantchekon 
2011).  
The method is based on the common phenomenon that in multiple regressions, the size of 
the coefficient of the main variable of interest declines as more (observable) control variables are 
included. The Altonji-Elder-Taber-ratio (AET-ratio) compares the size of the coefficient of the 
full model including the controls to the size of the coefficient of a restricted model with only a 
constant (and in our case, country fixed effects) included.  
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The AET-ratio is calculated as follows: 
gãå − .&)(< = GaROOGLMUFLDbFMW − GaROO 
The bigger the coefficient of the full model, the stronger is the effect of the variable of interest 
(silver dependence); and the smaller the difference between the coefficients of the two models, 
the less the size of the coefficient is affected by the selection on observable control variables. 
If the control variables do only modestly reduce the magnitude of the silver dependence 
coefficient, then the unobserved variables would need to have a very strong effect to eliminate 
this effect completely. This methodology relies on the assumption that the relationship between 
the treatment and the observed explanatory variables provides information about the relationship 
between the treatment and the unobserved variables (Altonji, Elder and Taber 2005). 
Oster (2017) recently suggested an important improvement to the AET-ratio. She shows 
that not only the movement of the coefficient matters, but also changes in the explanatory power 
(as measured by the R2) need to be taken into account to obtain a consistent estimator for omitted 
variable bias. Following Oster (2017), the movement of the coefficient is evaluated relative to the 
changes in R2 which is the share of variation of the dependent variable explained by the included 
control variables. A maximum value for R2 needs to be set, determining the maximum share of 
variation the unobserved variables could explain. Then we can estimate the explanatory power 
unobserved variables would need to have in order to turn the estimated treatment effect of silver 
dependence insignificant (s). 
Table C.9 presents the estimates of the amount of selection on unobservables necessary 
for the treatment effect to be equal to zero (G=0). 19 Both estimates (including all countries or 
                                                
19 We use the Stata command psacalc provided by Oster (2017) to calculate the estimates of the sensitivity 
parameters, and least-squares dummy variable version of model (4) of  
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including only the countries with significant silver productions) are above 1, hence the results are 
robust to omitted variable bias according to Oster (2017). When using a less conservative 
approach and setting the maximum R2 to 0.9, then the estimates of the sensitivity parameters 
increase, indicating that the power of the unobservables would need to be at least as big as the 
explanatory power of the variables already included. We conclude that our findings can be 
considered robust to omitted variable bias. 
C.5. Summary and Conclusions 
In the past, it has been shown that the resource curse can have many dimensions. With this paper, 
we have added to the literature by showing that the presence of valuable mining resources (such 
as silver) can lead to increased country-level violence. This effect seems to be amplified when 
being interacted with poor institutional setups. The mechanism might be weak property rights 
enforcement, because kleptocratic behavior cannot be avoided. Moreover, criminal organization 
might substitute any public enforcement of property rights. Organizations prone to violence 
(gangs, guerrillas, paramilitary groups) may benefit from the additional revenue generated by the 
resources (instead of the government), especially with weak institutional setups. This allows them 
to become even more violent and powerful, purchasing more weapons and exerting more regional 
influence. There are several studies that examine the impact of resources on violence and its 
interaction with institutions in a local context (Angrist & Kugler 2008, Umbeck 1977, Couttenier 
et al. 2016).  
It is important to formalize and regulate the exploitation of valuable resources to avoid 
conflicts about the distribution of created revenue. Well-defined property rights and the efficient 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
Table C.3 using the Stata command areg with country dummies. 
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prosecution of delinquency are crucial in this context. In the future, environmental change, 
economic development and population growth will increase the pressure on natural resources 
such as water, soil, crude oil, natural gas, coal even more (Bergstrom and Randall 2016, 
Vörösmarty et al. 2000). This development will create more settings with scarcity of certain 
resources that might eventually escalate into open violence (Ide 2015). In this context of future 
developments, the research of the impact of scarce natural resources on human behavior is even 
more relevant.  
Furthermore, our findings add to the previous literature on the determinants of violent 
crime. First, consistent with most previous investigations, the level of economic development, 
measured by GDP per capita, is negatively linked to the homicide rate. This link is most 
pronounced over time. We also studied inequality effects and found that this link is only visible 
across countries, but not over time.  
In this article, we focused on the “silver curse” since this mining resource probably had 
less of a time variant effect than oil or guano and it has been important for many countries, while 
gold and diamonds are more concentrated in a few geographical areas. Still, there would be a 
desideratum for future research to examine a combined resource curse from the sum of all 
resources. However, conceptually, it is not easy to weigh the different resources according to 
their appropriability or “lootability” (Boschini et al. 2007). More lootable resources certainly 
matter more for any potential resource curse and technological changes in the appropriability of 
resources was considerable, which complicates such an “all-resource” approach. Hence, 
identifying a “silver curse” is an important first step which needs to be taken when studying the 
development of welfare in a global perspective.  
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C.7. Figures and Tables 
C.7.1. Figures 
 
 
 
Figure C.1: Silver Dependence and Homicide Rates for Selected Countries (Panels 1 to 3)20 
 
 
Panel 1 
 
  
                                                
20 All figures without citation are own elaborations.  
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Figure C.2: Silver Dependence and Homicide Rates in Europe, the Americas and the World 
 
Average homicide rates and silver dependence values for Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, 
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, UK, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
the US, all countries in the sample for which the full nine decades were available. 
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Figure C.3: Silver Deposits in the World 
 
 
Source: http://mrdata.usgs.gov/mrds/map.html#  
(USGS – US Geological Survey – Mineral Resources Online Spatial Data) 
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C.7.2. Tables 
Table C.1: Mining Contribution to GDP 
 
Country Decade 
Our Calculation of 
Silver contribution to 
GDP 
Total Mining 
Contribution to 
GDP 
Source 
Mexico 192021 2.3% 8-11.45% Groningen Growth and Development Center 
Peru 1940 0.4% 8.1 – 7 % Groningen Growth and Development Center 
Germany 1870 0.12% 1.9% Groningen Growth and Development Center 
Indonesia 1980 0.01% 0.0% (Gold and Silver) Van der Eng (2014) 
Indonesia 1990 0.05% 0.6% (Gold and Silver) Van der Eng (2014) 
 
 
Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Observations22 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Log(Homicide rate) 278 1.171 1.196 -1.952 4.751 
Silver Dependence 278 0.0607 0.160 0 1.730 
Log(GDP per capita) 278 8.254 0.823 6.225 10.11 
Gini Coefficient 278 43.40 8.194 21.35 70.10 
Education 278 5.992 2.974 0.140 13.05 
Conflict Dummy 278 0.439 0.497 0 1 
Autocracy Dummy 278 0.335 0.473 0 1 
Death Penalty Dummy 278 0.687 0.465 0 1 
 
 
  
                                                
21 This observation is not included in the regression analysis; nevertheless, we used it to check the validity of 
our silver dependence variable.  
22 The number of observations in Table C.3, Table C.4 and Table C.5 is 268, because by lagging the silver 
dependence variable, we lose 10 observations.  
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Table C.3: Fixed Effects Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate) 
 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
L.Silver Dependence 0.539* 0.540* 0.446** 0.355* 0.522*** 
 (0.283) (0.284) (0.204) (0.200) (0.159) 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.138 -0.405* -0.467** -0.397* 
  (0.129) (0.239) (0.216) (0.214) 
Gini Coefficient   0.012 0.010 0.010 
   (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
Education   0.099 0.089 0.095 
   (0.07) (0.072) (0.071) 
Conflict Dummy     0.448*** 
     (0.148) 
Autocracy Dummy    -0.325* -0.336** 
    (0.191) (0.154) 
Death Penalty 
Dummy 
 
   0.005 
     (0.158) 
Constant 1.791*** 2.753*** 3.955*** 4.121*** 3.693*** 
 (0.268) (0.873) (1.364) (1.284) (1.202) 
      
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 
R-squared 0.052 0.058 0.080 0.090 0.187 
Number of Countries 60 60 60 60 60 
Half-Century FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All variables in decade means; standard errors clustered on the country level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.4: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rates): Within- and Between- Country Effects 
 
  (0) (1) (2) (3) 
     
Within Effects     
L.Silver Dependence 0.628** 0.518* 0.355* 0.478*** 
 (0.273) (0.285) (0.198) (0.152) 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.161 -0.467** -0.383** 
  (0.115) (0.214) (0.191) 
Gini Coefficient   0.0102 0.009 
   (0.012) (0.009) 
Education (spliced index)   0.089 0.094 
   (0.072) (0.074) 
Conflict Dummy    0.452*** 
    (0.145) 
Autocracy Dummy   -0.325* -0.332** 
   (0.190) (0.161) 
Death Penalty Dummy    -0.012 
    (0.154) 
Between Effects     
L.Silver Dependence 1.229* 1.247** 0.755 0.838 
 (0.672) (0.593) (0.665) (0.708) 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.462** -0.345 -0.317 
  (0.188) (0.273) (0.334) 
Gini Coefficient   0.062*** 0.059*** 
   (0.023) (0.023) 
Education (spliced index)   0.018 0.023 
   (0.086) (0.089) 
Conflict Dummy    0.271 
    (0.414) 
Autocracy Dummy   -0.167 -0.138 
   (0.422) (0.414) 
Death Penalty Dummy    0.125 
    (0.530) 
Constant 1.231*** 4.944*** 1.254 0.912 
 (0.158) (1.551) (2.037) (2.663) 
     
Observations 268 268 268 268 
Number of Countries 60 60 60 60 
Hausman Test FE-RE  
(p-value) 0.24 (0.516) 
2.67 
(0.263) 
8.78 
(0.118) 
8.91 
(0.259) 
All variables in decade means; standard errors clustered on the country level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.5: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rates): Including Dummy for Major Drug Producer 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Within Effects    
L.Silver Dependence 0.519* 0.356* 0.481*** 
 (0.284) (0.198) (0.152) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.160 -0.466** -0.380** 
 (0.116) (0.215) (0.192) 
Gini Coefficient  0.01 0.009 
  (0.01) (0.009) 
Education (spliced index)  0.088 0.093 
  (0.072) (0.074) 
Conflict Dummy   0.454*** 
   (0.145) 
Autocracy Dummy  -0.324* -0.331** 
  (0.190) (0.161) 
Death Penalty Dummy   -0.015 
   (0.154) 
    
Between Effects    
L.Silver Dependence -0.189 -0.311 -0.355 
 (0.892) (0.987) (1.213) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.436** -0.414 -0.359 
 (0.183) (0.265) (0.306) 
Gini Coefficient  0.056** 0.052** 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Education (spliced index)  0.037 0.042 
  (0.084) (0.082) 
Conflict Dummy   0.165 
   (0.441) 
Autocracy Dummy  -0.246 -0.203 
  (0.415) (0.416) 
Death Penalty Dummy   0.324 
   (0.588) 
Major Drug Producer 1.149** 0.858 0.995 
 (0.582) (0.627) (0.907) 
Constant 4.729*** 2.004 1.377 
 (1.509) (2.003) (2.507) 
Observations 268 268 268 
Number of countries 60 60 60 
All variables in decade means; standard errors clustered on the country level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.6: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rates): Institutions and Silver Dependence 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Within Effects    
L. Autocracy -0.124 -0.167 -0.094 
 (0.239) (0.232) (0.196) 
L.Silver Dependence 0.824** 0.636** 0.763** 
 (0.322) (0.322) (0.322) 
L. (Autocracy x Silver Dependence) -1.006 -0.899 -0.993 
 (0.807) (0.835) (0.796) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.147 -0.450* -0.352 
 (0.116) (0.254) (0.233) 
Gini Coefficient  0.009 0.009 
  (0.011) (0.01) 
Education (spliced index)  0.100 0.091 
  (0.085) (0.085) 
Conflict Dummy   0.433*** 
   (0.158) 
Death Penalty Dummy   -0.09 
   (0.168) 
Between Effects    
L. Autocracy -0.656 -0.509 -0.524 
 (0.412) (0.432) (0.413) 
L.Silver Dependence -1.553 -1.248 -1.254 
 (0.988) (0.940) (0.946) 
L. (Autocracy x Silver Dependence) 8.053*** 6.168*** 6.200*** 
 (2.294) (2.080) (2.323) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.502** -0.343 -0.338 
 (0.217) (0.302) (0.398) 
Gini Coefficient  0.053** 0.052** 
  (0.025) (0.025) 
Education (spliced index)  -0.001 -0.004 
  (0.097) (0.103) 
Conflict Dummy   -0.036 
   (0.486) 
Death Penalty Dummy   -0.002 
   (0.516) 
Constant 5.536*** 1.887 1.902 
 (1.884) (2.267) (3.076) 
    
Observations 255 255 255 
Number of Countries 57 57 57 
Hausman Test FE-RE (P-value) 8.13 (0.087) 11.4 (0.077) 11.03 (0.200) 
All variables in decade means; standard errors clustered on the country level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.7: 2SLS Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
First Stage      
Log(Silver sites per area) 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008) 
Log(L.World Silver Price) 0.072** 0.067** 0.067** 0.064*** 0.06*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.022) 
F-Stat of excluded instruments 9.34 8.94 8.24 8.05 8.24 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Second Stage      
L.Silver Dependence 9.306*** 9.320*** 10.27*** 8.974*** 10.63*** 
 (2.194) (2.259) (2.602) (2.520) (2.831) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.0239 -0.362 -0.481**  0.466 
 (0.391) (0.223) (0.238)  (0.431) 
Gini Coefficient    0.0347* 0.0116 
    (0.0185) (0.0232) 
Education (spliced index) -0.129    -0.230* 
 (0.105)    (0.119) 
Conflict Dummy 0.830** 0.904***  0.925*** 0.811** 
 (0.325) (0.320)  (0.293) (0.334) 
Autocracy Dummy -0.0891     
 (0.355)     
 (0.381) (0.376) (0.412) (0.341) (0.390) 
Constant -0.271 2.046 3.435* -2.119*** -3.651 
 (2.805) (1.992) (2.067) (0.742) (3.023) 
      
Observations 231 231 231 198 198 
Sargan-Test 0.095 0.386 0.699 0.413 0.096 
P-value 0.759 0.534 0.403 0.521 0.757 
Hausman-Durbin-Wu 65.457 60.149 64.141 37.714 55.322 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables in decade means;  
half-century fixed effects included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.8: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rates): LIML 
 
 
(1) (2) 
First Stage   
Log(Silver sites per area) 0.036*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.01) (0.008) 
Log(L.World Silver Price) 0.067** 0.065*** 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
Second Stage   
L.Silver Dependence 9.507*** 9.195*** 
 
(2.323) (2.599) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.356 
 
 
(0.227) 
 Gini Coefficient 
 
0.034* 
  
(0.019) 
Conflict Dummy 0.909*** 0.932*** 
 (0.326) (0.298) 
Constant 3.297 -1.327* 
 
(2.037) (0.756) 
   Observations 231 198 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables in decade means;  
half-century fixed effects included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table C.9: Oster (2017) Ratios based on Model (4) of Table C.3 
 
Model with Controls 
All 
Countries With Silver >0 ! 0.522 0.491 
R2 0.816 0.819 
   
Model without 
Controls (only country fe)   ! 0.738 0.841 
R2 0.016 0.027 
 
  
Sensitivity Parameters  "   
 
  
with Rmax=1, ! =0 1.37 1.078 
   
with Rmax=0.9, ! =0 2.96 2.267 
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C.8. Appendix 
C.8.1. Sources of Homicide Rates 
The database about homicide rates is the result of a vast amount of research effort realized 
over the last years. The observational unit of the data set employed in this paper is decade-
country averages; hence, the source given in the following table is always the source from which 
data was retrieved for most of the years in each respective decade. Data has been organized using 
the current country borders. 
 
Table C.10: Overview Sources of Homicide Data 
 
Source 
Number of 
Observations 
Detailed Source Description 
WHO Mortality 
Database 
105 
The WHO Mortality Database is a collection of cause-
of-death data as reported by civil registration systems 
of the member states. The data is coded according to 
the ICD-9 and ICD-10.  
Link: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/ 
Clio Infra 37 
Dataset produced by Winny Biermann and Jan Luiten 
van Zanden in 2014. Most of the data has been 
collected from statistical yearbooks.  
Link: https://www.clio-
infra.eu/Indicators/HomicideRates.html 
UNODC 34 
UNODC data, mostly compiled via the UN Survey on 
Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems. 
Link: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/statistics/historic-data.html 
Interpol 26 
The International Police Organization (Interpol) is the 
source of annual published crime statistics for member 
countries. Link: https://www.interpol.int/News-and-
media/Publications2/Annual-reports2 
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Historical Violence 
Database 
22 
Historical Violence Database (see: 
http://cjrc.osu.edu/research/interdisciplinary/hvd).  
Randolph Roth, Douglas L. Eckberg, Cornelia Hughes 
Dayton, Kenneth Wheeler, James Watkinson, Robb 
Haberman, and James M. Denham. 2008. “The 
Historical Violence Database: A Collaborative 
Research Project on the History of Violent Crime and 
Violent Death.” Historical Methods 41, 81-97. 
NRILP 16 
Lehti, M. (2013), “NRILP Comparative Homicide 
Time Series (NRILP-CHTS)”, National Research 
Institute of Legal Policy, Research Brief, 32, Helsinki. 
Archer & Gartner 14 
Comparative Crime Data File by Archer, Dane and 
Rosemary Gartner (1984) Violence and Crime in 
Cross-National Perspective. New Haven: Yale 
University Press., excel available on 
https://cjrc.osu.edu/research/interdisciplinary/hvd/asia/
sri-lanka 
SJBDE 6 Statistische Jahrbücher für das Deutsche Reich 
Mexico 5 
Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
various years, see inegi.org.mx 
India 4 Statistics of the colonies of the British empire. 
Brazil 2 
Brazil 1832-1890. Center for Research Libraries, 
Reports of the Brazilian Provinces 1830-1889, 
http://brazil.crl.edu/bsd/bsd/hartness/crimecomm.html, 
and Anuario estatistico do Brasil:1908-1912. (available 
at: http://memoria.org.br/) 
Colombia 2 
Colombia 1915-1930, Anuario Estadistico de 
Colombia 
Eisner 2 
Eisner, M., (2003), ‘Long-Term Historical Trends in 
Violent Crime’, Crime and Justice 30, 83-142. 
Japan 2 
Statistical Bureau, Management and Coordination 
Agency ed., Historical Statistics of Japan, vol.1, 5, 
Tokyo, 1988 
Total 27823  
  
                                                
23 The number of observations in the different regression tables might differ from this total number of 
observations, since single control variables are not available for all decades. 
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C.8.2. Sources of the Data on Silver Production, Occurrence and Dependence 
C.8.2.1. Silver Production Data 
The information about silver production has been retrieved from three main sources: 
1) Clio Infra, Silver mining production by decade and country, Kees Klein Goldewijk 
& Jonathan Fink-Jensen, Utrecht University, 2014, silver mine production, in 
metric tons, which contains information from: 
a. BGS, British Geological Survey. https://www.bgs.ac.uk/ 
b. Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics – Africa, Asia & Oceania 
1750-1993 (London, 1998). 
c. Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics – Europe (London, 1998). 
d. Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics – The Americas 1750-
1993 (London, 1998). 
e. Schmitz, Christopher J., World Non-Ferrous Metal Production and Prices, 
1700-1976 (London, 1979). 
f.  http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/silver/  
2) Minerals UK (Centre for sustainable mineral development), World mineral 
statistics archive from the British Geological Survey (BGS), 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/worldArchive.html 
3) US department of Commerce 1930 (Merrill, Charles White), Summarized Data of 
silver production, Economic Paper (Bureau of Mines) 8, United States, 
Washington D.C. : 
digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc40312/m2/1/high_res_d/bomeconpapers_
8_w.pdf 
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C.8.2.2. Calculation of Gross Value Added of Silver Mining 
To construct the gross value added (GVA) of silver mining per capita, we used the silver 
production quantities reported from our sample in kg per capita. We then multiplied the quantities 
with the real silver price per capita in 1990 GK USD:  #$%	'()*+,	-(.(./	0+,	120(32 = 5()*+,67 (.	8/ ∗ :;,)<	5()*+,	0,(1+	0+,	8/ 
The real silver price (in 1990 GK USD) was obtained by dividing the nominal silver prices by a 
deflator:  
=+2)	'()*+,	>,(1+	(1990	#C	D'E) = G;H(.2)	'()*+,	>,(1+	(1I,,+.3	D'E)<+J)23;,  
We calculated the deflator following the approach by Földvári (2006) with the help of two time 
series: the current GDP of the US and the GDP expressed in 1990 GK USD. The ratio of the two 
series is a deflator, which can be used to convert the current USD silver prices to 1990 GK 
international USD.  
<+J)23;, = .;H(.2)	#E>	0+,	120(32	(1I,,+.3	D'E),+2)	#E>	0+,	120(32	(1990	#C	D'E)  
Since no information on the international silver prices could be found, we retrieved the nominal 
silver price by dividing the New York Market (world) price of gold (per fine ounce) by the 
gold/silver price ratio. Both variables are reported in Officer and Williamson (2017).  
G;H(.2)	'()*+,0,(1+ = GK	-2,8+3	#;)<	>,(1+	0+,	J(.+	;L#;)< − '()*+, − >,(1+	=23(;  
To obtain the real silver price per kg, silver price per oz. was then multiplied with 35.374. The 
gold/silver price ratio is computed as the ratio of the price of gold to the price of silver. The ratios 
are “world” market ratios, meaning that the marketplace was always selected to be the best 
representation of the “world” price ratio by Officer and Williamson as follows: Hamburg 1687-
1832, London 1833-1914, New York 1915-1990.   
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Table C.11: Sources of Nominal and Real GDP and Gold/Silver Prices 
 
Nominal and real GDP of the US 
Louis Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, "What 
Was the U.S. GDP Then?" MeasuringWorth, 2017 
Gold prices and gold/silver price 
ratio 
 
Lawrence H. Officer and Samuel H. Williamson,  
"The Price of Gold, 1257 - Present.," 
MeasuringWorth, 2017 
URL: http://www.measuringworth.com/gold/ 
We used the New York market prices. 
 
C.8.2.3. Silver Occurrence Data 
The data on silver occurrences has been retrieved from: 
U.S. Geological Survey, 2005, Mineral Resources Data System: U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, 
Virginia; available under https://mrdata.usgs.gov/mrds/. 
For each country, all discovered (identified) geographical sites that contain silver as first, second 
or third commodity were selected. We included all kinds of silver deposits: simple occurrences 
(marginally and sub-economic reserves) as well as prospective, current or past producers of silver 
(economic reserves). In a next step, the number of silver sites was divided by the total surface 
area of each country to obtain a measure of the intensity of silver occurrences in each country.  
C.8.3. Data Selectivity Analysis 
The following table gives an overview of the distribution of observations across countries. The 
most frequent countries in the data set are Germany and France with 11 decadal observations 
each. The remaining countries are represented with 10 or fewer decades, while for 19 countries 
we have only one observation in the data set.  
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Table C.12: Number of Observations per Country 
 
Country # of obs. Country # of obs. Country # of obs. 
France 11 Costa Rica 4 Botswana 1 
Germany 11 Ghana 4 Cuba 1 
Australia 10 Morocco 4 Haiti 1 
Canada 10 Nicaragua 4 Iran 1 
Japan 10 Philippines 4 Kazakhstan 1 
United States 10 Tanzania 4 Kenya 1 
Colombia 9 Thailand 4 Malaysia 1 
Italy 9 Turkey 4 Mali 1 
Sweden 9 Zambia 4 Niger 1 
Hungary 8 Brazil 3 Romania 1 
Ireland 8 Cote d'Ivoire 3 Russia 1 
Austria 7 Dominican Republic 3 Slovak Republic 1 
Finland 7 Honduras 3 Tajikistan 1 
Greece 7 Panama 3 Uganda 1 
Poland 7 South Korea 3 Uzbekistan 1 
Spain 7 Tunisia 3 Total 278 
Guatemala 6 Bolivia 2 
South Africa 6 China 2 
Chile 5 Ecuador 2 
India 5 El Salvador 2 
Mexico 5 Norway 2 
New Zealand 5 Zimbabwe 2 
Peru 5 Algeria 1 
Portugal 5 Armenia 1 
Argentina 4 Azerbaijan 1 
Bulgaria 4 Belgium 1 
 
The data is widely distributed geographically. As usual, data availability was slightly better for 
early industrialized countries such as France, Germany, Australia, Canada, Japan and the US. 
Nevertheless, there is no underrepresentation of poorer countries, since there is, for example, a 
very good coverage of Latin American countries like Colombia, Guatemala, Chile, Mexico and 
Peru. For Asia, India is covered by 5 decades, followed by Thailand and South Korea. For Africa, 
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we have South Africa represented by 6 decades, and Ghana, Morocco and Tanzania by at least 4 
decades. This shows that even though there is a slight bias towards richer countries, the data 
coverage is quite global, representing all world regions.  
 
Table C.13: Number of Observations per Decade 
 
Decade # of observations 
1890 7 
1900 9 
1910 12 
1920 12 
1930 14 
1940 15 
1950 26 
1960 39 
1970 44 
1980 42 
1990 58 
Total 278 
 
When looking at the distribution of observations over time, it is obvious that the number 
is continuously increasing when moving from early decades to more recent ones. For the earliest 
decade, 1890, we nevertheless have 7 observations (Spain, Italy, Germany, Greece, France, 
Sweden, Japan) and 58 for the most current one. 
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Figure C.5: Observations by Decades and Countries 
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C.8.4. Control Variables – Sources and Description 
Table C.14: Sources and Description of Control Variables 
 
Variable Source Description 
Log (GDP per capita) 
 
Bolt, J. and J. L. Van Zanden (2013): “The 
First Update of the Maddison Project: Re-
Estimating Growth before 1820,” Clio Infra 
Project, available at: https://www.clio- 
infra.eu/datasets/indicators (last accessed: 
07.07.2016).  
GDP per capita in 1990 
international Geary- 
Khamis dollars  
 
Gini Coefficient of 
income inequality 
Baten, J., J. L. Van Zanden, M. Moatsos, P. 
Foldvari and B. van Leeuwen (2014): „Gross 
household income gini 1820-2000“, Version 
1, Clio Infra Project, available at: 
https://www.clio- infra.eu/datasets/indicators 
 
Execution of death 
penalty (dummy 
variable) 
Own elaboration based on the following 
sources: 
Amnesty International 2017, accessed through 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/death-
penalty/ 
 
Cornell Center on the Death Penalty 
Worldwide (2017), accessed through 
http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/search.cfm 
Indicator variable that 
takes on the value 1 if 
the death penalty has 
been executed in the 
respective decade, and 0 
otherwise (independent 
from legal status of the 
death penalty) 
Education (spliced 
index of numeracy 
and enrollment rates) 
Average years of schooling: 
Van Leeuwen, B., J. Van Leeuwen-Li, and P. 
Foldvari (2013): “Average Years of 
Education, 1850-2010,” Version 2, Clio Infra 
Project, available at: https://www.clio- 
infra.eu/datasets/indicators  
 
Numeracy: 
Baten J. (2013): “Numeracy Estimates 
(ABCC) by Birth Decade and Country,” 
Version 1, Clio Infra Project, available at: 
https://www.clio-infra.eu/datasets/indicators  
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Interstate conflict in 
that decade (dummy 
variable) 
 
Constructed based on Brecke, P. and P. 
Foldvari (2013): “Armed External Conflicts, 
1500-2000,” Version 1, Clio Infra Project, 
available at: https://www.clio-
infra.eu/datasets/indicators  
Indicator variable taking 
on value 1 if an internal 
or external violent 
conflict took place in the 
respective decade and 
value 0 otherwise.  
Autocracy (dummy 
variable) 
 
Marshall, M. G., K. Jaggers, and T. R. Gurr 
(2013): “Autocracy-Democracy Index, 1800-
2010,” Version 1, Clio Infra Project, available 
at: https://www.clio- 
infra.eu/datasets/indicators 
 
 
C.8.5. Robustness Checks and Discussion of Magnitudes 
To assess the validity of the obtained results, this section presents various robustness checks, first 
using country-year observations and secondly using different groups of countries.  
C.8.5.1. Regressions Based on Country-Year Observations 
This regression uses the country-year observations instead of the decadal averages. Due to data 
availability, only GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient can be added as control variable. Due 
to the big time dimension of this panel based on yearly observations (between 9 and 30 
observations per country) there is a risk of spurious regression. Unit root tests however show, that 
the series of silver dependence and homicide rate are stationary. Hence, the results are presented 
here to underline the results obtained using decade averages. The silver dependence has been 
lagged by 10 years just as in the regressions based on decadal averages. 
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Table C.15: FE Regressions of Log(Homicide Rates) using Country-Year Observations 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
L.Silver Dependence 0.585*** 0.590*** 0.702** 
 
(0.211) (0.206) (0.312) 
Log(GDP per capita) 
 
-0.332 -0.358 
  
(0.320) (0.328) 
Gini coefficient 
  
0.00977 
   
(0.00809) 
Constant 2.445*** 4.589** 4.154* 
 
(0.456) (2.178) (2.301) 
    Observations 527 527 457 
R-squared 0.212 0.225 0.266 
Number of countries 59 59 52 
Decade fixed effects included; country-year observations; standard errors clustered on the 
country level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C.15 shows that the coefficient on the silver dependence is the same in sign, magnitude and 
significance as in Table C.3, hence corroborating the previously obtained results.  
C.8.5.2. Silver Dependent Countries 
To check the robustness of the results, we identified the most silver oriented economies 
with a mean silver dependence higher than 0.5 % and estimated the models for this group 
separately. The threshold economy is Belgium with a mean silver dependence of 0.06%. We then 
checked the relationship between silver dependence and homicide rates for this group of 
countries (24 countries). In all model specifications, the coefficient of the lagged silver 
dependence is highly significant, indicating that if the silver dependence increases by one 
percentage point, the homicide rate will increase by around 50%. 
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Table C.16: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate): High Silver Dependence 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
L.Silver Dependence 0.335* 0.639** 0.552** 0.605** 
 (0.193) (0.232) (0.238) (0.220) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.041 0.153 0.00736 -0.142 
 (0.195) (0.527) (0.463) (0.437) 
Gini Coefficient  -0.00931 -0.00627 0.000427 
  (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0158) 
Education  0.00214 0.00690 -0.00911 
  (0.131) (0.118) (0.121) 
Conflict Dummy   -0.385* -0.333 
   (0.206) (0.205) 
Autocracy Dummy    0.120 
    (0.176) 
Death Penalty Dummy    -0.449 
    (0.319) 
Constant 2.961 1.966 1.601 2.788 
 (1.878) (3.869) (3.363) (3.153) 
Observations 126 82 80 80 
R-squared 0.128 0.124 0.114 0.139 
Number of countries 24 15 15 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Half-century fixed effects included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
C.8.5.3. Silver Dependent Countries & Political Setup 
Since the impact of silver dependence on crime seems to hinge on the quality of institutions, this 
effect should be more visible in countries with autocratic setup. We therefore estimated the 
impact of silver dependence on homicide rates separately for countries with good institutional 
setups and for countries with varying institutional quality. 
1) Silver dependent countries with constant democratic setups (6 countries): 
These countries are identified by the fact that the dummy variable autocracy is constantly zero 
throughout the observed time period. Hence, these countries are characterized by a constant 
democratic institutional setup for the observed time period.  
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2) Silver dependent countries with variable autocratic institutions (18 countries): 
These countries are identified by the fact that the Autocracy dummy changes its value at least 
once over the observed time, hence, the governing regime changed. Countries included are 
among others Mexico, Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, Poland, Uzbekistan and others.  
 
 
 
 
Table C.17: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rate): Democratic Setup 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
L.Silver Dependence 0.515*** 0.513* 0.466** 0.502*** 
 (0.051) (0.182) (0.128) (0.049) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.056 0.350 0.401 0.089 
 (0.136) (0.331) (0.285) (0.115) 
Gini Coefficient  -0.002 -0.004 0.000 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
Education -0.028 -0.034 -0.018 -0.023 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.056) (0.041) 
Conflict Dummy   -0.164 -0.052 
   (0.084) (0.039) 
Death Penalty Dummy -0.465***   -0.444*** 
 (0.03)   (0.058) 
Constant 1.03 -1.930 -2.450 0.643 
 (1.415) (2.498) (2.256) (1.047) 
Observations 33 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.762 0.635 0.662 0.764 
Number of countries 5 4 4 4 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; half-century fixed effects included.  
Countries included: Australia, Canada, USA, Belgium, Namibia and Makedonia 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.18: Regressions of Log(Homicide Rates): Variable Institutions 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
L.Silver Dependence 0.706** 0.918 1.036* 1.018* 
 (0.301) (0.528) (0.563) (0.543) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.284 0.128 0.212 0.192 
 (1.014) (1.127) (1.179) (1.178) 
Gini coefficient  -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.00714 
  (0.0293) (0.0288) (0.0321) 
Education -0.0592 -0.0210 -0.0346 -0.0470 
 (0.199) (0.202) (0.220) (0.236) 
Conflict dummy   0.250 0.299 
   (0.380) (0.394) 
Death Penalty 
dummy -0.585   -0.353 
 (0.404)   (0.636) 
Constant 0.506 1.418 0.658 0.873 
 (7.356) (7.719) (8.154) (8.085) 
Observations 64 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.130 0.067 0.084 0.088 
Number of countries 14 11 11 11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; half-century fixed effects included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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D. Homicide Rates and the Death Penalty 
 
Abstract 
This paper challenges the traditional view that the causality runs from the death penalty to the 
homicide rate via deterrence. Even though a multitude of studies have been conducted on the 
topic of the deterrent effect of the death penalty during the last almost 50 years, there is no 
conclusive evidence. One reason for this might be the fact that previous studies looked only at 
one direction of potential causality, namely they tested if the death penalty had a deterrent effect 
on homicide rates. It is however likely, that there are at least feedback effects in the reverse 
direction. In the past, decreases in violence have often been accompanied by a mitigation in the 
severity of punishments delinquents faced (Eisner 2014), and on the other hand, increasing crime 
and violence induce fear and insecurity, leading to demands for a tougher treatment of criminals. 
This paper first conducts Granger-causality tests, an approach traditionally used when the 
direction of causality is unclear. While there is no evidence for deterrence, the results show that 
declining homicide rates likely influence the decision to abolish the death penalty. In a second 
step, this potential link is further scrutinized by conducting event history analysis of the abolition 
decision revealing the factors that determine the decision to abolish or retain the death penalty, 
among them the homicide rate. 
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D.1. Introduction 
Homicides are not any crime. UNODC (2013) declares it the “ultimate crime, whose ripple effect 
goes far beyond the initial loss of human life and can create a climate of fear and uncertainty” 
(p.9). Intentional homicide causes the death of around half a million people every year across the 
world. Almost 750 million people, which is around 10% of the world population, live in countries 
with homicide rates higher than 20 victims per 100,000 inhabitants and hence see their lives 
affected by the everyday experience of violence and high insecurity (UNODC 2013). Particularly 
in the Americas, homicide rates are high and not declining since the 1980s in several countries. 
To combat crimes such as homicides, more severe punishments have been suggested, which is 
supposed to deter potential delinquents from committing a crime. Increasing the severity of the 
penalty would finally result in the most severe punishment, the death penalty. But is this 
mechanism working? Or does it work only to some extent or for certain types of crimes? 
The deterrent effect of the death penalty on crime rates is a long debated concept. 
Different disciplines, such as criminology, sociology and economics have dealt with it using a 
variety of methods and indicators, yet there is no conclusive evidence (see Shepherd, 2009 and 
Gerritzen and Kirchgässner, 2013 for a meta-analysis of many empirical studies on the deterrent 
effect). What complicates the research on this topic is the fact that the causality between crime 
and punishment might run in either direction. While the punishment in place influences crime via 
deterrence, one can imagine a causal link in the opposite direction as well: the homicide rate 
might for example influences the decision of a country to abolish or to retain the death penalty. It 
is possible that rising violence levels in a country lead politicians to promise a more ruthless 
treatment of criminals, which might entail the (re-)introduction of the death penalty; or politicians 
might postpone the abolition of the death penalty to more peaceful times.  
In international comparison, the homicide rate in countries with the death penalty in place 
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is on average higher than for countries that are abolitionist (Nagin and Pepper 2012; Lappi-
Seppälä and Lehti 2014). This observation is in line with the hypothesis that high-violence 
countries maintain the death penalty, while low-violence countries are rather prone to abolish it. 
It is also contradictory to the deterrence hypothesis, since if deterrence works, then the homicide 
rate would be expected to be lower in a country with the death penalty in place. 
Most of the previous empirical studies on this topic look only at one direction of causality 
and ignore the possibility of reverse causation: they examine either the deterrent effect of 
punishment, or the impact crime rates have on the abolition decision. This might be one of the 
reasons why, despite the large number of studies on the topic, there have not been any conclusive 
results. If deterrence works, which it might very well, then the homicide rate should be lower, 
ceteris paribus, if the death penalty is in place. The coefficient of the death penalty hence is 
expected to be negative. However, in the presence of feedback effects from the homicide rate on 
the death penalty, the coefficient would get less negative or even positive, due to the positive 
linkage between higher homicide rates and the death penalty. 
Additionally, most of the studies use some specification of the number of executions as an 
explanatory variable, which might be inherently endogenous. Even in the least effective law 
enforcement regimes an increasing number of homicides would result in an increasing number of 
executions, if the death penalty is still in place. Alternatively, Nagin and Pepper (2012) suggest 
that the higher the number of homicides, the lower the conviction rates: “An increase in the 
homicide rate may decrease the intensity with which the death penalty is applied as death penalty 
proceedings require more resources than non-death-penalty proceedings” (Nagin and Pepper 
2012, p. 66). This would still suggest a positive, but decreasing impact of the number of 
homicides on the number of executions. The fact that there is usually no data on the intensity of 
application of the death penalty further obscures the interlinkage between the number of 
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homicides and executions. 
By improving the understanding of the underlying patterns and interlinkages between 
homicides and punishment this study can help to develop strategies to fight homicides. Since the 
causality could run in either direction, the first part of the study employs causality tests. One of 
the novelties of the study is the use of a simple, binary indicator variable for the presence of the 
death penalty as well as the actual practice in a country, i.e. if the death penalty is applied or not. 
The results show that while there is no evidence for deterrence, the homicide rates might 
influence the retention or abolition of the death penalty. To further assess this potential effect, 
event history analysis is applied to the legal abolition as well as to the stops in executions. First, 
the following sections D.1.1 and D.1.2 introduce the concepts and definition as well as the data 
set that form the basis for the extensive study of the relationship between the homicide rates and 
the death penalty.  
D.1.1. Definitions and Concepts 
The first step towards an analysis of the relationship between the two concepts is a careful 
definition of the variables used in the study. In the case of the homicide rates, a standard 
definition has been used, while the death penalty has been measured with a simple dummy 
indicator variable. 
D.1.1.1. Measuring Homicide Rates 
The definition of a homicide is based on the UNODC classification of homicide as an “unlawful 
death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person” (UNODC 2011). This definition 
stresses that the incident must fulfill the following three points: 1) There must be a killing, 2) the 
killing was intended by the perpetrator, and 3) the killing was against the law. It also excludes 
deaths resulting from inter-state wars (external conflicts) and internal conflicts such as civil wars, 
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revolutions, uprisings or genocides (van Zanden et al. 2014, p. 142). 
One threat to international comparability of homicide rates is the fact that some countries 
do not distinguish between manslaughter (unintentional killing) and homicide; others have a 
different counting method when it comes to the killing of children (infanticide). Additionally, the 
definition of “unlawful” varies across countries, since in most societies the killing in self-defense 
is not regarded as homicide. There is also a discrepancy regarding the definition of crimes with 
numerous victims, such as mass murders and terrorist attacks. According to the UNODC, the 
victims of terrorist attacks should be counted as homicide victims; however, as an example, the 
US did not count the victims of the September 11th attack as homicide victims, but created a new 
category24.  
Despite these discrepancies, the UNODC (2011) reports that most countries’ definitions 
are in line with the official one and, thus, the measurement error due to distinct definitions is 
quite small. Especially for newer data, the differences in definitions are negligible. A more severe 
bias should be expected due to underreporting, since the institutions reporting homicide rates 
(police force, criminal justice system) could have an incentive to artificially lower the number of 
homicides to mask their own inability to fight crime. 
The data on homicide rates used in this study was constructed using two different source 
types; that is criminal statistics and health statistics, both of which are affected to a certain degree 
by the two measurement challenges reported above: lack of standardized definition and 
underreporting (van Zanden et al. 2014). 
Criminal statistics are usually compiled by local police forces which simply count the 
number of reported incidents. This data source can be affected by underreporting, given that in 
                                                
24 In comparison to the total number of deaths resulting from homicide, the number of victims of terrorist 
attacks is minor in the US (for every victim by terrorism, 1000 died from firearms alone) according to the US 
department of State (www.state.gov).  
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settings with weak law enforcement, people might consider not reporting the crime at all. 
Another possible reason for underestimated homicide rates using this source is the manipulation 
of statistics by political or law enforcement representatives, since they might have an incentive to 
artificially lower the homicide rate for their own advantage (UNODC 2011, p.84).  
The second main source of homicide data are health statistics. This data is collected by 
health authorities and per UNODC (2011), this source type is less affected by the problems of 
unequal definitions or underreporting. The deaths certified by health physicians are usually 
classified using the WHO International Classification of Diseases, version 10 (ICD-10). This 
classification system has a separate category counting deaths that have been caused by assault, 
e.g. homicides and “injuries inflicted by another person with intent to injure or kill, by any 
means” (WHO 2016). Consequently, in this type of cause-of-death data, most countries apply the 
same definition, regardless of the national legal definition of homicide. The accuracy of health 
statistics depends mostly on the qualification of the health personnel in the respective countries 
and if they recognize a homicide as such (UNODC 2011). Due to this nature of public health data 
source, the health statistics are usually more reliable than criminal statistics and less affected by 
underreporting (van Zanden et al. 2014). Consequently, while compiling the sample for this 
study, priority has been given to public health data over criminal statistics, if both were available 
for a country. 
Despite the drawbacks of underreporting and minor differences in the definition, homicide 
rates are one of the most accurate proxies for violent crime levels, since they have several 
advantages:  
1) In comparison to other crimes such as robbery and rape, a homicide is clearly and 
universally defined across time and space (van Zanden et al. 2014, p. 149).  
2) Homicide rates have high reporting rates, compared to other crimes. Due to the 
  
 153 
severity of a homicide, people tend to report a higher share of the total homicides 
committed, while for example a far lower share of robberies are reported 
(Fajnzylber et al., 2000).  
3) All social groups are affected equally by homicides. Thus, it is an indicator that 
mirrors the situation of the whole society, not only one special part (van Zanden et 
al. 2014, p. 140).  
4) Homicide trends are correlated with other types of crime such as crimes against 
the property (Fajnzylber et al. 2000), which makes it a proxy for crime in general. 
UNODC (2013) calls the homicide rate “the most readily measurable, clearly defined and most 
comparable indicator for measuring violent deaths around the world”. It is “both a reasonable 
proxy for violent crime as well as a robust indicator of levels of security within states” (p.9). The 
data used in this study has been compiled using a variety of publicly available data sets of Clio 
Infra, Interpol, the WHO Mortality Database, the National Research Institute for Legal Policy 
(Helsinki, Finland), and the UNODC database. Wherever possible, additional sources such as 
national statistical yearbooks have been used to amplify the database25. 
  
                                                
25 Most of the additional data has been compiled by the chair of economic history of Prof. Dr. Jörg Baten at the 
University of Tübingen over several years. See appendix D.7 for a detailed description of the data sources.  
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D.1.1.2. Measuring the Death Penalty 
Over the course of history, the death penalty has been applied for a variety of crimes. In 18th 
century Britain, 222 crimes were punishable by death, including cutting down a tree and 
marrying a Jew (Jones and Johnstone 2011). In most countries, capital crimes have been 
abolished step-by-step, leaving only murder and in some instances treason in times of war and 
crimes against humanity punishable by death. In the framework of this paper, the death penalty as 
a punishment for murder is taken as main indicator, since the list of other capital crimes varies a 
lot across countries, while murder remains a capital crime in most countries retaining the death 
penalty. Hence, the death penalty is said to be “abolished” if it is no longer legal or used as 
punishment for murder, but for example is retained as punishment for crimes against humanity or 
treason during war times. To measure the presence of the death penalty in a country, two 
different indicators are employed to capture two different aspects: 
1) Legal Status of the death penalty 
This dummy variable takes on value 1 if the death penalty is still inscribed as legal within the 
constitution of the country and value 0 as soon as it is constitutionally abolished. During a 
moratorium, which is defined as “a suspension of activity or an authorized period of delay” 
(Lehman and Phelps 2005, “moratorium”), the indicator value will remain 1, until the death 
penalty is constitutionally declared illegal. This variable captures the “official” aspect of the 
death penalty, however it cannot gauge the daily practice regarding the death penalty. To better 
capture the actual experience citizens of a country have with the death penalty, a second indicator 
is introduced. 
2) Execution of the death penalty 
This binary value takes on value 1 if the death penalty has been imposed and executed in the 
respective year. It takes on value 0 if there have not been carried out any executions, regardless of 
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the legal status of the death penalty. Hence, it takes on value 0 if a moratorium is in place or if the 
country simply has not carried out any executions as a result of a conviction for murder. The 
reason for the choice of two different dependent variables is the fact that many countries are 
“abolitionist in practice” for years or even decades before they finally constitutionally abolish the 
capital punishment. For example, in Argentina, the last civilian execution took place in 1916, but 
the death penalty was not abolished until 1984 (for civilian crimes). In Mexico, the de facto 
cessation of the death penalty for ordinary crime preceded the final abolition by 68 years. The 
Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide claims that moratoria, whether official or just an 
unofficial stop in executions, play an important role today (2011). More than half of the countries 
that retain the death penalty de jure has not carried out executions in the previous years, meaning 
they are “de facto abolitionist” (Cornell Center on the Death Penalty 2011). 
For potential delinquents, it is the de facto punishment they will face after committing a 
crime that matters. Similarly, for the citizens of a country, the death penalty appears less present 
if there are no reports about executions. Since the discrepancies between the legal status of the 
death penalty and the actual practice are substantial, it is important to introduce this second 
indicator variable, that can better capture the actual practice, and it is assumed to be more 
informative than the mere legal status variable.  
Most of the information on the practice and the legal status of the death penalty has been 
obtained from Amnesty International (2017) and Death Penalty Worldwide (2017). The only 
discrepancies found were due to the retention of the death penalty for extraordinary crimes, for 
example during war times. While some sources counted the death penalty as abolished as soon as 
it was outlawed for ordinary crimes, others reported the country as retentionist. Whenever 
possible, the information has been cross-checked with other sources such as national records and 
publications. 
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D.1.2. Data Coverage and Historical Background 
The data set contains observations on both homicide rates and death penalty status (and 
additional covariates) for a total of 130 countries from all continents. The nations included in this 
study were selected on basis of data availability only. For some European countries, such as 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy and the UK, the data starts as early as 1800. For 
the second half of the 19th century, the data coverage expands to Chile, Netherlands, Brazil, 
Austria and the US from 1880 on. For the 20th century, there is yearly data for 18 countries 
(including now Russia, Japan and India) and the number of countries covered increases steadily 
for later periods. By 1960, 60 countries are covered, reaching a total of 130 countries by 2008. 
For a complete overview of the observations contained in the data set see Figure D.1. The 
complete data set enters the tests in section D.2, however in section D.3, the sample may vary due 
to the availability of covariates. 
To provide a background for the empirical analysis of the relationship between the death 
penalty and the homicide rate, the following paragraphs will offer a short descriptive overview 
over the historical developments of the homicide rates in the sample. Homicides have declined 
from very high levels during the middle ages until today (Eisner 2003). Eisner’s work (2003) is 
the most cited analysis of long-term trends in violent crime. He reports a massive drop in 
homicide rates from the 15th to the 20th century for European countries such as England, 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, which is clearly a manifestation of a cultural change in most 
societies (Gurr 1981, Eisner 2003). Growing awareness of violence and increasing controls 
furthermore contributed to the long-term decline.  
After the onset of the 20th century, the trends between the countries diverge. In Europe for 
example, homicide rates in Europe persisted at a low level, with one small upsurge during World 
War II (see Figure D.3 and Gurr 1981). Compared to Europe, the US homicide rate persisted on a 
  
 157 
level almost four times as high all throughout the 20th century. Between 1940 and 1960, the 
homicide rate dropped to around half, before increasing again after 1960. This increase between 
1960 and 1990 is typical for some of the Western countries (Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti 2014), and 
is also visible if looking at the development of the homicide rate for single European countries 
(Figure D.4). Some countries, such as Spain and Italy, experienced relatively high levels of 
homicide rates until the start of the 20th centuries, while other countries such as Belgium or 
France reached very low levels already by 1800.  
In Latin America and the Caribbean, crime rates remained high, mostly due to unstable 
conditions and the drug industry (Figure D.5). Other factors that seem to have caused short-term 
upsurges are mainly conflicts, rapid urbanization and industrialization, and changes in the 
demographic structure (Gurr 1981). Two of the countries with the highest homicide rates in the 
world are Colombia and South Africa, where rates have even increased towards the end of the 
20th century (Figure D.6). 
D.2. Causality Tests: Is there Evidence for a Deterrent Effect? 
This first part of the study applies causality tests to the link between the two concepts of the death 
penalty, a proxy for the general severity of punishment, and the death penalty, a proxy for 
violence and crime. The traditional view at this relationship is the deterrence hypothesis which 
claims that a higher severity of the punishment leads to decreasing crime rates since potential 
delinquents are deterred from committing a crime (Ehrlich 1975, Becker 1968).  
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D.2.1. Literature Review 
D.2.1.1. Theoretical Background 
The death penalty as a punishment for unwanted behavior has been known and applied since 
ancient times. One of the most famous examples is the execution of Socrates by hemlock in 399 
BC (Linder 2018). The debate about the ability of the death penalty to deter crime is equally old. 
Socrates’ student, Plato, was one of the first scholars to write about the aims of this type of 
punishment, namely the improvement of society, be it through deterrence or by removal of the 
offender by exile or death (Saunders 1994). Already roughly 100 years earlier, Diodotus, an 
Athenian politician, claimed that human nature cannot be influenced by fear of death, but is 
rather determined by the hope of a successful achievement. Hence crime cannot be reduced by 
increasing the severity of punishment, but by ensuring that the offender does receive a 
punishment at all (Thucydides 1968). 
Ever since, the debate about the deterrent effect has been ongoing – and unresolved (see 
for example Hobbes 1651). In 1968, Becker revolutionized the concept of crime by embedding it 
in an economic framework: he states that potential delinquents respond rationally to incentives, 
just as every other economic agent, and chose to commit a crime if the potential benefits 
outweigh the costs. The costs are determined by two factors: the severity and the probability of 
punishment. In this theoretical framework, it is possible to deter crime by increasing one or both 
determinants: By increasing the severity of the punishment related to a murder, the expected 
values of the costs exceed the expected value of the reward, and the potential delinquent choses a 
different behavioral option. The reward obtained from the crime does not necessarily have to be 
of monetary nature. The model likewise applies to other form of reward such as for example the 
psychological satisfaction of needs. Similarly, crime can be deterred by increasing the probability 
of being punished by improving the detection and conviction rates. 
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Both the severity of the punishment and the probability of being punished need to be 
sufficiently high in order to observe a deterrent effect in the model. The pure threat of being 
punished is not effective, just as the certainty of being punished with an insignificantly high fine 
is not.  
If the probability of being arrested, trialed and punished by death after committing a 
murder is very variable across countries, then it is difficult to compare the effect of the death 
penalty across countries, even if the severity of the punishment is the same. 
The most important assumption behind this economic theory of crime is however the one 
of rational choice. If this assumption can be maintained, then potential delinquents should adjust 
their behavior at least to some extent to the severity and the probability of the punishment. In 
many cases of hate crimes and crimes against the person it is difficult to maintain this 
assumption, since they are largely a result of hate, jealousy or other conflicts and decision of 
committing the crime is probably taken without consideration of prospective gains and losses. In 
these cases, the crimes could not be deterred by increasing the severity or probability of 
punishment.  
This point has been made by most opponents of the deterrent effect. They have rarely 
questioned the validity of the mechanisms themselves, but rather the fact that this basic 
assumption on which the theory of deterrence is based, does not hold in practice (Ehrlich 1975). 
Some crimes are simply “undeterrable”, since they are not based on a rational decision process 
(Sunstein and Vermeule 2005). 
Another theory developed by opponents of the deterrence theory is the “brutalization 
effect” which indicates that the use of the death penalty by the state diminishes people’s respect 
for life and results in increased violence (King 1978). This theory is the very reverse to the 
deterrence hypothesis, predicting a homicide-increasing impact of the death penalty and has also 
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been called the “anti-deterrent” effect. When empirically studying the impact of the death penalty 
on the homicide rates, there could appear both a negative or a positive coefficient. Finding a 
negative impact of the death penalty indicator on the homicide rate hence supports the deterrence 
hypothesis, while finding a positive impact would support the brutalization theory. 
D.2.1.2. Previous Empirical Evidence 
Empirically, it has always been challenging to detect the deterrent effect of punishment, since it is 
only possible to observe those offenders that have not been deterred, and we may never know 
how many potential delinquents refrained from committing a crime due to the potential 
punishment. Numerous empirical studies both in favor of the deterrence argument and against it 
have been realized. For a good overview of the literature see Shepherd (2009); for a meta-
analysis see Gerritzen and Kirchgässner (2013). 
The first scholar to use regression analysis to examine the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty was Isaac Ehrlich in the 1970s. He published two papers, of which the first one (1975) 
used US time-series data from 1933 to 1969 and the second (1977) US cross-sectional data for 
the 1950s. Both papers indicate a substantial deterrent effect of the capital punishment on the 
number of homicides, however he also states that other forms of punishment could be used as 
substitutes. Pasell and Taylor (1977) examined Ehrlich’s studies and revealed that the results are 
very sensitive to the specification of the variables and econometric model. 
A multitude of econometrics studies followed shortly after – with mixed results: 
Depending on the cross-section year, the time period and the econometric specification 
employed, the papers find or do not find evidence for deterrence (for example Ehrlich and 
Gibbons, 1977; Yunker 1976; Bowers and Pierce 1975; Black and Orsagh 1978). Most of these 
earlier studies use the same type of data: either national time-series data, which may produce 
spurious results, or cross-sectional data across American states, which does not allow to include 
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time fixed-effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states. 
Another wave of papers followed in the late 1980s and the 1990s with improved methods 
that tried to overcome these flaws by using panel data or the correction of non-stationarity, again 
with mixed results (Cover and Thistle 1988; Chressanthis 1989).  
Dezhbaksh et al. (2003) provide evidence for a strong deterrent effect, relying on US 
county-level panel data from 1977 to 1996. They use the number of executions as explanatory 
variable which is negatively associated with the murder rate. Similar studies, using execution 
rates or the number of executions as explanatory variable and US panel data are Katz et al. (2003) 
and Lott and Landes (1999), both with limited evidence of a deterrent effect. Katz et al. (2003) 
find that the quality of life in prison is better suited to deter crime than the execution rate. 
Donohue and Wolfers (2006 and 2005) look at the most recent studies on the deterrent effect of 
death penalty, and conclude that there is no plausible evidence on the topic yet. If anything, 
studies hint towards a murder-increasing effect of the death penalty, but in general the 
conclusions are very fragile, as do most of the meta-studies (for example Chan and Oxley 2004). 
Newer time series studies have been realized for example by Greenberg and Agozino 
(2012). They used a time series from Trinidad and Tobago for the period between 1955 and 2005. 
Even though sanction regimes varied substantially, they find that neither imprisonment nor death 
sentences nor executions had any relationship to murder rates. Cochran and Chamlin (2006) 
employed weekly time series data 1989 to 1995 from California to analyze the impact of the end 
of a 25-year moratorium. They find a decline in non-stranger felony-murders and an increase in 
the level of argument based murders, hence finding both deterrence and brutalization effects. 
Maybe it is not surprising that the literature on the deterrent effect is nearly exclusively 
focused on the United States. Chan and Oxley (2004) analyze 74 studies that have been published 
on the topic since 1950 and 68 of these examine US data. There are a only a few studies on other 
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countries, for example one longitudinal study on Nigeria by Adeyemi (1987) which shows that 
there is no support for the deterrence hypothesis in this data; two studies on Canada (Layson 
1983, Avio 1979) and one on the UK (Wolpin 1978). 
The only two international panel studies are those by Rahav (1983) on 17 countries with 
inconsistent findings, and Archer et al. (1983), covering 14 countries and concluding that the 
abolition of the death penalty is followed by a decrease in the homicide rate, which supports the 
brutalization theory. To my knowledge, there is no recent, international panel study on the topic. 
All the traditional studies on the deterrent effect have in common one or both of the 
following drawbacks: They do not take into account potential feedback effects that might occur 
from the homicide rate on the fact that the death penalty is in place and/or they use a specification 
of the death penalty indicator that is flawed or even endogenous. These problems will be 
discussed in the following two chapters.  
D.2.1.3. The Reverse Causality Problem 
When analyzing the deterrent effect of the death penalty, most studies ignore the fact that there 
might be a reverse causality problem. There are many reasons to believe that the level and the 
development of crime rates in a country importantly influences the decision of a country whether 
to retain or to abolish the capital punishment. In fact, it could even be that there is no impact of 
the death penalty on crime rates whatsoever, and that the correlations found are due to the reverse 
causality present. 
There are many potential channels through which the development of the homicide rate 
could influence the decision about abolition or retention: one possibility is that increasing 
homicide rates prevents policy makers from abolishing this punishment, while decreasing rates 
might insinuate the obsolescence of such a harsh punishment. Liu (2004) states that “the abolition 
or reinstatement decision on the death penalty itself is endogenous, associated mainly with the 
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public sentiment for and against the death penalty”. In the case of execution numbers, higher 
murder rates could cause a public outcry for more executions and hence lead to higher execution 
numbers (Shepherd 2009). Another way how crime rates could affect the death penalty is that 
increases in crime may put more stress on the criminal justice system and result in lower 
conviction rates in the short run (Nagin and Pepper 2012).  
A few studies have tried to address this severe problem which highly complicates the 
estimation of the deterrent effect. Liu (2004) examines the endogeneity of a states’ decision to 
enact death penalty laws. Using switching regression techniques and the same data set as 
Ehrlich’s first study he still finds supporting evidence for the deterrence hypothesis. 
Other studies addressed the issue by estimating a system of equations to minimize the bias 
from endogeneity, such as Dezhbakshsh et al. (2003), finding a negative impact of the death 
penalty on the homicide rate. A third strategy to deal with the endogeneity is the use of 
instrumental variables such as police spending, judicial spending, or the proportion of murder 
committed by non-whites (Zimmerman, 2004; Donohue and Wolfers 2005, 2006). Of the studies 
using instrumental variables some find evidence for a deterrent effect, some find evidence for a 
brutalization effect, but all of them have been criticized due to the choice of the instrumental 
variables used (Nagin and Pepper 2012). The fact that the actual determinants of homicide rates 
are very heterogeneous makes it very difficult to find a valid instrument.  
Stolzenberg and D’Alessio (2004) used monthly Texas time series data, taking into 
account reciprocal effects by applying ARMA statistical procedures. They found strong evidence 
for a feedback effect: a negative delayed effect of murder on the execution risk, since more 
murders reduce the efficiency of the judicial system and hence result in a lower probability of 
being executed. They found no other significant effects in either direction between the homicide 
rate and the death penalty. Narayan and Smyth (2006) use a cross-national panel of countries and 
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check for spurious results due to non-stationarity, concluding that there is only limited support for 
the deterrence hypothesis.  
D.2.1.4. Specification of the Dependent Variable 
The second drawback of previous studies is the specification of the dependent variable. Most of 
them use the number of executions as indicator (Dezhbaksh et al. 2003) or the execution rate, i.e. 
the number of executions per 1,000 homicides (Katz et al. 2003). These measures are flawed in 
several ways, the main problem being endogeneity. When the homicide rate increases and the 
judicial and law enforcement systems are at least somewhat effective, then the number of 
executions will increase, which makes the number of executions an inherently endogenous 
measure. Furthermore, the short-term fluctuations in the number of executions are probably 
irrelevant to the decision process of potential murderers, since they base their decision on their 
perception of the entire criminal sanction regime in place which is constant in the short run and 
not on the recent occurrence of executions (Nagin and Pepper 2012). 
D.2.2. Empirical Strategy 
D.2.2.1. Specification of the Variables 
The goal of this section is to check if there is a significant impact from the presence of the capital 
punishment on the homicide rate. When estimating the relationship between the two variables of 
interest, it is crucial to define the “treatment” and identify which units are “treated” with the 
death penalty and which are not. As mentioned before, the “treatment” in the case of the 
deterrence hypothesis is affected by two factors: the probability of being caught and the severity 
of the punishment. 
Previous studies measured the severity of the treatment by using the number of 
executions, which insinuates varying treatment intensities, even though the severity of the 
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punishment that the murderer would receive is always constant. 
The approach of this study is to specify capital punishment not as continuous variable 
with varying intensity, but as a binary treatment. When the capital punishment is legal and/or 
applied in a certain year, then the country is considered as “treated”, if not, the country is 
untreated. In the “untreated” countries, the delinquents face the risk of a lengthy prison sentence. 
The second factor, the probability of being caught, is assumed to vary substantially across 
countries, since political institutions and cultural factors differ substantially. However, within one 
country, especially in the short run, this probability is assumed to be relatively constant, and 
hence can be removed by using country fixed effects. 
The homicide rate is transformed logarithmically to reduce the severe (positive) skewness 
and kurtosis present in the distribution (see Figure D.2).  
D.2.2.2. Granger-Causality Tests 
When estimating the relationship between the death penalty and the homicide rate, it is important 
to take into account is the potential reverse causality. The econometric methodology needs to 
allow for feedback effects or should not rely on an ex ante assumption of the direction of 
causality. The traditional econometric approach when the direction of causality is unclear is to 
estimate vector panel autoregressions (VAR) and conduct Granger-causality tests (Granger 
1969). The basic notion of these tests is to check how much additional predictive power the lags 
of the variable X add, compared to using the lags of Y alone. If the lagged values of X provide 
statistically significant information about Y, then the variable X is said to Granger-cause Y. The 
big advantage of this methodology is that it does not require any previous assumption on the 
direction of causality; the tests can be conducted in either direction. In the past decades, the 
Granger-causality approach has been extended to the panel data setting (see Holtz-Eakin, Newey 
and Rosen 1988 and Hurlin 2004, 2005). Advantages of panel data over the single time-series 
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Granger-causality test are the ability to control for individual, time-invariant heterogeneity, and 
increased precision of the estimations due to the higher number of observations, among others. 
Panel Granger-causality tests are used today in a variety of contexts and disciplines (see for 
example Hongchang et al. 2018 for a recent application). 
One basic assumption of the VAR-model is that it linearly relates current realizations of Y 
to previous realizations of X and Y, which implies that the dependent variables needs to be 
continuous-valued. If one of the variables is binary, the assumption of a linear relationship can no 
longer be maintained. In the context of this study, the death penalty indicator is defined as binary, 
hence can enter the VAR only on the right-hand side. Using the following equation, it is possible 
to test the deterrence hypothesis, i.e. the impact of the death penalty on the homicide rate: 
ℎ;H(1(<+	,23+OP = 1Q + SQTℎ;H(1(<+	,23+O,PVT +6TWQ !QT<+23ℎ	0+.2)3XO.PVT + ZO,QP
6
TWQ  
In this equation, the finding of at least one of the !QT being significant and negative corresponds 
to deterrence, while a positive coefficient would support the brutalization theory. Finding no 
significant effect would suggest that there is no Granger-causality from the death penalty on the 
homicide rate. Since the death penalty indicator is a binary variable, the Granger-causality tests 
can only be conducted in this direction, and the impact of the homicide rate on the death penalty 
cannot be modeled. For a more detailed description of the Granger-causality test methodology 
please see Appendix D.7.3. 
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D.2.2.3. Dynamic Logit Model with Feedback Effects 
Since in this context, the traditional Granger-causality tests can only be used to test for the impact 
of the homicide rate on the death penalty, a second model that is able to accommodate reciprocal 
effects will be estimated: Bartolucci and Pigini (2017) have recently developed26 a model that can 
handle a binary dependent variable, a dynamic setup and the violation of the strict exogeneity 
assumption. This model is well suited to estimate the interdependence between the death penalty 
and the homicide rate. Additionally, a test for Granger-causality can be derived. The proposed 
model is a dynamic logit model that allows for a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption by 
including feedback effects from the dependent on the independent variable. 
For i=1, …, n and t=1, …, T we observe the binary response variable XOP and the covariate [OP. In the framework of this paper, the binary response is the death penalty indicator, while the 
covariate is the homicide rate.  
The binary response has the distribution 0 XOP 2O, \, ]O,Q:PVQ = 0 XOP 2O, \O,P:P_Q, XO,PVQ  
This implies that the present value of the probability of XOP depends on the present and the future 
value of the covariate. To allow for violation of the strict exogeneity assumption, the lead of the 
covariate must be included as a correction term. This can be interpreted as a “measure of the 
effect of the present choice XOP on the expected utility (or propensity) at the next occasion (t+1)”. 
In the presence of positive state dependence, the correction term is positive, since making the 
choice today has a positive impact on the expected utility (Bartolucci and Nigro 2010, 
Wooldridge 2010). 
Chamberlain (1982) shows that the violation of Granger non-causality corresponds to the 
                                                
26 Strategies to estimate dynamic models with feedback effects in binary data had not been developed until 
recently. Mosconi and Seri (2006) present a methodology to test for feedback effects in binary bivariate time 
series, but Bartolucci and Pigini (2017) is the first model that can accommodate a binary dependent and a 
continuous-valued independent variable. 
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presence of feedback effects, hence a test for Granger-causality test can also be derived using the 
Bartolucci-Pigini-model. The logit model takes into account “feedback effects from the past of 
the outcome variable on the present value of covariates” (Bartolucci and Pigini, p. 3) and it can 
be estimated using a pseudo conditional likelihood estimator developed by Bartolucci and Nigro 
(2012). 
The resulting model is specified as follows: 0 XOP 2O, \O,P:P_Q, XO,PVQ = /VQ 2O + [′OP ∗ ! + [aO,P_Q ∗ b+, XO,PVQ ∗ c , 3 = 2,… , f − 1	 
with /VQ(. ) being an inverse link function. 
This shows that the probability of XOP is conditional on the unobserved country fixed effect 2O, the 
contemporaneous realization of the homicide rate [′OP, the future realization of homicide rate [aO,P_Q and the past realizations of the death penalty.  
The lead of the independent variable is included in order to correct for feedback effects 
from the dependent variable on the exogenous variable. Using this term, a test for feedback 
effects can be derived. If the homicide rate is strictly exogenous, then the lead [aO,P_Q should be 
completely unrelated to the death penalty, and hence the coefficient should be insignificant. If it 
is significant, then there are important feedback effects that cannot be ignored.  
D.2.3. Results 
This section presents the results of the Granger-causality tests and the dynamic logit models 
estimated with the goal of identifying if there is a significant impact running from the death 
penalty on the homicide rate. The panel at hand is a macro panel with large T and limited N. In 
this type of data set, the possibility of non-stationarity arises. In order to avoid spurious results in 
the subsequent econometric analysis, the series needs to be pre-tested for the presence of a unit 
root.  
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D.2.3.1. Tests for Cross-Sectional Dependence 
Most panel unit root tests require cross-sectional independence; hence the homicide time series 
are first checked for interdependence across countries before conducting unit root tests. Cross-
country dependence could emerge if common global shocks impact various countries or if 
countries within the same region experience similar developments due to spillover effects. The 
Pesaran-test for cross-sectional dependence is based on the correlation coefficients between the 
time series for each of the cross-sectional units and can detect cross-section dependence in the 
form of a single unobserved common factor (Pesaran 2004). 
The test can only be applied to balanced panels, which is why the data had to be restricted 
to common observations between 1950 and 2000. The remaining sample contains 26 countries 
with 51 observations each. The test then calculates the 26 x 51 coefficients of correlation between 
country i and all other countries. This test is robust to non-stationarity. The null hypothesis is that 
the data are cross-section independent. The results are reported in Table D.1. For comparability, 
the test was also conducted for GDP per capita. For the homicide rate, the average coefficient of 
correlation is 0.261, which is relatively low compared to the average correlation of 0.881 in the 
case of GDP per capita. Hence, homicide rates are more independent across countries than GDP 
per capita; and shocks are not as easily transmitted across countries as in the case of GDP27.  
Nevertheless, the cross-sectional correlation is still considerable: The Pesaran-test rejects 
the null hypothesis of cross-section independence for all variables on all significance levels. 
Hence, the unit root test to be employed must allow for cross-sectional dependence in the data. 
  
                                                
27 Among the regions, Europe has the highest average correlation of GDP per capita between countries of 
0.981, while among the American countries the average correlation is only 0.526. A similar pattern is 
discernible for homicide rates.  
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D.2.3.2. Tests for the Presence of Unit Roots 
Variables that enter the VAR need to be covariance-stationary, otherwise spurious results can be 
a problem, especially in panels with a larger time dimension. According to Noriega and Ventosa-
Santaularia (2007), a panel data set with more than 25 time periods is prone to display non-
stationarity. In the sample at hand, the average number of time periods in the unbalanced panel is 
40, which is considerably above the threshold of 25 observations.  
In time series studies, unit root testing is standard procedure, however for panel data, tests 
for unit roots have only been developed in the last two decades (Baltagi and Kao 2000). To test 
for the presence of unit roots in the presence of cross-sectional dependencies, the cross-sectional 
augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin test (CIPS) has been developed by Pesaran (2003). It allows for 
cross-section dependence in the form of a single unobserved common factor with heterogeneous 
factor loadings in the data. The test consists of country-specific augmented Dickey-Fuller 
regressions where cross-section averages of both independent and dependent variables are 
included. In a second step, the single statistics are averaged following the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) procedure. 
The null hypothesis is that the homicide series are integrated of order 1. The test is 
conducted for two different balanced panels and the results are presented in Table D.2 (balanced 
panel from 1950 to 2000) and Table D.3 (balanced panel from 1970 to 1990). The specification 
without trend is reported, since the trend was not significant. However, when including a trend, 
the results are identical. The table also reports the Maddala and Wu test (1999) results.  
The tests reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity28 for all the specifications, except 
of the specification with two lags included in the shorter balanced panel. Given these results, it 
                                                
28 For both the Maddala and Wu (1999) – test and the CIPS test (Pesaran 2003) test the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity. Other unit root tests like the Lagrange-multiplier test are based on the null hypothesis of 
stationarity.  
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can be concluded that the homicide series are not integrated of some order, and hence can enter 
the VAR regression untransformed. For the case of the binary death penalty indicator, unit root 
tests are not necessary, since binary variables are always integrated of order zero and hence 
stationary. 
D.2.3.3. Granger-Causality Tests 
Before estimating the VAR, the optimal lag length has to be selected. The difference of the 
overall coefficient of determination (Abrigo and Love 2015) between different specifications 
using from 1 to 6 lags is minimal: The coefficient of determination varies between 0.9960 and 
0.9962, with the maximum value for 3 lags. Hence the VAR is estimated using 3 lags, using the 
legal status as well as the execution death penalty indicator; an additional specification with 2 
lags is also reported. The results are presented in Table D.4 and Table D.5. The corresponding 
Granger-causality tests are included at the bottom of each table. 
For the homicide rate equations (columns 1 and 3 in each Table), the coefficients of the 
homicide rate lagged by one, two or three periods is always significant and positive, which 
stresses the inertia properties of crime. However, none of the coefficients of the death penalty 
indicators is significant in any of the specifications. Hence neither the legal status nor the 
application of the death penalty in previous years helps to predict the homicide rate. Likewise, the 
null hypothesis that all coefficients of the lagged death penalty indicator are simultaneously equal 
to zero (Granger-non-causality) cannot be rejected. The results are identical using either of the 
death penalty indicators. There is no evidence for Granger-causality running from the death 
penalty to the homicide rate. This result contradicts the deterrence hypothesis. 
To sum up, the Granger-causality tests based on a vector autoregression with two and 
three lags respectively did not detect any Granger-causality from the death penalty to the 
homicide rates, irrespective of the death penalty indicator used. 
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D.2.3.4. Dynamic Logit model with Feedback Effects 
The second approach that can be employed to check for an impact of the death penalty on the 
homicide rate is the dynamic logit model that can accommodate a binary dependent variable and 
feedback effects from the dependent on the independent variable (Bartolucci and Pigini 2017). 
This model is well suited for the two variables and the research question here, since the death 
penalty indicator is binary and the dependent variable (homicide rate) does not need to be strictly 
exogenous in order to enter the model. A violation of the strict exogeneity assumption in the form 
of feedback effects from the death penalty on the homicide rate can be modeled. The dynamic 
logit model suggested by Bartolucci and Piginin (2017) allows to test the significance of the 
feedback effect and hence the null hypothesis of Granger-non-causality. If the feedback effect is 
significant, then there is an impact of death penalty on the homicide rate, and this result would 
support the deterrence hypothesis. 
Since the Bartolucci-Pigini model is only applicable to short panels, the data set had to be 
restricted to a shorter time frame. According to Eberhardt (2011) a short (micro) panel consist of 
a “substantial” number of cross-sectional units and covers only a short time period, while a macro 
panel typically covers considerably more than ten time periods. In order to obtain a short panel 
but still maximize the number of observations included in the regressions, the panel was 
restricted to the observations four years before and four years after the last execution or the 
official legal abolition of the death penalty. This results in a maximum of nine observations per 
country, less if data is not available for all nine years around the last execution/abolition for the 
respective country. This way, the time period is strictly shorter than ten and the Bartolucci-
Piginin model can be applied.  
  
 173 
The first set of regressions29, (see Table D.6) include the observations in the nine-year 
time frame around the last execution, resulting in a total of 629 observations for 100 countries. 
The model has been estimated using both the legal status indicator as well as the execution 
indicator. The results indicate that only the execution indicator displays significant state 
dependence, while in the legal status variable, the lagged legal status dummy does not have 
significant explanatory power. The most important variable of interest is the lead of the 
log(Homicide rate), since it captures possible feedback effects from the death penalty on the 
homicide rate. Using any of the death penalty indicator, this variable is insignificant, showing 
that the current realization of the death penalty is statistically unrelated to future realizations of 
the homicide rate. Hence, there is no evidence of a deterrent effect from the capital punishment 
on the homicide rate. Finally, there is no significant contemporaneous impact of the homicide 
rate on the death penalty in the same year.  
The second set of regressions include the observations in the nine-year time frame around 
the legal abolition of the death penalty, covering 54 countries and a total of 668 observations. The 
results can be found in Table D.7. Again, the lagged death penalty indicator is only significant in 
the regression using the execution indicator. As in the first set of regressions, results do not offer 
any evidence for a feedback effect, because the coefficient of the homicide rate in t+1 is always 
insignificant. Furthermore, no effect of the homicide rate on the death penalty in the same year is 
found. To sum up, the results of the Bartolucci-Pigini model applied to the global data set offer 
no evidence for the deterrence hypothesis or for any effect running from the death penalty on the 
homicide rate. 
  
                                                
29 The regressions have been conducted using the cquad Stata-package developed by Pigini and Bartolucci 
(2015). 
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D.2.4. Summary of the Findings 
This section had the goal to add to the vast existing literature on the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty keeping in mind the possibility of feedback effects or reverse causality. By introducing 
new econometric methodologies to the topic and using a new data set with global coverage, it 
was possible to overcome drawbacks of previous studies: The death penalty measure was not 
defined as a continuous variable as for example the number of executions per year. Instead, a 
binary indicator of the legal status and the application of the death penalty has been used. First, 
vector autoregressions and related Granger-causality tests were used to show that there is no 
Granger causality of the death penalty on the homicide rates. These findings contradict the 
deterrence theory. Additionally, a dynamic logit model that can accommodate a binary dependent 
variable and feedback effects from the independent on the dependent variable was estimated 
(Bartolucci and Pigini 2017). The results confirm the initial findings, namely that there is no 
significant impact from the death penalty on the homicide rate and hence no evidence for a 
deterrent or any other effect.  
In the framework of Bartolucci and Pigni (2017), the finding of independence of the 
homicide rate ([O,P) can be expressed as follows: 0 [O,P_Q 2O, gO,Q:P, ]O,Q:P = 0 [O,P_Q 2O, gO,Q:P ; 		( = 1,… , .; 	3 = 1,… , f − 1 
The binary response XO,P (death penalty) does not cause the covariate [O,P (homicide rate) 
conditional on the time fixed effect 2O, if [O,P_Q is conditionally independent of XO,Q:P, given 2O and 
the past realizations of [O. Bartolucci and Pigini show, that this condition is equivalent to the 
condition of strict exogeneity with respect to the binary response: 0 XO,P 2O, gO, ]O,Q:PVQ = 0 XO,P 2O, gO,Q:P, ]O,Q:PVQ	 ; 		( = 1,… , .; 	3 = 1,… , f − 1 
Hence the findings of the past analysis open the possibility to add the homicide rate as 
independent variable when trying to explain the timing of the abolition of the death penalty or the 
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stops in executions, without the risk of endogeneity. The second part of the paper explores this 
potential impact of homicide rates on the decision of a country to stop executions or to legally 
abolish the death penalty. 
D.3. Event History Analysis  
D.3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter D.2 was intended to shed some light on the direction of causality present 
between the two concepts of the death penalty and the homicide rate. While the advocates of the 
deterrence hypothesis predict a crime-reducing effect of the death penalty, the performed data 
analysis could not detect any support for this theory. Interestingly, the analysis has shown 
potential effects in the opposite direction: the level of the homicide rate might significantly 
influence the decision of a political system to abolish, introduce or retain the capital punishment. 
Several examples, where an increase in violence led to the re-introduction of the death 
penalty or the increase of the severity of general punishments can be found in history: On 
December 16th 2014, seven fighters of the Islamic Tehreek-e-Taliban attacked a public army 
school in Peshawar, Pakistan. The attack resulted in 130 dead school children and as a response 
to this violent incident, the Pakistani government resumed the execution of the death penalty after 
a de facto moratorium that had lasted for almost 6 years. This is just one example of how a 
country saw its decision to abolish the death penalty affected by an upsurge of violence. One 
potential channel is that even though the research on the deterrent effect is still inconclusive, the 
public may demand severe punishment in response to high crime rates. This way crime rates 
might significantly affect the likelihood of abolition. On the other hand, decreasing crime rates 
might generate a climate more conducive to abolition, since politicians demanding a hard hand 
against criminals might not get as much support if crime rates are low. Looking at Figure D.3, 
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one can discern that homicide rates started to rise in the US in the 1960s, which is exactly when 
politicians such as Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon started to introduce the topics of law 
enforcement and deterrence into the political discourse. The reasons for the increase in homicides 
can be found in the “decivilizing process” of the 1960s (Pinker 2011) as well as the riots, strikes 
and incidents of civil disorder of the African American communities fighting against racism and 
discrimination (Hinton 2015). As response, Johnson declared a “War on Crime” and effectively 
replaced anti-poverty programs with “the state apparatus of punishment – including law 
enforcement, criminal justice and prison systems” (Hinton 2015, p.111). In a presidential 
campaign speech in 1968 Nixon stated that the “solution to the crime problem is not the 
quadrupling of funds for any governmental war on poverty, but more convictions” (Crutchfield 
2007, p. 52). Finally, the drug war raging in Mexico during the last decade with rampant killings 
and kidnappings has led to calls to reinstate the death penalty (Olivero 2013).  
This illustrates how in times of increasing crime rates and violence, policy makers try to 
fight this uprising by introducing even harsher punishment and even tougher legislation, instead 
of addressing the root causes of the problem that might be of social or economic nature. 
Looking at the development of homicide rates around abolition for abolitionist countries 
today, it is possible to discern descending rates in the five years leading up to the abolition. 
Figure D.7 looks at the trend of the homicide of the 27 countries for which data for all ten years 
before and after the legal abolition of the death penalty is available. The mean homicide rate 
decreases by almost 50% in the five years leading up to the legal abolition, suggesting that 
countries take the decision to abolish after experiencing a decrease in homicide rates. A similar, 
pattern is discernible for the mean homicide rate development in the three years before the stops 
in executions (Figure D.8). 
While there are several studies that examine the general determinants of the abolition 
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decision of a country, most of them do not consider the role the level of crime and violence in a 
country might play in this context (for example Miethe et al. 2005, McGann and Sandholtz 2012, 
Lourtau and Babcock 2016). 
This chapter will apply event history analysis to the timing of abolition in order to 
examine the effect homicide rates have in this context. The previous analysis has shown that the 
homicide rate is not Granger-caused by the death penalty and can be assumed as fairly exogenous 
(Bartolucci and Pigini 2017). Therefore, it is possible to include the homicide rate as explanatory 
variable in the event history study without a high risk of endogeneity issues. The main hypothesis 
is that increasing homicide rates have a delaying effect on the abolition decision, while 
decreasing homicide rates lead to a sooner abolition. The analysis follows roughly the 
methodology of Neumayer (2008) and Kent (2010). Apart from doubling the number of countries 
included in the analysis, this study introduces a novel indicator of the death penalty: an indicator 
variable assessing if the death penalty has been applied or not. Since many countries introduce 
moratoria decades before finally legally abolishing the death penalty, this indicator can better 
capture the actual practice of the death penalty in a society. 
D.3.2. History of the Capital Punishment and Data Coverage 
The capital punishment or death penalty, e.g. the practice to put a person to death as a sanction 
for a forbidden action, has been used in nearly all societies since ancient times (Reggio 2014). 
The first documented death penalty law goes back as far as the 18th century BC and the first death 
sentence historically recorded took place in the 16th century BC (Reggio 2014).  
The first modern times country that ever abolished the death penalty was Venezuela in 
1863, after not having carried out an execution since independence in 1830 (Hood and Hoyle 
2008). In general, the Latin American continent was very inclined towards abolition, since 
several countries in the continent followed Venezuela in the subsequent decades: Costa Rica 
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(1877), Ecuador (1906), Colombia (1910) and Panama (1922). Many of these abolitions 
coincided with a universal annulment of colonial laws after the countries won their independence. 
The second continent with noticeably early abolitions is Europe (for example Iceland, Portugal 
and Italy all had abolished by 1950). In some European countries, however, the death penalty was 
reinstated during or after the second World War. In Italy, the reintroduction was induced by the 
authoritarian regime of Mussolini. In Germany, the death penalty had not been abolished 
completely before 1933, however the Nazi regime tremendously intensified its use. In Belgium, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands, the reintroduction was a response to the severity of the crimes 
against humanity committed during wartime (Hood and Hoyle 2008).  
After the second world war, the abolitionist movement gained momentum in the entire 
world: From 1960 to 1990, 25 countries abolished capital punishment, and in the 1990s, another 
35 countries followed (Sinclair and Sinclair 2011). European countries that have been governed 
by a dictatorship or repressive state such as Spain, Greece and Eastern Germany used the capital 
punishment longer than democratic countries. 
Interestingly, almost all countries display the same pattern: They had the death penalty 
established since ancient times, abolish it at some point in time and then stay abolitionist 
thereafter (Neumayer 2008). There are only very few exceptions to this general rule, in which the 
death penalty was reintroduced after an initial abolition, e.g. the reintroductions during and after 
World War II, even though most of these reintroductions were limited to the capital punishment 
for extraordinary crimes (Neumayer 2008). Another example is Iraq, where the capital 
punishment was repealed after the fall of Saddam Hussein and reintroduced one year later in 
2004 (UNAMI/OHCHR 2014). Pakistan that put an end to a 6-year moratorium, introducing the 
death penalty after the massacre of Peshawar (BBC News 2014). 
Another stylized fact about the abolitionist development is that the abolitions seem to 
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happen in waves, which indicates a high degree of cross-country correlation in the decision to 
abolish the death penalty. 
Today, 114 countries have completely abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes 
(seven of these retain the death penalty for serious crimes, for example treason during war times). 
An additional 30 countries are abolitionist in practice: while not having legally abolished the 
death penalty, they have not imposed the death penalty for at least 10 years. That leaves 57 
retentionist countries, of which 23 carried out executions in 2016 (Amnesty International 2017). 
Most of the retentionist countries are situated in North Africa and the Middle East, some in Asia. 
China is estimated to be the country with the highest number of yearly executions (Amnesty 
International 2017).  
The described development of a steadily increasing number of abolitionist countries raises 
the question about the driving forces behind this trend. Why did most of the countries abolish the 
death penalty while some retain it? What are the most important political and economic factors 
for the timing of the abolition? And finally, what role do crime rates play in this context? Due to 
the findings in the first part of this chapter, I expect that high or increasing crime rates decrease 
the likelihood of abolition, while sinking crime rates might push a country towards abolition, if 
abolitionist tendencies were already existing.  
Of the total 130 countries in the data set, eight enter the data set after have already legally 
abolished the death penalty30. Most of these are countries were some of the first to abolish capital 
punishment, as for example Venezuela and Panama (1863 and 1903). Since for these countries 
there is no information available for the time periods leading up to abolition, they cannot be 
included in the event history analysis when using the legal status death penalty indicator. 
An additional 10 countries have never applied the death penalty in the time span covered 
                                                
30 Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Iceland, Panama, Portugal, Venezuela 
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by the observed data31; hence these cannot be included when using the second death penalty 
indicator that captures the application of the death penalty due to missing observations for the 
years before the last execution. 
This leaves a total of 122 countries that have the capital punishment in their constitution 
when they enter the data set. 62 of these, so roughly half the countries in the data set, legally 
abrogate the capital punishment in the years included in the data set, the other 60 countries 
maintain the death penalty in place all throughout the covered time span. 
When looking at executions, 112 countries are executing convicted perpetrators at the 
beginning of the observed time periods. 100 of these countries stop executing at some point, 77 
permanently, 23 re-introduce the executions after some time. 12 countries in the data set have at 
least one execution recorded in every year 32 (of the observed years). 
D.3.3. Literature Review 
Eisner (2014) draws a graph of the European trend in executions versus trend in homicide rates 
for the years 1200 until 1900, and is astonished by the similarity of the two curves (p. 41). A 
direct correlation cannot be the result of a deterrent effect, but could be seen as “evidence that 
homicide and capital punishment were two sides of the same coin and that their simultaneous 
decline up to 1800 reflects a more fundamental shift that affected elite attitudes away from 
approving the spectacle of human beings being debased, tortured [and] killed” (Eisner 2014, p. 
42). Pinker (2011) in his seminal work includes in his definition of violence robbery, kidnapping, 
homicide, assault, rape, war and genocide but also treatment committed by institutions such as 
corporal and capital punishment. Van Dülmen (1995), looking at early trends of crime and 
punishment in Germany, claims that the decline in death penalties since the late sixteenth century 
                                                
31 Argentina, Gabon, Haiti, Madagascar, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Slovenia 
32 Botswana, Chile, China, Eritrea, Fiji, French Guinea, Iraq, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Saudi 
Arabia and Vietnam 
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is a result of decreasing crime levels. What these authors tentatively suggest is that the causality 
of this effect is not running from the punishment towards crime but rather in the other direction. 
Decreasing crime and violence can change the society in a way that it accepts less cruel and less 
severe forms of punishment. In a similar fashion, where crime and violence are high, the public is 
more fearful, insecure and social capital is low. In this setting it is more likely that harsher 
sanction, culminating in the ultimate punishment, will be demanded (Otterbein 1986, Greenberg 
and West 2008). The reason might be that people simply believe in deterrence or that they 
demand retribution.  
The scientific literature looking at the determinants of the timing of the political decision 
to do away with the capital punishment is completely disconnected to the literature presented in 
the first part of this chapter, i.e. the literature on the impact of the death penalty on crime and the 
deterrence hypothesis. In contrast to the topic of deterrence which has been studied extensively, 
there is very little research on the determinants of the death penalty itself. Thus, the question why 
countries choose to abolish, retain or reinstate the death penalty as a legal punishment remains 
unanswered. 
The literature on the factors influencing a country’s decision to abolish is mainly 
characterized by qualitative methods such as case studies. A couple of studies look at one single 
country, scrutinizing the events, developments and conditions leading up to the abolition in that 
particular case (Bedau 1997, Lourtau and Babcock 2016). In these case studies, a variety of 
factors have been identified as being causal to the decision to abolish the death penalty: political 
factors such as the degree of democratization, a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic 
government, especially following civil wars or conflicts (Lourtau and Babcock 2016), a left-wing 
party in power and strong political leaders and a country’s experience with war and conflict (long 
peaceful periods seem to increase the likelihood of abolition). Unstable political systems are 
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more likely to retain the death penalty, not to deter ordinary homicides and crimes, but to secure 
their status and to be able to govern effectively (Greenberg and West 2008). 
Apart from the political conditions, cultural norms and conditions have also been 
mentioned to be of important influence. While Christianity is usually assumed to be conducive to 
abolition, Islam is associated with longer retention of the death penalty, as is a high degree of 
ethnolinguistic or religious fractionalization. The origin of the legal system as well as colonial 
history also seem important. Finally, there are general social and economic factors that might 
affect the decision to abolish, such as the level of economic development and the international 
openness to trade, which goes hand in hand with the pressure exerted by international 
organizations and treaties (Lourtau and Babcock 2016). 
Aside from the qualitative studies looking at single countries, there are a couple of 
quantitative studies covering more than one country.  
Killias (1986) is one of the first scholars to conduct a cross-national comparison and finds 
that the higher the economic development and the democratization of a country, the more likely 
that the abolishes the death penalty. The importance of stable, democratic institutions is 
confirmed by several newer studies (Miethe et al. 2005, Neumayer 2008, McGann and Sandholtz 
2012). Neapolitan (2001) finds that political freedom is significant when explaining the use of 
capital punishment, while also stressing the impact of historic, cultural and geographic 
conditions. 
Rudell and Urbina (2004) emphasize the importance of ethnic heterogeneity when 
predicting abolition in another cross-national study. Lesser cultural and ethnic diversity within a 
country is associated with an early abolition of death penalty. Two other studies additionally 
report significant impact of religion and the legal system (Greenberg and West 2008 and Anckar 
2004). Surprisingly, Anckar (2004) finds a significant impact of population size: Bigger countries 
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are more prone to retain the death penalty. One possible explanation is that bigger countries are 
more difficult to control and hence tend to retain more drastic punishments in their legislation.  
Two studies that are worth mentioning due to their choice of methodology are Kent 
(2010) and Neumayer (2008). Both studies use event history analysis with the dependent variable 
being the abolition of the death penalty for either all or ordinary crimes. As explained in section 
D.3.3.2, this estimation method is the most adequate to examine this kind of data with a binary 
dependent variable, which is why emphasis should be put on the findings of these two studies. 
Neumayer (2008) confirms that the most important factors are of political nature, such as 
democracy and international political pressure. He also detects regional contagion dynamics. A 
legal system based on English common law decreases the likelihood of abolition. Both Kent 
(2010) and Neumayer (2008) conclude that higher ethnic fractionalization and income inequality 
are both impeding an abolition of the death penalty. 
To sum up, the political system seems to be one of the most important factors influencing 
the abolition of the death penalty, hence when testing for the impact of the homicide rate, a proxy 
variable capturing the political system needs to be included as covariate. Other important factors 
are ethnic heterogeneity and inequality. 
Very few of these previous studies consider the potential effect crime rates might have on 
the severity of the punishment or the presence of the death penalty. Traditionally, studies looked 
at correlations between crime rates and prison populations (for example Neapolitan 2001) and 
found positive association, but this is not very informative. If the legal justice system is at least 
somewhat effective, then higher crime rates should always lead to higher prison population, even 
if the legal justice system remains completely unchanged. Hence it is not clear, if this correlation 
is due to an increase in the severity of the application of the law or due to the simple fact that 
there are more crimes and hence the probability that a delinquent gest caught and convicted is 
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higher. The same holds for studies using the number of executions as indicator of the “severity” 
of the punishment. An increase in the number of executions might as well be due to the increased 
number of potential convictions. A change in the status of the death penalty however is always 
due to a profound change in the legal justice system and hence can better capture the effect 
homicide rates might have on the severity of punishment.  
Of the newer, quantitative studies, four include an indicator of violent crime. Ruddell and 
Urbina (2004) and Greenberg and West (2008) include homicide rates, but find no significant 
effect on the likelihood of abolition/retention in a logistic regression. Kent (2010) uses reported 
crime rates as indicator of crime levels and finds a counterintuitive effect: higher crime rates lead 
to higher abolition probability. The paper does not offer any explanation of the unexpected result. 
Finally, the study by Neumayer (2008) shows that higher homicide rates significantly lower the 
likelihood of abolition, and quite strongly so. 
The contradictory previous results could also be a result of the different structure of the 
data samples employed in each study. Due to the “extremely poor” data availability (Neumayer 
2008, p. 22) for the homicide rate, the samples were relatively small and selective. Greenberg and 
West (2008) could only obtain a total of 116 country-years; Kent (2010) used a multiple 
imputation procedure to estimate missing information, which might have introduced a substantial 
amount of measurement error, hence biasing the outcome. Neumayer (2008) was able to increase 
the number of observations to 768 from 62 countries, and hence the most representative sample 
so far. 
Due to the newly assembled data set at hand, this study is based on the most extensive 
sample so far. The number of countries covered is almost doubled, reaching a maximum of 121 
countries and 4,000 country-years. 
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D.3.3.1. Specification of the Dependent Variable 
In previous studies, the dependent variable has been specified as legal abolition of the death 
penalty for all crimes or for ordinary crimes (Neumayer 2008, McGann and Sandholtz 2012, 
Kent 2010). In this study, the legal abolition of the capital punishment for murder will be used as 
the dependent variable, which is similar to the definition of abolition for ordinary crimes used in 
the previous studies mentioned. The death penalty is counted as “abolished” as soon as it is 
removed from the constitution as sanction for murder (even though it might remain legal as 
sanction for ordinary crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity). The reason why 
this definition is chosen (instead of abolition for all crimes) is that the death penalty for murder is 
first of all the most universal definition, which makes the data more comparable across countries. 
Furthermore, it is the kind of sanction that matters most for the citizens of the country, whereas 
death penalty for war crimes and crimes against humanity is only applied in very extreme 
circumstances, and hence is not perceived by citizens in their everyday lives. Therefore, 
abolitionist movements and pressures might be higher regarding the death penalty for “ordinary” 
crimes than regarding the death penalty for extraordinary crimes. 
Additionally, a novelty of this study is that apart from the indicator of the legal status of 
the death penalty for murder in the constitution, an additional measure that gauges the application 
and actual practice of the death penalty is introduced. Reviewing the history of the capital 
punishment, it is striking that some countries retain it in their constitution as punishment but do 
not carry out executions during entire decades. Venezuela had not carried out an execution in the 
30 years before abolishing death penalty, and Argentina carried out its last execution in 1916 and 
did not abolish the death penalty for civilian crimes until 1984. In these cases, the citizens as well 
as politicians of a country might perceive the death penalty as abolished, since it is not applied 
anymore, and hence refrain from pushing abolitionist demands, or abolitionist movements might 
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diminish their efforts once executions have stopped. Almost half of the countries retentionist 
today are not applying the death penalty in practice, even though it remains still legally inscribed 
in the constitution. These facts illustrate, that a look at the legal status of the death penalty is not 
sufficient to gauge the experience of the death penalty as a country. The pressure on the 
government to introduce a moratorium might be even higher, than the pressure to finally abolish 
it. The fact that the United Nations General Assembly has approved a resolution that calls for a 
moratorium on the use of the death penalty every year since 2007 illustrates the importance of 
official moratoria or unofficial stops in executions (UNGA 2016). In many cases, the decision to 
put a moratorium on executions is the first and at the same time the most important step towards 
abolition, while the legal abolition is sometimes just a formality. In most cases, moratoria lead to 
eventual abolition of the death penalty, mainly because it demonstrates that a society can function 
without the death penalty. The Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide claims that 
“moratoria on executions, both official and unofficial, are playing an increasingly important role 
in eliminating the death penalty throughout the world” (Cornell Center on the Death Penalty 
2011). 
Hence, the mere legal status indicator is not able to fully capture the daily experience of a 
country with the death penalty. This study thus uses an additional indicator which captures the 
fact if an execution was carried out in the respective year or not. Greenberg and West (2008) 
already introduced a measure of the death penalty with a four-point scale, indicating if the death 
penalty was in place for ordinary crimes, extraordinary crimes and if the death penalty was 
actually used. Here, a binary indicator is used that takes on value 1 if any execution took place in 
the respective year and value 0 if not33.  
Using these two different specifications of the dependent variable allows to test if the 
                                                
33 See also section D.1.1.2 for a more detailed description of the execution indicator.  
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independent variables impact the two different forms of abolition differently. Figure D.9 shows 
the distribution of the number of countries that legally abolish the death penalty each year and 
Figure D.10 the number of countries that stop executing each year. It is evident, that the numbers 
of stops in executions are a lot higher, since moratoria or unofficial stops in executions are more 
frequent than legal abolitions of the capital punishment. Thus, there is more variation in the death 
penalty indicator using the stops in executions.  
D.3.3.2. Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
To analyze the factors leading up to an event the scientific literature commonly uses event history 
models, also called survival analysis or duration models. This class of statistical models has first 
been developed to analyze the factors determining the probability of survival in medical patients, 
for example after the onset of a disease. Therefore, the event is commonly referred to as “failure”. 
Logistic models can only analyze if the event occurs or not. They estimate the odds of the 
presence or absence of a binary characteristic, given a certain exposure to the covariates. In 
contrast, the event history models can model both the time that goes by before the event and the 
fact that the event happens. They can estimate the impact of different factors on the time of the 
occurrence of the event and give an estimate of the risk of the event happening at any given point 
in time. 
Among the event history models, the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972) is best 
suited to analyze the factors influencing the decision to abolish the death penalty and has been 
used in the previous studies on the topic by Neumayer (2008) and Kent (2010). The model is a 
continuous time model, where the event can happen at any point in time, as opposed to discrete 
time models where the event can only happen at a predetermined point in time (for example 
election day). 
The model assumes that there is a base hazard of abolition at any given point in time. 
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Individuals are “at risk” of experiencing the event from the moment they enter the sample. Apart 
from that, observed variables can increase or decrease the probability to a constant proportional 
extent. The model is called proportional hazards model, since the hazard of the event for any 
value of x is a constant multiple of the hazard.  
The basic proportional hazard model is defined as follows: 
 i 3 = ij(3) ∗ exp	(!Q[Q + ⋯+ !T[T) 
 
The probability at time t is defined by the baseline hazard ij(3) and the impact of the vector of 
covariates. The baseline hazard is the probability of failure if all covariates are equal to zero and 
changes over time, hence is time dependent. The vector of covariates impacts the probability via 
the vector of parameters that needs to be estimated. The Cox proportional hazards model is semi-
parametric: it models the impact of the independent variables; however, it is not necessary to 
define the time-dependence of the baseline hazard (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). 
The coefficients are estimated using maximum partial likelihood estimation34. The 
standard errors are clustered on the country level, hence are allowed to be correlated within one 
country over time. Failure to take into account the likely autocorrelation can lead to 
underestimated standard errors. The estimated coefficients are hazard ratios, i.e. the ratio of the 
hazards for two different groups determined by the covariates. A number bigger than one 
indicates that this variable increases the probability of the event, while a number smaller than one 
shows that this variable decreases the likelihood of abolition. A coefficient equal to one would 
indicate no effect, hence the two groups have the same hazard of the event occurring.  
In the framework of the abolition of the death penalty, the event is defined as the abolition 
                                                
34 The estimations are run using STATA Version 13.0 and the command stcox. 
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of the death penalty, hence the transition of the death penalty indicator variables described above 
from 1 to 0. Countries start to be “at risk” of abolition as soon as they enter the sample. Countries 
that abolished the death penalty before they enter the sample cannot be included in the analysis 
and hence are removed from the sample. This is called left-censoring, since the event occurs 
before the start of the observation period, which is a phenomenon unique to event history 
analysis. It might introduce some bias if important cases are left out of the sample, however in 
this case only very few countries had to be excluded from the analysis due to left-censoring35. 
The estimated hazard ratios express the difference in likelihood of abolition between two 
groups, hence the ratio of the hazard rates of the two groups. For example, a hazard ratio of 0.95 
expresses that two countries that differ by one unit in the homicide rate face hazard rates that 
differ by around 5%; e.g. a country with a 1-unit higher homicide rate has a likelihood that is 5% 
lower. 
The assumptions underlying the Cox Model are threefold: 
1) The effect ! of the covariates is constant over time (proportional hazards 
assumption). This means that the survival curves of two subgroups (determined by 
covariates) must be proportional over time, i.e. have a constant relative hazard. 
Hence, if group A of countries has double the hazard of group B in 1950, then this 
ratio between hazards needs to be constant over time. 
2) The covariates enter the link function as a linear combination. 
3) The link function is modeled as exponential. 
While assumptions 2) and 3) cannot be tested, the first assumption can be examined using the so 
called Schoenfeld residuals (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). They represent the difference 
                                                
35 The alternative approach to dealing with left-censored observations is to set the occurrence of the event on 
the first observed period. This solution might introduce even bigger bias, if the covariates take on significantly 
different values in the first year of observations than in the year of the actual event happening (Mooney and Lee 
2000).  
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between the observed covariate and the expected value of the covariate, given the risk set at that 
time. To test the proportionality assumption, the correlation of the residuals with time is 
examined. If the residuals vary significantly with time, then non-proportionality is present. The 
correlation should hence not be significantly different from zero. 
D.3.3.3. Covariates 
The main independent variable of interest is the homicide rate. Since the analyses in the first part 
of the chapter have shown that the death penalty does not Granger-cause the homicide rate, it is 
possible to introduce it as independent variable in this framework without a high risk of 
endogeneity (Wooldridge 2010). The main hypothesis to be tested is that the level of the 
homicide rate impacts the timing of the abolition of the death penalty. 
The literature review in section D.3.3 introduced some of the political, cultural and 
economic factors that are likely to impact the timing of abolition. To avoid the risk of omitted 
variable bias, these factors have to be controlled for in order to obtain a correct estimate of the 
impact of the homicide rate on abolition and stops in executions: 
 
Political and Cultural Factors: 
1) Polity IV - Democracy and the degree of democratization have been suggested as 
most important drivers of the abolition decision (Miethe et al. 2005, Neumayer 
2008, McGann and Sandholtz 2012, Killias 1986). democracies are more willing 
to accept limits to governmental power and to respect the human rights and the 
human dignity of their citizens (Neumayer 2008) than authoritarian regimes, and 
hence oppose the death penalty in most cases. As proxy for the democracy level, 
the indicator from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2017) is included as 
explanatory variable. The indicator ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 being a full 
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autocracy and +10 being a full democracy. The expected direction of the effect is 
positive, since a higher level of democratization, hence a higher polity score, is 
expected to increase the hazard of abolition. 
2) Ethnic Fractionalization – Kent (2010) states that the “presence of racial or ethnic 
minorities may affect abolition likelihood” (p. 58), since the presence of minorities 
often results in political repression and harsher criminal sanctions against ethnic 
minorities. Ethnic heterogeneity has been shown to explain cross-sectional 
differences in the presence of the death penalty (Rudell and Urbina 2004, 
Neumayer 2008, Kent 2010). Fractionalization, measured using the Herfindahl 
index of ethnic group shares (Alesina et al. 2003), is expected to lower the 
likelihood of abolition in this study. 
3) Education – The role of education has been highlighted in the study by Greenberg 
and West (2008). Higher levels of education reduce rigor in religious doctrines 
and increases the number of people questioning long-standing traditions and 
habits. It also alters the moral sensibilities and increases the importance of human 
rights. Furthermore, education enables the public to read the body of literature 
written on the topic of deterrence and question its efficacy. A spliced index of 
education including both numeracy rates and the number of average schooling 
years included in the regression analysis is expected to increase the probability of 
abolition.  
4) Conflict Dummy - A country’s experience with war and violent conflict has been 
mentioned repeatedly as a determining factor of abolitionist decisions, especially 
in single country qualitative studies (Lourtau and Babcock 2016). There are two 
potential directions: First, war and violent conflict might reduce the probability of 
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abolition, since during wartime violence against the person is perceived as 
necessary means and the general acceptance of violence is higher (Greenberg and 
West 2008). On the other hand, especially after wars and violent conflicts, a 
county might be more prone to do away with the death penalty after the recent 
cruel experience with violence. Furthermore, an ending war is often associated 
with a regime change, which can go hand in hand with new legislation. However, 
this regime transition might be better captured by the Polity IV variable. The 
previous empirical evidence is not definite at all, since for example Neumayer 
(2008) does not find any significant impact of a conflict dummy or the years that 
have gone by since the last armed conflict.  
5) British Legal Origin Dummy –The United Kingdom and other countries that 
inherited English common law abolished the death penalty late or remain 
retentionist (Neumayer 2008). Britain has a history of a widespread use of the 
death penalty. For example, in the 18th century 222 crimes were punishable by 
death (Jones and Johnstone 2011) and the number of capital offenses reduced 
slowly compared to other European countries (Greenberg and West 2008). With 
English common law, the use of the death penalty spread over the British Empire, 
and the long-term consequences might still be visible today. Hence, this study 
controls for British legal origin of the law, expecting a negative impact on the 
likelihood of abolition (as do Neumayer 2008 and Greenberg and West 2008).  
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Economic and Socioeconomic Factors: 
6) GDP per capita - The theory of the civilizing process, first established by Norbert 
Elias, predicts that as societies develop and evolve, they become more civilized 
and are less willing to accept cruel and violent treatment of individuals, hence also 
tend to oppose the death penalty (Neapolitan 2001). Another argumentation is that 
richer countries can afford alternative to the death penalty such as expensive 
correctional systems, and hence they might be less likely to retain the death 
penalty (Ruddell and Urbina 2004). In any case, higher economic income is 
expected to increase the likelihood of abolition. The empirical results however do 
not support this link, since none of the previous studies (Neumayer 2008, McGann 
and Sandholtz 2012, Greenberg and West 2008) could find a significant impact 
(except for Killias (1986) in a cross-sectional comparison).  
7) Economic Inequality (Gini coefficient) - Kent (2010) and Neumayer (2008) both 
conclude that countries with high inequality have one of the lowest likelihoods of 
abolition. Some authors theorize that in the presence of high economic inequality, 
harsh coercion measures are used to enforce order (Kent 2010). Inequality might 
also reduce social trust and empathy, increasing the willingness to accept harsh 
punishment (Greenberg and West 2008). 
8) Trade share as percentage of GDP - International pressure is exerted via treaties, 
human rights conventions and UN Protocols demanding abolition of the death 
penalty (Neumayer 2008). It is voluntary to join international treaties; however, 
abolitionist countries try to persuade others to do so. For example, Western Europe 
successfully used political pressure to bring abolition to Easter European countries 
in the 1990s (Neumayer 2008). In other cases, trade and aid incentives are given to 
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persuade countries to join international treaties. Neumayer (2008) mentions that 
Europe might be able to exert abolitionist pressure on Asian and Sub-Saharan 
Africa via trade incentives, however it is “unlikely” that Europe will pressure US 
in to abolition (p. 31). In any case, the more international ties a country has, the 
more likely it is to be influenced by abolitionist movements in other countries. 
Ruddell and Urbina (2004) likewise suggested that political pressure can be 
exerted especially when the countries are linked economically through trade. 
International trade measures the international openness and the degree of 
integration in the world economy, a factor that had not been examined in previous 
research. Generally, higher trade share is expected to increase the likelihood of 
abolition due to greater exposure to abolitionist international pressure. However, 
there are two countries that might bias the results in the opposite direction: China 
and US, both retentionist and two of the countries with the highest share in 
international trade.  
For a more detailed description of the data formats and sources, please refer to appendix D.7.4. 
The information on summary statistics can be found in Table D.8. Because the distributions of 
the homicide rate, the GDP per capita and the total trade share all show severe skewness, the 
logarithm of these variables is used (see Figure D.2). 
D.3.4. Empirical Results 
The objective of this section is to check for a significant impact of the homicide rates on the 
abolition of the death penalty. The regressions are run using the Cox proportional hazards model 
following the approach described in Cleves (2008) and in Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004). 
The two previously introduced indicators of the death penalty are used as dependent variables, 
each reported in separate regressions. First, bivariate analysis is run to offer an initial impression 
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of the link between death penalty abolition and homicide levels. Consequently, different sets of 
covariates are included to assess the robustness of the results and to explore at the same time 
which additional variables have an impact on the timing of abolition. 
D.3.4.1. Bivariate Analysis 
In the bivariate analysis enter 121 countries that had not abolished the death penalty and were 
carrying out executions when entering the sample. In the case of the execution indicator, there are 
110 occasions where a country stops applying the death penalty. For the legal status, a total of 57 
abolitions contribute to the analysis. 
The proportional hazards assumption is tested using the Schoenfeld residuals. The 
graphical inspection of the residuals plotted against time shows that the fitted line has a zero 
slope for both specifications of the model in Table D.9 (see Figure D.11 and Figure D.12). A 
non-zero slope would indicate a violation of the proportional hazards assumption, e.g. an increase 
or decrease in the residuals over time. The statistical Schoenfeld-test of the slope of a linear 
regression of the residuals on the log of time fails to reject the null hypothesis of a non-zero 
slope, indicating that the proportional hazards assumption can be maintained. The Cox model fits 
the data well in both specifications. The results of the Schoenfeld-test are reported at the bottom 
of the regression tables.  
Table D.9 presents the results from the bivariate regressions. In both specifications of the 
dependent variable, the homicide rate significantly decreases the hazard of abolition, and quite 
substantially so. Per the results in model (1), the likelihood of a stop of executions decreases by 
15% if the homicide rate increases by one standard deviation36. This result clearly supports the 
main hypothesis, that an increase in the homicide rate might hinder the stop of the death penalty 
                                                
36 The homicide rate in the sample has a standard deviation of 11.24, which translates into a standard deviation 
of the log(homicide rate) of 2.42.  
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practice, and that likewise, a decrease in the homicide rates rises the likelihood of a stop. Model 
(2) offers similar insights for the legal abolition of the death penalty. The percentage change in 
hazard for a one standard deviation increase in the homicide rate is around 13%. On the other 
hand, a decrease in homicide rates significantly improves the chances that a legal abolition will 
occur soon. These estimates are relatively low, compared to the estimates given by Neumayer 
(2008), who predicts a decrease in the hazard of abolition of up to 80%, following a one standard 
deviation increase in homicide rates37. Given these bivariate baseline estimates, different sets of 
covariates will now be included in the model to assess the impact of the homicide rate while 
controlling for other confounding factors. 
D.3.4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
Prior to estimating the model a correlation analysis of the covariates is standard procedure to 
avoid multicollinearities (Table D.10). The main explanatory variable, the homicide rate, is 
significantly correlated with all covariates except for the trade share. Interestingly, high 
inequality coincides with high homicide rates, while high GDP per capita, good education and 
democratic systems correlate with low homicide rates. Fortunately, the magnitude of the 
correlation is not very high, hence multicollinearity is not expected to be an issue here. Positive 
correlation very high in magnitude is found between the three indicators democratic systems, 
education and GDP, hence, when these indicators are included at the same time in a model, 
multicollinearity might occur. Across most previous studies, the level of democracy has proven to 
be the most important determinant of the decision to abolish the death penalty (Neumayer 2008, 
Greenberg and West 2008, Killias 1986, McGann and Sandholtz 2012), hence this variable is 
                                                
37 In the sample of Neumayer (2008), the homicide rate displays a standard deviation as high as 75, which 
seems unrealistically high. In the sample at hand for this study, the standard deviation is only 11.25. This 
difference in standard deviations naturally translates into the interpretation of the coefficients and results in the 
big difference between the estimated effects. The estimated hazard ratio for a one unit increase in homicide rate 
is 0.976.  
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given priority as control variable in this context.  
First, the results for the stops in executions are discussed. The model including both the 
homicide rate and polity index as measure of democratization is reported in column (1) of Table 
D.11. Due to data availability of the Polity IV indicator, the sample size is slightly reduced to 91 
countries and 61 stops in executions. Again, the test of the proportionality assumption indicates 
that the model fits the data well (p-value reported at the bottom of the table). The hazard ratio 
associated with a one unit decrease in the log of the homicide rate has a similar magnitude as in 
the bivariate models and is significant on the 5%-level. The Polity variable is positively 
associated with the likelihood of abolition, as expected: a one unit increase in the index translates 
into an increase of 3% in the likelihood. 
Having fit a Cox model to the data, it is possible to plot survival functions for a particular 
group, characterized by the value of the covariates. Figure D.13 plots the survival curve based on 
model (1) of a representative country evaluated at the mean homicide rate and the mean polity 
score. At the beginning of the 20th century, the likelihood of a stop in executions is very low, 
hence the survival curve remains over 0.8 until after 1950. Subsequently, the survival curve drops 
rapidly, indicating an increase in the likelihood of stops in executions. After 1980, the hazard of 
abolition reaches 50%. By 2000, the representative country has most certainly experienced a stop 
in executions. The survival curves can also be drawn at specific values of the independent 
variables: Figure D.14 compares the survival curves for two countries with the same polity score 
(mean), but with a homicide rate of two standard deviations over and under the mean value. The 
country with the higher homicide rate “survives” about one to two decades longer, before 
stopping the executions than the countries with the lower homicide rate. Finally, Figure D.15 
compares the survival curves for two different countries that have the mean polity score and the 
mean homicide rate of Germany and Russia respectively. While at the beginning of the 20th 
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century, both have a very high survival rate, it starts to drop shortly after 1950. The difference 
between the countries varies between 10 and 20 years, so a country that has the characteristics of 
Germany is expected to stop executing a lot earlier than a country with the characteristics of 
Russia. Indeed, while executions stopped in Germany after the second World War, Russia 
executed the last person in 1996.  
In the following columns of Table D.11, additional covariates of political and cultural 
nature are included. Determined by data availability of the covariate, the number of countries and 
stops in executions covered varies in each column. For the ethnic fractionalization index, no 
significant impact can be detected. The same holds for the dummies capturing the occurrence of a 
conflict and the British origin of the legal system. Education has a significant hazard ratio bigger 
than 1 (column (3)), indicating that higher education increases the odds of a stop in executions 
happening. However, this effect is not very robust. The homicide rate however is significant 
across all models in Table D.11 and the magnitude of the hazard ratio remains similar, no matter 
which covariates are included.  
The analysis is extended to the inclusion of economic covariates in Table D.12. Except for 
the specification in column (1), where only GDP is included as covariate, the effect of the 
homicide rate is equal to the one in the previous specifications and robust both in significance 
and magnitude. The GDP per capita is also an important driver of the timing of abolition: An 
increase in the economic level of development of a country strongly increases the likelihood that 
the country stops executing. The trade share as percentage of GDP does not display a significant 
impact. The distribution of the economic income, measured by the Gini coefficient, does not 
seem to play a role either. 
Figure D.16 plots the survival curves of two countries situated one standard deviation 
over and under the mean GDP per capita. At the beginning of the century, the difference in 
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economic development does not translate in a different likelihood of survival. From 1910 to 
1950, there is a small but constant difference, with the richer country being less likely to retain 
the death penalty longer. After 1950, the difference starts to increase. 
Turning to the results using the legal abolition of the death penalty as event, the results are 
less explicit (Table D.13). The main variable of interest, the homicide rate, is only significant in 
one of the specifications, and slightly so. This indicates that the impact of the homicide rate on 
the timing of the legal abolition is not as strong and robust as on the stops of the executions. The 
Polity IV variable on the other hand is highly significant, hence democracy seems to play an 
important role when it comes to explaining the legal abolition of the death penalty. In column (3), 
there is no significant impact of the Polity IV variable. This might be caused by multicollinearity, 
since the education indicator, that is highly correlated with the Polity variable, is included here. 
Ethnic fractionalization has an impact significant only at the 10% level, reducing the likelihood 
of abolition. The legal origin of the legal system also seems to be more important here, than in 
the case of the stops in executions. The likelihood of abolition is around 64% lower for a country 
of British legal origin compared to a country of any other legal origin. This is also visible in the 
survival curves for two representative countries that only differ in the fact that one of them is of 
British legal origin (Figure D.17). The difference in hazard is increasing over time, resulting in an 
expected difference of over 50 years. Table D.14 presents the estimation results using the legal 
abolition as event variable and including economic covariates. The GDP per capita is again 
highly significant, indicating a higher likelihood of abolition for richer countries. To illustrate 
this, Figure D.18 plots the survival curves for two countries that differ by two standard deviations 
in the GDP per capita. First, it is apparent that the hazard of abolition stays close to zero up until 
1900, then it starts to increase, and more quickly so for the richer country. For the country with a 
lower economic development, the hazard of abolition stays very low until the end of the sample 
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period. 
An additional result is that, as predicted by previous studies, the Gini coefficient also does 
significantly decrease the likelihood of abolition. Trade share, as in the results for the execution 
indicator, is not significantly altering the odds of legal abolition. 
To illustrate and compare the magnitude of the impacts, Table D.15 reports the percentage 
changes in the hazard rate corresponding to a one standard deviation increase in the covariates for 
selected models. Only the variables significant in the respective models are reported. The impact 
with by far the biggest magnitude on both the hazard of a stop in executions and the hazard of 
legal abolition has the GDP per capita. An increase of one standard deviation causes the hazard 
rate to double (in the case of the execution variable) or to even triple (in the legal status variable). 
This shows, that the level of economic development, or the conditions and circumstances it 
entails play a major role determining the abolition decision of a country. The legal origin variable 
only impacts the decision of a country to legally abolish the death penalty. Countries that are of 
British legal origin have a 60%-lower likelihood of abolition than countries of other legal origin. 
The impact of democratization is the less steady in magnitude, since it entails an increase in the 
likelihood of stops in executions of 30% and an increase of 86% in the likelihood of legal 
abolition. Finally, the homicide rate has a relatively robust, negative impact: A one standard 
deviation change in the homicide rate makes a country between 20 and 30 % less likely to stop 
executions, and about 40 less likely to legally abolish the death penalty. The latter effect however 
is not very robust to alterations in the model specification. 
The obtained results for the legal abolition indicator can be compared to the previous 
studies using a similar indicator. Of the four studies that considered the potential impact of crime 
rates on the abolition of the death penalty, two had found no effect using cross-sectional analysis 
(Ruddell and Urbina 2004; Greenberg and West 2008). The two studies using event history 
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analysis had opposite results: while Kent (2010) found that increasing reported crime rates make 
a country more likely to abolish the death penalty, Neumayer (2008) was able to show that higher 
homicide rates have the opposite effect. The results in this paper with an increased number of 
countries covered in the sample corroborate the results by Neumayer (2008). The contradictory 
results obtained by Kent (2010) might be biased by the measurement error introduced by the 
imputation procedure used to increase the number of observations. 
Regarding democratization, most previous studies agreed that it importantly impacts the 
decision to abolish the death penalty (Miethe et al. 2005, Neumayer 2008, McGann and 
Sandholtz 2012). This is confirmed by the results of this study. The higher the level of 
democratization of a country, the higher the likelihood that it will soon abolish the death penalty. 
At the same time, the results about the role of ethnic fractionalization can be confirmed. As 
previous studies suggest (Rudell and Urbina 2004, Neumayer 2008, Kent 2010), countries with 
higher ethnic heterogeneity are less likely to abolish the death penalty. Likewise, the previous 
findings on the British Legal origin could be confirmed (Neumayer 2008, Greenberg and West 
2008). Education, that had been found to play a significant role by Greenberg and West (2008) 
did not show any significant effect in this analysis. Regarding the general income level measured 
by GDP per capita, the findings show that changes of the average income level do indeed have a 
significant impact on the abolition decision. This contrasts with most previous studies, where the 
income level did not show significance (Neumayer 2008, McGann and Sandholtz 2012, 
Greenberg and West 2008). Finally, earlier findings that higher income inequality hinders the 
abolition of the death penalty could be corroborated (Kent 2010 and Neumayer 2008). Since there 
are no previous studies looking at the stops in executions, those results obtained here cannot be 
compared. 
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D.3.4.3. Robustness Checks 
The trade share was expected to increase the likelihood of abolition due to greater exposure to 
international political abolitionist pressure, however, no significant impact could be found. One 
possibility is that the outliers, China and the US, who both have a high trade volume but are 
retentionist, bias the result. To check this possibility, the model is estimated excluding China and 
the US from the sample (column (1) of Table D.16 and of Table D.17). However, regarding both 
the stops in executions as well as the legal abolitions, the results do not change and hence the 
insignificance is not a result of outlier bias.  
Another phenomenon that will be assessed here is the fact that most of the Latin 
American countries abolished the death penalty very early and yet maintain a high level of 
violence until today. This is contradictory to the theory that countries with high homicide rates 
retain the death penalty longer. However, when estimating the model for the stops in executions 
for the Americas only, the coefficient of the homicide variable even increases in magnitude 
(column (2) of Table D.16). This illustrates, that even though the Latin American countries all 
abolished the death penalty early and have high homicide rates, the variation within the American 
continent still supports the theory, because even within the continent, countries with higher 
homicide rates retained the death penalty longer. GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient and the 
Polity variable all show no significant impact in this regression. This could likely be a result of 
the small number of observations and the fact that now only seven stops in executions are 
contained in the data set. For the legal abolition indicator, it is not possible to estimate the model 
for the Americas only, since the number of observations is insufficient. Estimating the model 
excluding the American countries (columns (3) of Table D.16 and of Table D.17), the results 
obtained for the entire sample are corroborated. 
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D.3.5. Summary of the Findings 
Section D.3 examined the hypothesis that homicide rates have an impact on the death penalty, 
measured as both the inscription in a country’s legislation as well as the actual use of the death 
penalty. Using event history analysis, the impact of homicide rates on the hazard of abolition as 
well as on the hazard of a stop in executions, for example via the introduction of a moratorium, 
was analyzed. Higher homicide rates were expected to delay the abolition/stop, while lower 
homicide rates were expected to lead to higher hazard rates of abolition/ a stop.  
The main hypothesis could be confirmed in the case of the tangible application of the 
death penalty: Homicide rates have an important impact on the timing of stops in executions. 
Higher homicide rates importantly lower the hazard that a stop of the executions occurs, while 
lower homicide rates make it more likely, that a country stops applying the death penalty. The 
results indicate that the homicide rates influence the legal abolition of the death penalty in the 
same way, however this effect is not as robust as in the case of the executions.  
This discrepancy in the results using the different indicators of the death penalty confirms 
the initial assumption that the two indicators capture two very different aspects of the death 
penalty that are also perceived differently by the public. The introduction of a moratorium or an 
unofficial stop in executions is often the first, and many times the most important step towards an 
abolition. This first step is much more susceptible to the impact by increasing violence rates. 
Once the moratorium is in place and the public might realize that a stop in executions is not 
accompanied by an increase in violence and that the death penalty is not crucial for the 
functioning of the society. Afterwards, an increase in violence does no longer provoke the call for 
harsher punishments or a tougher treatment of criminals. 
To control for the impact of covariates, a number of other factors that have been shown to 
impact the timing of abolition in previous research have been included in the study, and this way 
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the impact of these factors on abolition and stops in executions could be examined as well. The 
factor that has been unanimously claimed as most important for the decision of a county to 
abolish the death penalty by previous studies is democratization. Indeed, the results have shown 
that a higher level of democracy, measured by the Polity IV variable, increases the likelihood of 
legal abolition. The impact on the stops in executions however is not as strong and robust. The 
level of economic development, measured as GDP per capita, matters for both the timing of legal 
abolition as well as stops in executions. There are several channels through which GDP impacts a 
country’s decision to do away with the death penalty, since GDP might be a proxy not only for 
increasing living standards but also for higher education or a more efficient system of institutions. 
Ethnic fractionalization, the origin of the legal system as well as inequality only have a 
significant impact on the legal abolition, not on the initial stop in executions. These variables 
measure characteristics that are mainly determined by a country’s history such as colonization, 
migration and by how the society is structured. Finally, the fact that a county experiences a 
violent internal or international conflict in the respective decade as well as the level of education 
have no significant impact on any of the two dependent variables in this study. 
The takeaway message of this analysis is that the initial step a country takes towards 
abolition in the form of a moratoria is highly influenced by the experience with violence in the 
recent years; however, for the following legal abolition, other factors such as the degree of 
democratization, the economic development and the inequality are more important determinants.  
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D.4. Conclusions 
This paper scrutinized the interlinkages between homicide rates and capital punishment. The 
traditional view of deterrence assumes that the presence of a severe punishment, such as the death 
penalty, has a crime reducing effect, since it makes a criminal behavioral option less attractive for 
potential delinquents taking into account the costs and benefits of the crime. However, there are 
many examples throughout history where politicians, the media and the public demand tougher 
legislation and harsher punishment of criminals as an answer to an increase in crime rates. Hence, 
it can be hypothesized that the causality runs in opposite direction: the development in homicide 
rates might dictate the introduction, retention or abolition of harsher punishments such as the 
death penalty. Some empirical studies as well as evidence from recent or historic events back up 
this hypothesis. Reading through historical reports and tales on trends in crime one often comes 
across the fact that an increase in crime and violence was countered by an aggravation of the 
punishments by the governing institutions (Eisner 2014). The more violent the times, the more 
cruel and severe the punishments. The recent demand of US president Donald Trump to change 
the law to be able to execute drug dealers (Drash 2018) is just the most recent example of 
politicians promoting “getting tough” policies when confronted with increasing (or persistently 
high) crime rates. 
The first part of this study was looking at the deterrent effect of the death penalty. The 
relationship between homicide rates and the death penalty was modeled empirically using 
methodologies that allow for feedback effects from the death penalty on the crime rates. The 
Granger-causality tests and the estimation of a dynamic logit model recently developed by 
Bartolucci and Pigini (2017) could not offer any support for the deterrence hypothesis. Given 
these results, it was possible to introduce the homicide rate as explanatory variable when 
explaining the timing of the abolition of the death penalty or the stop in executions in the second 
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part of the paper. The event history analysis revealed that the homicide rate does indeed 
significantly impact the timing: increasing homicide trends lead to a lower probability of 
abolition or a stop in executions. One novelty of this study was the proxy used to measure the 
death penalty. Two dummy variables were employed, one indicating the legal status of the death 
penalty and the other the actual practice, that is if the death penalty was applied and executions 
were carried out. Using the two indicators, two different dimension of the capital punishment 
could be measured. A stop in executions, either via the introduction of an official moratorium or 
just an unofficial stop, is an important initial step towards the abolition of the capital punishment. 
This initial step has been shown to be highly influenced by the development of crime rates in the 
recent years. Countries experiencing an increase in violence are less prone to put a preliminary 
stop on the execution practice. The second and definite step in the abolition of the death penalty 
is rather influenced by other factors such as the degree of democratization, the economic 
development, inequality and the origin of the legal system.  
In the last couple of years, even countries with a traditionally low violent crime incidence 
have experienced a recurrence in violent crime (BKA 2016) accompanied by the usual demands 
for tougher legislation. Hence it is more important than ever to understand the relationship 
between crime and punishment to not commit the mistake of increasing the severity of the 
punishment as a counter-measure of rising crime rates instead of looking for the real reasons 
behind the increase. The evidence of a deterrent effect of the death penalty is far too weak as to 
refer to it as a valid and universal anti-crime measure. Alternative strategies such as addressing 
the socioeconomic conditions that are conducive to criminal behavior are probably more 
meaningful. 
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Figure D.1: Observations by Country and Year (Panels 1 to 4) 
Panel 1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
British Virgin Islands
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of Congo
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
C
ou
nt
rie
s
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
  
 215 
Panel 2 
 
 
Panel 3 
  
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Falkland Islands
Fiji
Finland
France
French Guiana
French Polynesia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guam
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
C
ou
nt
rie
s
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Martinique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mayotte
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Montserrat
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
North Korea
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Palestine
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Reunion
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
C
ou
nt
rie
s
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
D. Homicide Rates and the Death Penalty 
 216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel 4 
 
  
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Turks and Caicos Islands
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
United States Virgin Islands
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zimbabwe
C
ou
nt
rie
s
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
  
 217 
Figure D.2: Distributions of Homicide Rate (Panel 1) and Log(Homicide Rate) (Panel 2) 
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Figure D.3: Homicide Rate Trends in the 20th Century - Europe vs. the US38 
 
 
 
Figure D.4: Homicide Rate Trends in Europe 
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Figure D.5: Homicide Rate Trends in Latin America 
 
 
 
Figure D.6: Homicide Rate Trends in Asia and Africa 
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Figure D.7: Mean Homicide Rate before/after Abolition of the Death Penalty 
 
 
 
Figure D.8: Mean Homicide Rate before/after Stops in Executions 
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Figure D.9: Number of Legal Abolitions per Year 
 
 
 
Figure D.10: Number of Stops in Executions per Year 
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Figure D.11: Graphical Test of the PH-Assumption (Execution Indicator) 
 
 
 
Figure D.12: Graphical Test of the PH-Assumption (Legal Status Indicator) 
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Figure D.13: Survival Curve: Mean Homicide Rate and Polity IV (Model (1) of Table D.11) 
 
 
 
Figure D.14: Survival Curves: High and Low Homicide Rate (Model (1) of Table D.11) 
 
Survival curves for two representative countries one standard deviation over and under the mean 
homicide rate.   
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Figure D.15: Survival Curves: Germany vs. Russia (Model (1) of Table D.11) 
 
 
 
Figure D.16: Survival Curves: High and Low GDP per capita (Model (5) of Table D.12) 
 
Survival curves for two representative countries one standard deviation over and under the mean GDP 
per capita.   
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Figure D.17: Survival Curves by Legal Origin (Model (5) of Table D.13) 
 
 
 
Figure D.18: Survival Curves: High and Low GDP per capita (Model (5) of Table D.14) 
 
Survival curves for two representative countries one standard deviation over and  
under the mean GDP per capita.  
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D.6.2. Tables 
 
 
Table D.1: Pesaran (2004) Tests of Cross-Sectional Dependence (Balanced Panel 1950-2000) 
 
Variable CD-Test p-value Average Correlation 
Log(Homicide Rate) 28.851 0.000 0.261 
Log(GDP per capita) 96.634 0.000 0.881 
# of Countries 26 
 
Average # of Observations 51 
 
 
 
Table D.2: Unit Root Tests of Log(Homicide Rate) (Balanced Panel 1950-2000) 
 
Pesaran Test Number of Lags Zt-bar p-value 
 0 -9.075 0.000 
 1 -5.095 0.000 
 2 -3.728 0.000 
Maddala-Wu Test 0 213.137 0.000 
 1 78.489 0.010 
 2 63.475 0.132 
# of Countries 26  
 Average # of Observations 51 
 
 
 
Table D.3: Unit Root Tests of Log(Homicide Rate) (Balanced Panel 1970-1990) 
 
Pesaran Test Number of Lags Zt-bar p-value 
 0 -9.107 0.000 
 1 -5.006 0.000 
 2 -1.142 0.127 
Maddala-Wu Test 0 241.587 0.000 
 1 153.563 0.000 
 2 139.157 0.003 
# of Countries 48  
 Average # of Observations 21 
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Table D.4: Granger-Causality Tests based on VAR with 2 Lags 
 
 DP39 Legal Status Indicator DP Execution Indicator 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dependent Variable Log (Homicide Rate) DP 
Log 
(Homicide Rate) DP 
     
L. Log(Homicide Rate) 0.281*** 0.001 0.282*** -0.001 
 (0.054) (0.001) (0.054) (0.001) 
L2. Log(Homicide Rate) 0.365*** 0.000 0.366*** -0.001 
 (0.038) (0.000) (0.038) (0.001) 
L.DP -0.062 1.007*** 0.108 0.889*** 
 (0.141) (0.004) (0.127) (0.048) 
L2.DP 0.088 -0.000194 -0.099 0.101** 
 (0.081) (0.001) (0.107) (0.048) 
Granger-causality tests 
(p-value)     
excluding DP 0.512  0.636  
excluding Log(Homicide Rate)  0.565  0.309 
     
Observations 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 
# of Countries 207 207 207 207 
Average # of Observations 40 40 40 40 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
  
                                                
39 In all the tables, “death penalty” is abbreviated as “DP”. 
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Table D.5: Granger-Causality Tests based on VAR with 3 Lags 
 
 DP Legal Status Indicator DP Execution Indicator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dependent Variable Log (Homicide Rate) DP 
Log 
(Homicide Rate) DP 
     
L. Log(Homicide Rate) 0.228*** 0.001 0.228*** -0.001 
 -0.056 (0.001) (0.056) (0.001) 
L2. Log(Homicide Rate) 0.360*** 0.000 0.360*** -0.001* 
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.039) (0.001) 
L3. Log(Homicide Rate) 0.125*** 0.000 0.125*** -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.000) (0.046) (0.001) 
L.DP -0.017 1.006*** 0.130 0.889*** 
 (0.125) (0.003) (0.122) (0.044) 
L2.DP 0.023 -0.000 -0.129 0.156** 
 (0.083) (0.000) (0.133) (0.070) 
L3.DP 0.069 0.000 0.048 -0.060 
 (0.050) (0.000) (0.045) (0.036) 
Granger-causality Tests 
(p-values)     
Excluding DP 0.309  0.607  
Excluding Log(Homicide Rate)  0.405  0.310 
     
Observations 7,837 7,837 7,837 7,837 
# of Countries 200 200 200 200 
Average # of Observations 39 39 39 39 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.6: Dynamic Logit Model (4 years before and after last execution) 
 
# of Countries 100  
# of Observations 629  
Dependent Variable DP Legal Status Indicator DP Execution Indicator 
 Coefficients 
Standard 
errors 
p-
values Coefficients 
Standard 
errors 
p-
values 
Log(Homicide Rate) -0.555* 0.317 0.080 -30.718 283.812 0.914 
Log(Homicide Rate) in t+1 0.175 0.193 0.365 33.806 81.962 0.680 
L.DP 7.255*** 2.231 0.001 282.441 4698.252 0.952 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table D.7: Dynamic Logit Model (4 years before and after legal abolition) 
 
# of Countries 54 
 
# of Observations 668 
Dependent Variable DP Legal Status Indicator DP Execution Indicator 
 Coefficients 
Standard 
errors 
p-
values Coefficients 
Standard 
errors 
p-
values 
Log(Homicide Rate) 2.175 2.742 0.428 0.472 33.592 0.989 
Log(Homicide Rate) in t+1 0.717 2.022 0.723 -3.884 30.464 0.899 
L.DP 13.227*** 2.761 0.000 61.323 104.846 0.559 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.8: Summary Statistics 
 
 
# of 
Observations Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Homicide Rate 9876 6.284 0 240 12.031 
Log(Homicide Rate) 9876 0.837 -9.210 5.481 2.116 
Death Penalty Indicators 
DP Execution Indicator 9876 0.534 0 1 0.498 
DP Legal Status Indicator 9876 0.708 0 1 0.454 
Year of Last Execution 6076 1965.655 1830 2016 35.779 
Year of Legal Abolition 5046 1960.188 1863 2014 39.179 
Covariates 
Population 6271 34485.02 45.183 1264093 102484.6 
GDP per capita 4442 5386.796 1.1365 33326 4991.255 
Gini Coefficient 4914 42.8105 21.352 70.099 7.830 
Spliced Education Index 4323 5.783 0.07 13.05 3.107 
Polity IV 4162 3.230 -10 10 6.780 
Conflict Dummy 4572 0.388 0 1 0.487 
Legal Origin UK 4572 0.238 0 1 0.426 
Ethnic Fractionalization 4045 0.366 0.01 0.959 0.274 
Trade (% of GDP) 4852 7.308 0.143 222.037 15.519 
 
 
Table D.9: Bivariate Analysis 
 
  (1) (2) 
  DP Execution Indicator DP Legal Status Indicator 
Log(Homicide Rate) 0.886* 0.868** 
 (0.056) (0.062) 
   
Observations 3,723 5,034 
# of Countries 121 121 
# of Abolitions 110 57 
p-value Global Schoenfeld -Test 0.541 0.393 
Standard errors (clustered on the country level) in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.10: Correlation Analysis 
 
 Log(HR)    
Polity IV -0.245*** Polity IV   
Conflict Dummy 0.167*** -0.181*** Conflict  
Eth. Fractionalization 0.339*** -0.213*** 0.109* Fractionalization 
Education Index -0.308*** 0.677*** -0.275*** -0.282*** 
Population 0.102* 0.0342 0.164*** 0.229*** 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.293*** 0.651*** -0.252*** -0.365*** 
Gini Coefficient 0.393*** -0.436*** 0.207*** 0.348*** 
Trade (% of GDP) -0.032** 0.086*** -0.25*** -0.024 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Education    
Population -0.0481 Population   
Log(GDP per capita) 0.898*** -0.0889* Log(GDP per capita)  
Gini Coefficient -0.499*** -0.0428 -0.426*** Gini 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.0833*** -0.578 0.128*** -0.219*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.11: Determinants of Stops in Executions: Political and Cultural Factors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Log(Homicide Rate) 0.815** 0.824** 0.814** 0.798** 0.826** 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.079) (0.076) (0.08) 
Polity IV 1.038* 1.019 0.978 1.010 1.026 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.029) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  1.137 1.762   
  (0.524) (0.805)   
Education Index   1.136** 1.071 1.043 
   (0.067) (0.051) (0.052) 
Conflict Dummy    1.08  
    (0.264)  
Legal Origin UK     0.660 
     (0.212) 
      
Observations 2,054 1,829 1,787 1,986 1,986 
# of Countries 91 71 66 81 81 
# of Stops 61 51 48 57 57 
PH-Test (p-value) 0.517 0.746 0.864 0.654 0.6 
Standard errors (clustered on the country level) in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.12: Determinants of Stops in Executions: Economic Factors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Log(Homicide Rate 0.889 0.777*** 0.825*** 0.745*** 0.729*** 
 (0.089) (0.073) (0.055) (0.075) (0.069) 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.437**   3.165*** 2.813*** 
 (0.243)   (0.937) (0.846) 
Gini Coefficient  1.004  0.994 0.999 
  (0.017)  (0.017) (0.018) 
Log(Trade (% of GDP))   1.016 0.850 0.869 
   (0.139) (0.236) (0.248) 
Polity IV     1.031 
     (0.026) 
      
Observations 2,238 2,693 2,453 1,518 1,420 
# of Countries 94 82 99 70 67 
# of Stops 59 53 88 41 41 
PH-Test (p-value) 0.084 0.269 0.73 0.061 0.169 
Standard errors (clustered on the country level) in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.13: Determinants of Abolition: Political and Cultural Factors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Log(Homicide Rate) 0.825 0.816* 0.813 0.836 0.823 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.110) (0.096) (0.110) 
Polity IV 1.092*** 1.069** 1.015 1.066** 1.095*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.031) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.285* 0.384 0.310* 0.447 
  (0.191) (0.269) (0.207) (0.314) 
Education Index   1.156*   
   (0.092)   
Conflict Dummy    0.635  
    (0.235)  
Legal Origin UK     0.364*** 
     (0.141) 
      
Observations 2,846 2,611 2,530 2,611 2,611 
# of Countries 103 82 76 82 82 
# of Abolitions 37 28 26 28 28 
PH-Test (p-value) 0.637 0.658 0.686 0.63 0.634 
Standard errors (clustered on the country level) in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.14: Determinants of Abolition: Economic Factors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Log(Homicide Rate 0.887 0.777** 0.867* 0.684** 0.662** 
 (0.104) (0.099) (0.075) (0.127) (0.129) 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.871***   6.967*** 6.016*** 
 (0.350)   (3.351) (3.358) 
Gini Coefficient  0.927***  0.923** 0.925** 
  (0.024)  (0.029) (0.031) 
Log(Trade (% of GDP))   1.272 1.111 1.229 
   (0.278) (0.342) (0.407) 
Polity IV     1.027 
     (0.041) 
      
Observations 3,056 3,531 3,611 2,115 2,000 
# of Countries 105 93 108 81 79 
# of Abolitions 39 34 44 22 22 
PH-Test (p-value) 0.345 0.136 0.617 0.718 0.877 
Standard errors (clustered on the country level) in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.15: Percentage Changes of Hazard Rates  
following a One-Standard Deviation Increase of the Covariates 
 
 
Execution Indicator Legal Status 
Table D.11 Table D.11 Table D.12 Table D.13 Table D.14 
 Column (1) Column (5) Column (5) Column (5) Column (5) 
Log(Homicide Rate) -21.5 -20.3 -30.8 ns -42.7 
Polity IV 29.2 ns ns 85.8 ns 
Log (GDP per capita) -- -- 102.8 -- 270.5 
UK Legal Origin -- -- -- -63.7 -- 
 
This table reports percentage changes in the hazard of abolition following a one standard deviation 
increase in the independent variable. 
 
 
 
Table D.16: Determinants of Stops in Executions: Robustness Checks 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Excluding US and 
China Americas Excluding Americas 
Log(Homicide Rate 0.815** 0.326** 0.756*** 
 (0.0800) (0.181) (0.0631) 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.169** 1.713 1.006*** 
 (0.293) (2.308) (0.276) 
Gini Coefficient 0.971 0.879 0.961* 
 (0.0192) (0.104) (0.0234) 
Log(Trade (% of GDP)) 0.926 0.0677* 1.135 
 (0.266) (0.106) (0.352) 
Polity IV 1.017 0.861 1.042** 
 (0.0297) (0.116) (0.0374) 
 
   Observations 825 136 710 
# of Countries 65 9 58 
# of Stops 37 7 31 
PH-Test (p-value) 0.218 0.699 0.453 
Standard errors (clustered on the country level) in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.17: Determinants of Abolition: Robustness Checks 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
Excluding  
US and China 
Excluding 
Americas 
      
   
Log(Homicide Rate 0.747 0.679** 
 (0.153) (0.147) 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.918** 1.512*** 
 (0.610) (0.461) 
Gini Coefficient 0.888*** 0.879** 
 (0.0322) (0.0390) 
Log(Trade (% of GDP)) 1.099 1.136 
 (0.365) (0.416) 
Polity IV 1.088 1.102 
 (0.0665) (0.0708) 
   
Observations 1,227 968 
# of Countries 76 66 
# of Abolitions 18 17 
PH-Test (p-value) 0.838 0.953 
Standard errors (clustered on the country level) in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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D.7. Appendix 
D.7.1. Data Sources Homicide Rates 
The homicide rate database has been constructed over years, using a variety of sources. The most 
important ones are described in the following list: 
Source Detailed Source Description 
WHO Mortality 
Database 
The WHO Mortality Database offers data on the causes of death for 
numerous countries from 1972 until 2011, mainly retrieved from civil 
registration systems of the member states. The classification of the 
causes of death follows the WHO International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD). During the period of observation, various revisions of the ICD 
classification took place, however, the definition of violent death has 
been unaffected. The major revision has been the inclusion of deaths due 
to legal intervention (police killings or the execution of the death 
penalty). 
Link: www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/ 
Clio Infra 
This dataset was constructed by Winny Bierman and Jan Luiten van 
Zanden in April 2014 and was revised by Jonathan Fink Jensen in 2015. 
The sources were mainly statistical yearbooks. A detailed description of 
the sources can be found in the working paper “World Countries 
Homicide Rate, 1500-2000” by Fink-Jensen (2015). 
Link: www.clio-infra.eu/Indicators/HomicideRates.html 
UNODC 
UNODC data, mostly compiled via the UN Survey on Crime Trends and 
the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. 
Link: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/historic-
data.html 
Interpol 
The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) has conducted 
yearly crime surveys from 1950 onwards, sending questionnaires to the 
member countries to obtain data on several crime indicators, as for 
example the intentional homicide rate. The data stems from criminal 
justice data sources. The Interpol definition of homicide also includes 
infanticide, and excludes manslaughter. Furthermore, it includes 
attempted murder in contrast to the other sources.  
Link: www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Publications2/Annual-reports2 
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Single country sources and statistical yearbooks: 
SJBDE Statistische Jahrbücher für das Deutsche Reich 
Mexico 
Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
various years, see inegi.org.mx 
India Statistics of the colonies of the British empire. 
Brazil 
Brazil 1832-1890. Center for Research Libraries, 
Reports of the Brazilian Provinces 1830-1889, 
brazil.crl.edu/bsd/bsd/hartness/crimecomm.html, and 
Anuario estatistico do Brasil:1908-1912. (available at: 
memoria.org.br/) 
Colombia 
Colombia 1915-1930, Anuario Estadistico de 
Colombia 
Japan 
Statistical Bureau, Management and Coordination 
Agency ed., Historical Statistics of Japan, vol.1, 5, 
Tokyo, 1988 
 
  
Source Detailed Source Description 
Historical Violence 
Database 
Historical Violence Database (see: 
cjrc.osu.edu/research/interdisciplinary/hvd).  
Randolph Roth, Douglas L. Eckberg, Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Kenneth 
Wheeler, James Watkinson, Robb Haberman, and James M. Denham. 
2008. “The Historical Violence Database: A Collaborative Research 
Project on the History of Violent Crime and Violent Death.” Historical 
Methods 41, 81-97. 
NRILP 
The National Research Institute of Legal Policy in Helsinki produced a 
Comparative Homicide Time Series (version 10-4-2014). The data can 
be found in the following publication: 
Lehti, M. (2013), “NRILP Comparative Homicide Time Series (NRILP-
CHTS)”, National Research Institute of Legal Policy, Research Brief, 32, 
Helsinki. 
Archer and Gartner 
Comparative Crime Data File by Archer, Dane and Rosemary Gartner 
(1984) Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective. New Haven: 
Yale University Press., excel available on 
cjrc.osu.edu/research/interdisciplinary/hvd/asia/sri-lanka 
Eisner 
Eisner, M., (2003), ‘Long-Term Historical Trends in Violent Crime’, 
Crime and Justice 30, 83-142. 
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D.7.2. Data Sources Death Penalty 
The data on both the execution of the death penalty as well as the legal status have been retrieved 
from two main sources: 
1) Amnesty International – This NGO has been campaigning again the use of the 
death penalty since 1961, and over the course of its activities has published 
numerous reports and country briefs containing information about the use and the 
legal status of the death penalty. All of the resources can be accessed on their 
website www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/death-penalty/ 
2) Death Penalty Worldwide, a project founded in 2011, has created a worldwide 
database containing information about the status and the use of the death penalty. 
The database can be accessed under: www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/ 
When possible, the data from these two sources have been cross-checked and supplemented with 
information from national reports, official statements and newspaper articles. 
D.7.3. Granger-Causality Tests - Methodology 
The concept of Granger-causality (Granger 1969) is defined as follows: One variable [ is 
said to Granger-cause another variable X if X can be better predicted using the joint history of X 
and [ as opposed to using the history of X only.  
In the following, XP and [P are two stationary time series (with 3 = 1, 2, 3, … , f). A simple 
Granger-causality test consists of regressing the following vector autoregressive model (VAR): 
XP = 1Q + SQTXPVT +6TWQ !QT[PVT + ZQP
6
TWQ  
[P = 1p + SpTXPVT +6TWQ !pT[PVT + ZpP
6
TWQ  
 
  
 241 
and then testing the coefficients !QT and SpTfor significance. There are four potential 
outcomes of the test: 
1) Unidirectional Granger-causality from x to y. In this case, at least one of the !QT-
coefficients is different from zero and all the SpT are equal to zero.  
2) Unidirectional Granger-causality from y to x with at least one of the SpT-
coefficients nonzero and !QT = 0 for all k.  
3) Bidirectional causality (feedback). If at least one of the !QT and at least one of the SpT-coefficients has a nonzero value.  
4) Independence. If the realizations of x and y only depend on their own lagged 
values, then there is no Granger-causality in any direction.  
In the context of the deterrence effect, the death penalty series Granger-causes the 
homicide rate, if the lagged death penalty indicator helps to forecast the development of the 
homicide rate. A recent change of the death penalty indicator from 1 to 0 (an abolition) should 
help predict the development of the homicide rate, if deterrence is present. On the other hand, 
past values of the homicide rate could help predict the abolition or retention of the homicide rate 
if feedback effects exist. 
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D.7.4. Data Sources Covariates 
 
Variable Data Sources 
Polity IV 
The annual polity score capturing political regime characteristics is 
available for 168 countries from 1800 to 2016 from the Polity IV 
Project (Marshall et al. 2017). The Polity2 index, the revised combined 
polity score is used. For this standardized authority scores have been 
converted to conventional polity scores by the authors.  
Link: www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
This fractionalization measure has been developed by Alesina et al. 
(2003). It is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the ethnic 
group shares: q,21r = 1 − 5OrpsOWQ  
for country j and its ethnic groups i (i=1 .... N). The ethnic 
fractionalization variable is chose here, since ethnicity combines both 
racial and linguistic characteristics, and hence is a more universal 
measure than using mere racial or mere linguistic fractionalization. The 
data on the fractionalization index is obtained from Alesina et al. 
(2003), Data source: Romain Wacziarg, available at: 
www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html 
Education 
Numeracy rates have been proven to be highly correlated with 
traditional education measures such as years of schooling (Crayen and 
Baten 2010) and both indicators have been used as measures of 
educational attainment in a country. To obtain a proxy of the 
educational level that covers the entire period of the data set, both 
indicators have been combined into one spliced indicator: The 
logarithm of average years of schooling has been linearly regressed on 
numeracy, and then the average years of schooling are predicted using 
the numeracy value, when the average years of schooling are not 
available. Otherwise, the original value of the years of schooling is left 
in place. 
 
Sources: 
Van Leeuwen, B., J. Van Leeuwen-Li, and P. Foldvari (2013): 
“Average Years of Education, 1850-2010,” Version 2, Clio Infra 
Project, available at: www.clio-
infra.eu/Indicators/AverageYearsofEducation.html 
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Baten J. (2013): “Numeracy Estimates (ABCC) by Birth Decade and 
Country,” Version 1, Clio Infra Project, available at: www.clio-
infra.eu/Indicators/NumeracyTotal.html 
 
Conflict Dummy 
Dummy variable, taking on value 1 if an internal or international armed 
conflict took place in the decade and 0 otherwise. It was constructed 
using the two indicators provided in the following datasets: 
 
Armed internal conflicts, 1500-2000, Peter Brecke and Peter Foldvari, 
2013, Version 1, Clio Infra Project, link: www.clio-
infra.eu/Indicators/ArmedconflictsInternal.html 
 
Armed external conflicts, 1500-2000, Peter Brecke and Peter Foldvari, 
2013, Version 1, Clio Infra Project, link www.clio-
infra.eu/Indicators/ArmedConflictsInternational.html 
 
Legal Origin UK 
Following the classification of LaPorta et al. (2008), the following 
countries are considered of British/English legal origin: Australia, 
Canada, India, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars (conversed 
by the author).  
Source: Bolt, J. and J. L. Van Zanden (2013): “The First Update of the 
Maddison Project: Re-Estimating Growth before 1820,” Clio Infra 
Project, Link: www.clio-infra.eu/Indicators/GDPperCapita.html 
Gini Coefficient 
Baten, J., J. L. Van Zanden, M. Moatsos, P. Foldvari and B. van 
Leeuwen (2014): „Gross household income Gini 1820-2000“, Version 
1, Clio Infra Project, available at www.clio-
infra.eu/Indicators/IncomeInequality.html 
Total Trade 
Volume 
Sum of imports and exports, extracted from Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set, Version 4.0 
1870 – 2014, Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk 
Both imports and exports are measured in current US millions of 
dollar. 
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E. Summary and Outlook 
 
Together, the chapters of this thesis contribute to the ongoing effort of shedding light on the 
dynamics of violence and violent crime in human societies. The first contribution to the literature 
is the extension of the available data both for Mexico and the world, reconstructing the 
development of violent crime rates back until the beginning of the 20th century. Secondly, this 
thesis has assessed the determinants of the long run development of violent crime in Mexico and 
the world with a special focus on the role of deterrence and natural resources. A number of 
conclusions can be drawn from the results that are common across all chapters: 
The importance of economic development and the general income level for reducing the 
incentives to commit crime has been corroborated. As the rational choice theory of crime 
developed by Gary Becker (1968) predicts, higher income levels imply higher opportunity costs, 
and therefore, criminal options become unattractive for a large part of society. This implies that 
rising income levels in the poorer countries of the world today would not only reduce poverty, 
but has a number of positive side effects such as reducing crime rates. However, if inequality 
increases alongside with income, then the positive side effects might not be as pronounced, since 
higher inequality has been shown to be a crime increasing factor. This result supports several of 
the sociological theories that predict a higher crime level if society is divided and heterogeneous 
(see for example Merton 1968).  
The second consolidated result of the chapters is the fact that there is no evidence for 
deterrence in any of the setups, using the death penalty as indicator of the severity of the 
punishment. In the case of Mexico, it could be shown that the quality of the law enforcement 
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system is much more effective in deterring crime by increasing the likelihood of apprehension 
and receiving the punishment. While even the most severe punishment cannot have a deterrent 
effect if it is not consequently imposed, a mild punishment can deter crime if it is imposed with 
certainty. These results imply that an effective anti-crime measure is an increase in the 
probability of being detained so that it appears in the cost-benefit analysis of offenders and 
significantly reduces the expected utility of the crime. To achieve this, it is necessary to improve 
the policing, law enforcement and judicial systems instead of reverting to the traditional demand 
of tougher punishment in the face of increasing crime rates. 
In Mexico, in the recent years, the strategy of fighting crime has been heavy militarization 
and the passing of a law that grants the military unprecedented policing abilities (Chávez 
Courtright 2018). This naturally comes along with the killing of innocent bystanders, subsequent 
impunity of the military forces and even more violence in the aftermath. In places that were 
targeted by military operations, the homicide rates have increased even more (ProDH Center 
2017). Hence, instead of improving the economic and educational conditions, strengthening 
civilian institutions, and establishing a strong rule of law, the government turned to more 
violence to combat the symptoms of the problem. The root causes however remain overlooked. 
At the same time, the passing of the new law could worsen the situation around Mexico’s 
natural resource extraction (Chávez Courtright 2018). Environmental defenders have always 
faced oppression and violence in the past (Estévez 2017), but the use of the military in internal 
affairs could exacerbate the problem. This is another example of how the presence of natural 
resource extraction leads to heightened violence levels, just as shown in the second part of this 
thesis. Since violence is a mean to prevail over others in the conflicts over natural resources, the 
extraction of natural resources has to be administered using a democratic and public approach in 
order to prevent violent outbursts. Other contexts where violence emerging around natural 
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resource extraction is highly topical are the illegal and legal logging of mahogany in Honduras 
(Environmental Investigation Agency 2005), mineral mining in Nicaragua and Guatemala, 
chrome mining in Zimbabwe, titanium extraction in South Africa and oil palm plantations in the 
Philippines. In all of these cases, natural resource extraction is accompanied by protests, 
assassinations and violent confrontation. 
My hope is, that some of the insights developed in this thesis will be used in the future as 
a basis to rethink anti-crime measures, and to implement more effective strategies that can 
improve living conditions in the countries suffering from the detrimental burden of violent crime.  
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